Why the 1945 Japanese Army Coup Against Emperor Hirohito Failed

When Japan surrendered on the 15th of August 1945, not everybody there was happy about it. Well, nobody was exactly happy about losing the war, but there were some there who were even less pleased about the surrender and the great feelings of shame that came with it. In fact, when talks of surrender picked up pace in early August, some officers within the army took it upon themselves to overthrow the government and install a hardline one which would continue the war. However, this coup went terribly and within the space of a day, it had failed. The emperor had broadcast his speech announcing Japan's unconditional surrender and those who would try to prevent it were inconvenienced. But given how strong

Japanese feelings towards surrender were, why did the coup aimed at keeping Japan fighting fail? Why couldn't it stop the emperor from giving in to the allies? So, as you'll know, by July 1945, things weren't exactly going great for Japan. The Philippines had just been liberated by the United States. The remnants of its navy were doing poorly, and most importantly, the Italians had just declared war. Now there were very few people in Japan who believed that this war would end in anything other than complete and utter defeat. The major disagreements were about what this defeat would look like exactly and what would become of Japan afterwards. The allies helpfully cleared this up when

they issued the potam declaration in which the United States, Britain and China made clear the terms of surrender that they would accept unconditional. Obviously for many in both the Japanese government and the military this was unthinkable. The idea that Japan itself would be occupied by foreign powers who hadn't earned the right by at least conquering it was obscene. One of the most famous points in Japanese history was its repelling of the invasion by the Mongol Empire under Kubla Khan. And so to give up without even trying to resist an American invasion was seen as cowardly and as a betrayal of Japan's

national honor. Not to mention that the Japanese army were fully aware that the Germans had fought to the bitter end and that the Italians had at least waited until the Allies had landed on the mainland before throwing in the towel and joining them. Alongside this, the status of the emperor or more broadly the monarchy in the imperial institution itself was undefined. The Japanese wanted guarantees that the emperor or at the very least his heirs would remain on the throne. They went to the Soviets as intermediaries who told them to go away and said that if Moscow's allies demanded unconditional surrender, then unconditional surrender it would have to be. And so for the vast majority of the

Japanese who revered the emperor, this was seen as a step too far. Meaning that resistance to the idea of surrender increased massively because nobody wanted to be the ones in charge when the 2 and a half thousand-year-old monarchy came to an end. As you'll probably have guessed, the Japanese government at the time was torn on what to do in response to the Allied demand for surrender. On the one hand, they all knew that victory was impossible. But on the other hand, if defeat was actually inevitable, surely it should be as costly for their enemy as humanly possible. This fierce divide led to very heightened tensions within the halls of power. For example, Canara Zuzuki, the prime minister, was

desperately pushing for peace and believed that this moment was Japan's best. Churchill had just been kicked out of office. The Soviets were still neutral and there was enough of a military left to make continuing the war a costly endeavor. Whereas Korajica Anami, the war minister, believed that the Allied terms were far too harsh. And he argued that the Germany that Japan had allied with had been completely eradicated and that such a fate couldn't be allowed to befall Japan. Furthermore, the military that he represented believed that surrender came after occupation and not before. And in the middle was Shigenorito, the foreign minister, who believed that the allies would be flexible on the harsher points

once Japan had actually surrendered. His immediate concern though was the Japanese people revoling if they learned what the terms of surrender were. And so we convinced the cabinet to publish the potam declaration minus the bits about unconditional surrender, disarming Japan and the whole trials for war criminals bits because they made them nervous. The government's response to the allied demands for surrender was the infamous mousatu. That is no comment. The problem was that the government saw this response as give us a minute whilst we think of what to do. But the allies saw it as that's so dumb we're not even going to dignify it with the response which to nobody's surprise angered the

allies and in turn led to Harry Truman authorizing the use of atomic weapons against the Japanese to see if that would convince them. A little over a week later, both Hiroshima and Nagasaki were destroyed. And to make matters even worse, the Soviet Union declared war, citing the complete lack of attempt by the Japanese to make peace. These two things combined spurred the Japanese government into action and would make surrender the obvious next choice. But fun fact, no. You see, the military and some of the cabinet believed that the Allies probably didn't have any more nuclear weapons, and that the demands for unconditional surrender were actually a clever ruse to hide their own

weakness, and that if Japan would simply hold out, the Allies would soon back down. As a result, they accepted surrender, but on the following conditions. First, that the emperor remain on the throne. Second, that Japan would oversee its own disarmament. Third, that the home islands wouldn't be occupied. And fourth, that there would be no trials for war criminals. Suzuki and those on his side pushed for just maintaining the emperor bit, which Hirohito agreed to, and they let the United States know. The Allies promptly rejected it because that's not what unconditional means. The Allied rejection set off alarm bells across the army, and many of its officers now believe that the Allies would seek to dominate Japan and make it an American

puppet republic. As such, some mid-ranking officers started to move troops into Tokyo since they believed that only a coup could now stop the surrender. And whilst a coup against the emperor might seem like an extreme reaction, it's important to note that there was precedent for what they were doing. The 1930s were a tumultuous time for Japan with the army, the navy, the civilian government, and the emperor all vying for power. And during this, things got out of hand. Hardliners in the army, and the navy attempted numerous coups against the government to secure their respective control over the country. But these coups failed every single time, mostly due to the fact that the army, or at least the rest of it, wasn't on

board. Now, you'd be forgiven for expecting in Imperial Japan that these coup attempts would be punished severely. But you'd be mostly wrong. The vast majority of those involved were barely punished at all. In fact, when the motives of hyper nationalist imperialistic emperor worshiing militarism became clear, the public seemed to agree. Also, by routinely stopping the coups against the emperor, the army's role in government became much more prominent, meaning that they kind of got what they wanted. Anyway, going back to 1945, Major Kenji Hatanaka, the coup's leader, asked Minister Anami if he would join them in their little coup, to which he said nothing. But also, he didn't turn them in or try to dissuade them from doing anything, which they took as a green

light. Over the following days, the plotters moved some more of their troops into Tokyo and finalize what the coup's objectives were. The plan was to first seize the Imperial Palace and to capture the emperor. If the emperor wanted to surrender, then having his support would guarantee success. And if not, then he was either too weak or perhaps not mentally well enough to remain in place. And so his son, who would be young enough to make a puppet out of, would be elevated in hisstead. After this, the prime minister and anyone against continuing the war, would be sent to the next life. And once this was done, the rest of the army would inevitably join them. Thus meaning that Japan was free

to continue fighting a losing war at unimaginable cost. Anyway, on the 14th of August, the prime minister called an imperial conference, basically a fancy a war council to press for the acceptance of surrender. It was here that Emperor Hiito personally broke the deadlock and agreed to unconditional surrender. Now, the emperor's intervention is often presented as an incredibly rare act. The idea being that the emperor was supposed to be a silent observer at the war councils. However, this wasn't the case. Over the course of the war, he routinely made note of how Japan's glorious victories were getting closer and closer to home. However, Hirohito knew that without his personal intervention, this

wasn't going to get resolved, and he was fully aware that nobody in the room was going to openly disagree. He then left the council to record a speech to the nation announcing the surrender for later broadcast. Upon hearing of the impending capitulation, those trying to stop it knew that they had to act. Now, this coup was technically in opposition to the emperor's personal views, but it was justified as him being tricked by weak, treasonous advisers. They ordered their troops into the Imperial Palace and tried to convince Teeshi Mori, the head of the Imperial Guard there, to join them. He was promptly shot for refusing, and Hatanaka then faked an order from him, telling the Imperial

Guard, to lock down the palace and find the recording. There were however some problems. Whilst they were able to occupy the palace, they couldn't find the emperor or his recording. This was mostly because none of the lights were on because of air raids. The emperor and his recordings were both in a bomb shelter under the palace, whereas the prime minister had been tipped off and successfully fled. When news of the coup got out, the high-ranking army officers around Tokyo quickly moved in to put it down. And with the rest of the army against them, it became clear that the coup had failed. They tried one last time getting war minister and army on board, but he was too busy offering

himself to be of any help. Thus, the leaders agreed to stand down and were subsequently told that they were free to go to do what was expected of soldiers that had acted dishonorably, an expectation that they would meet. Well, most of them at least. Anyway, with the coup over, the emperor's broadcast confirming Japan surrender to the Allies went out at midday. And soon afterwards, World War II was well and truly over, and the fate of the soon-to-be occupied Japan lay in the hands of the Allied high command, who would ultimately prove Shigenor Togo's predictions right to a degree. Japan was disarmed, but war crime prosecutions were much more lenient there than in Germany. And

because getting rid of him would be far too hard, the Allies kept the emperor on the throne. And so, if they had just said that, then a lot of trouble could have been avoided. I hope you enjoyed this episode with a special thanks to my patrons James Bizernet, Sky Chappelle, Katoitzka, Gustaf Swan, Marvin Cassau, Winston Kwood, Anthony Beckett, Wyan Hockey, Alex Schwin, Andy McGee, Paul H. Murza Armad, AF Firefly, Copper Tone, Uduan Wang, Shuen, L Diamond, Rod D. Martin, The McWer, Captain Sydog, Spencer Lightfoot, Respectable Level of Chaos, Robert C. Perkins, the Flying Deutsland, Castle Bravo, Kimoon Yun, Michael Halbert, Raj Mahana, Panica,

Starry Knights, Kitro, The Jim Stannom, Bonnie Bounds, Jim Sternberg, Remco Hoistman, Charles the First, Bet Kabot, and Lord Beak.