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The Great Lakes of North America are among the largest bodies of fresh water on Earth. Covering over 94,000 square miles, these five vast lakes form an inland waterway that stretches for over a thousand miles across the United States and Canada. But despite their name, these are not ordinary lakes at all. These are vast inland seas capable of generating fierce storms, hurricane-force winds, and towering waves that have sunk thousands of ships. The largest and deepest among them is Lake Superior, covering nearly 32,000 square miles with a depth of over 1,300 feet. Its icy waters and unpredictable November storms have made it one of the most dangerous waterways in North America. On November 10, 1975, one of the largest bulk carriers
operating on the Great Lakes, the 729-foot Edmund Fitzgerald, battled a powerful storm while carrying more than 26,000 tons of iron ore. Shortly after 7:10 p.m., the massive vessel disappeared from radar. So what happened aboard the Edmund Fitzgerald in those final hours? How could a massive steel bulk carrier disappear so suddenly without any distress signal? And do we really know, after more than 50 years of investigation, what sent the Edmund Fitzgerald to the bottom of Lake Superior?
Let's try to figure it out. Hello, I'm Mike Roberg, a Marine Corps veteran and filmmaker, and we'll try to answer these questions on today's episode of Forgotten History. The beginning of the most difficult 26 days in the history of the Marine Corps With confidence in our armed forces. The 36th President of the United States died this afternoon. There are women and children here, and they canceled it. On the morning of November 9, 1975, the Edmund Fitzgerald was loading at the dock in Superior, Wisconsin, on the western edge of Lake Superior.
Taconite pellets, obtained from iron ore for use in the steel industry, were loaded into the ship's cargo hold. By early afternoon, the Fitzgerald had taken on more than 26,000 long tons of cargo. The destination was Zug Island on the Detroit River. To get there, one had to cross Lake Superior and go through the Soo Locks to the lower lakes. The Fitzgerald was built for just such a job. Launched in 1958, the 729-foot-long dry bulk carrier transported raw materials to the region's steel mills for years. The wheelhouse was located near the bow, far ahead of the engine room and aft rooms. Between them ran a long cargo deck, equipped with 21
hatches. After loading, crew members installed steel covers to protect the cargo hold from water that could roll over the deck. Captain Ernest McSorley commanded a crew of 29, including himself. McSorley was 63 years old and had served as captain since 1951. He assumed command of the Fitzgerald in 1972. The senior officers also had extensive experience working on the Great Lakes. Stormy weather was a common part of their work, especially at the end of the shipping season. At about 2:15 p.m. that day, the Fitzgerald departed Superior. Another loaded dry cargo ship, the Arthur M.
Anderson, departed Two Harbors, Minnesota, later that day, bound for Gary, Indiana. Under the command of Captain Jesse B. Cooper, the Anderson was also to cross the Superior towards the Sioux Locks. The captains established radio contact while heading across the lake. A McSorley and Cooper discussed the weather and chose a route closer to the Canadian coast, where land could provide protection from the expected winds. This was not an established precaution among Great Lakes captains. From there, the ships turned southeast toward Whitefish Bay. As darkness fell on the lake, both dry cargo ships continued their journey along the
northern route, with the Anderson continued eastward along the northern part of Lake Superior. At 1:00 a.m. on November 10, the Fitzgerald reported wind speeds of 52 knots, approximately 60 mph, and wave heights of about 10 feet. An hour later, the National Weather Service issued a storm warning. The captains had chosen a northern route to shelter their ships from the worst of the storm, but to reach Whitefish Bay they would eventually have to turn southeast, leaving this protection behind and exposing their ships to the full force of the storm. The faster Fitzgerald took the lead around 3:00 that morning. By the time McSorley sent his morning report to the company, he could no longer give an exact time of arrival at the Su Locks. Now the weather
set the pace of the journey. Near Michipicoten Island, Cooper steered Anderson further west to give his ship more room before turning southeast. McSorley was already further ahead. The Fitzgerald was rocking, he reported, but it would keep moving. Their courses diverged, and by mid-afternoon the Anderson was about 16 miles behind. Around 3:30 p.m., McSorley called Cooper. A section of railing was demolished and two vents were lost or damaged. The Fitzgerald got a list. The loaded dry cargo ship tilted to one side as it continued through the storm. McSorley slowed down and asked Cooper to stay with him until they reached Whitefish.
Reducing speed gave Anderson a chance to close the gap, but it also meant a longer path to cover. Cooper asked if the pumps were still working. McSorley confirmed that both are working. The Fitzgerald was now moving forward Anderson approaching from behind. McSorley then reported another malfunction. Both of the Fitzgerald's radars failed. It was around 4:10 p.m. that day, less than an hour after McSorley's report of the damage. He was already trying to deal with the ship's roll when he lost the equipment that allowed officers to identify the coastline and nearby vessels in poor visibility. McSorley asked Anderson to follow him and provide navigational information for the rest of the journey. Cooper could still see the Fitzgerald on the
radar. Located a few miles behind, Anderson was to help steer the damaged ship toward Whitefish Bay. McSorley also sought information about the radio beacon at Whitefish Point. His signal could be another way to check the course towards the cape. At around 4:39 p.m., the Coast Guard at Grand Mare Station confirmed that the lighthouse was out of service. The Fitzgerald would have to continue on its journey without him. Between 17:00 and 17:30, McSorley contacted the Swedish cargo ship Avafors, which was heading north. The pilot on that ship saw the Whitefish Point fire, although the radio beacon remained off. The beacon still marked the approach if the Fitzgerald could reach a point where it could be seen through the weather.
During the conversation, McSorley apparently turned to someone on his vessel, leaving the radio on transmission. Those listening on the Avaforce heard him ordering people not to go on deck. Then followed an incomprehensible dialogue regarding the vent. After that, McSorley reported a severe list and heavy waves rolling onto the deck. He called these conditions some of the worst he had ever encountered. The next position report indicated that the Fitzgerald was approximately 35 miles from Whitefish Point. Even after hours of struggling to get to the bay, McSorley still had to travel that distance on a damaged ship without working radar. the Anderson that he intended to pass about 2.5 miles off the coast of Whitefish Point before
entering the relatively safe Whitefish Bay. Cooper was forced to maintain control of his own ship. South of Caribou Island, he later described waves as high as 18 to 25 feet. The crew of the Anderson continued to monitor the position of the Fitzgerald, maneuvering themselves among those waves. At around 6:20 p.m., the ships rechecked their courses. McSorley kept a course to the southeast, and Anderson continued to follow. Their radio communications maintained communication between the two crews as they approached Whitefish Point. Cooper could provide McSorley with the necessary route information, but the successful arrival in the bay depended on whether the Fitzgerald could stay afloat for the rest of the journey.
Shortly before 7:00 PM that evening, the Anderson encountered two waves that Cooper remembered in particular detail. According to Cooper, the first wave covered the ship from behind and passed forward along the deck, pressing the bow into the water. The Anderson rose from the water only to be hit by another large wave. Cooper watched as the waves continued to move in the direction of the Fitzgerald. He later suggested that they may have caused her death, but he did not see what happened to the ship ahead. At about 7 o'clock, Anderson located the Fitzgerald about 10 miles ahead and slightly east of her course.
The distance between the ships had been decreasing since midday. Ten minutes later, Anderson's first mate, Morgan Clark, contacted Fitzgerald about a ship heading north ahead. McSorley wanted to know if he could safely pass him. Clark assured him that another ship would pass west of him. Before ending the conversation, Clark asked how things were going on the Fitzgerald. McSorley replied: " We're holding on." McSorley did not ask for help, and Clark ended the call, expecting to speak to the Fitzgerald again. At around 7:20 p.m., a radar check on Anderson showed no contact with the Fitzgerald. The strong
sea current had already interfered with the radar's operation earlier, temporarily obscuring the ship's position. This time, however, the lack of contact was accompanied by another disturbing observation. Visibility has improved. The lights along the shore were visible for over 20 miles, and the lights of another vessel were visible for 19 miles. The Fitzgerald should have been much closer than they were. Its lights were nowhere to be seen. " Anderson" called again, but received no answer. Cooper's crew repeatedly tried to contact the Fitzgerald, but each call went unanswered. Cooper then contacted other vessels in the area, asking if anyone had seen or heard the missing bulk carrier. He even ordered
the crew to check whether the Anderson radio was working properly no sign of the Fitzgerald. As the huge bulk carrier disappeared from radar and all attempts at communication proved futile, Cooper notified the US Coast Guard that the Edmund Fitzgerald was missing. By the time the Anderson reached the relative safety of Whitefish Bay, the Coast Guard was faced with a serious problem. There was no available rescue vessel that could safely reach the. The Coast Guard tugboat Naugatuck, based in Sault Ste. Marie, was unable to navigate the rough seas and was experiencing technical problems. The Woodrush, which was almost 300 miles away in Duluth, Minnesota, would have taken about 24 hours to reach the search area. With no Coast Guard vessels nearby to conduct an
immediate surface search, authorities turned to merchant vessels already on Lake Superior. Around 9:00 PM, the Coast Guard contacted Captain Cooper and asked if he could turn the Anderson around and begin searching for survivors. Cooper hesitated. He warned that the sea outside the bay was extremely rough and that the Anderson would only be able to go back at a speed of two or three miles per hour. The Coast Guard asked him to decide whether he could return without putting his vessel in undue danger. Cooper replied, "I'll try, but that's all I can do." The Anderson turned back toward open water and the ship shook and swayed as the crew searched for any signs of the missing cargo ship. The William Clay Ford also left Whitefish Bay to
help. The Coast Guard sent a plane and boats, but these vessels took time to reach the search area. In the first hours, the crews of nearby merchant ships took on the main burden of searching for their fellow sailors. The search found wreckage of the Fitzgerald, including damaged lifeboats, but no signs of survivors. Crews continued their search throughout the night. The next morning, the cargo ship Roger Blow discovered an inflatable raft near Cape Coppermine. The identification marks indicated that it belonged to the " Fitzgerald". As the search continued, crews found additional rescue equipment and debris, but none of the 29 men were found. On November 14, a Navy aircraft recorded a strong magnetic contact northwest of Cape Whitefish. Sonar
surveys have detected debris below, but searchers have not yet been able to examine it in sufficient detail to reconstruct the circumstances of the sinking. The last radio messages from the Fitzgerald ended on the surface. The next piece of evidence lay more than 500 feet beneath her. The following May, investigators returned with the His cameras were able to reach the crash site and capture what the storm left on the lake bottom. The cameras revealed the Fitzgerald as two huge sections resting in Canadian waters at a depth of about 530
feet. The bow stood vertically on the bottom. The stern was turned upside down. Between them, the middle part of the hull was torn to pieces. On the upturned stern, investigators were able to read the name of the ship. Investigators had to reconstruct the events, moving in the opposite direction from this damage. Did the hull break while the ship was still afloat, or did it collapse as the Fitzgerald sank? And what could have killed him so quickly after the last radio call? The Coast Guard's Maritime Board was leaning toward the version of gradual flooding due to hatches that could not hold back the water. As the waves covered the cargo deck, water entered the hold and accumulated. The extra weight lowered the ship lower, leaving the
deck more vulnerable to rough seas., this process continued until the Fitzgerald could no longer stay afloat. But previous injuries complicated this explanation. McSorley reported broken fasteners and a roll several hours before the disappearance. The council was unable to determine exactly what caused this damage. A collision of the vessel with the object or its separation on board was considered, as well as possible damage near the shoals north of Caribou Island. These versions could explain how flooding began in other parts of the ship, but none has been recognized as the initial event. The National Transportation Safety Board, in its May 1978 report, identified a different final stage. Due to the previous flooding, the Fitzgerald started to list and
sit deeper in the water. Then, a strong sea swell created enough pressure to destroy one or more of the hatch covers. Water poured into the cargo hold through the holes that had formed. The NTSB concluded that this final sinking was so rapid that the crew did not have time to send a distress signal. The NTSB also identified another contributing factor. In 1969, 1971, and 1973, changes to federal regulations allowed Great Lakes cargo ships to carry heavier loads, which allowed them to sink deeper into the water. This meant that the distance between the ship's deck and the lake surface decreased, making it easier for large waves to roll over the ship. Although the Fitzgerald was operating within its authorized tonnage, investigators
concluded that these regulatory changes made the ship more vulnerable to flooding during severe storms. Investigators also found that the Fitzgerald's huge cargo hold lacked watertight partitions dividing it into separate compartments. This meant that once water entered the hold, it could spread throughout the cargo area, instead of being confined to one section. Cooper believed that the Fitzgerald had passed dangerously close to the shallows near Caribou Island. The NTSB rejected the theory of grounding as a probable cause, based on the reconstructed route and the lack of relevant damage to the exposed aft part of the bottom. It was also concluded that the hull broke during the dive or after hitting the bottom, rather than splitting on the
surface. These were investigative conclusions made on the basis of incomplete evidence. The exact sequence of events was not observed by anyone. And McSorley's final report remained the last word from any of the 29 men. The commemoration began the morning after the disaster, early in the morning of November 11, 1975. Reverend Richard Engels came to the Seamen's Church in Detroit and rang the church bell 29 times, once for each man who died on the Edmund Fitzgerald. Then he knelt at the altar and prayed for the crew. The late Gordon Lightfoot spread this act of remembrance to listeners around the world in his song "The Death of Edmund Fitzgerald." On July 4, 1995, the expedition raised the bronze bell " Fitzgerald". It became a memorial at the
Great Lakes Shipwreck Museum at Whitefish Point, not far from the shelter the crew tried to reach. Each toll honored a person whose life extended beyond that final voyage, with years of work and relationships that were important to those who knew them. In remembering the Fitzgerald, we honor those 29 sailors and their families who cherish their memory. Share your thoughts on the tragedy of "Edmund Fitzgerald" in the comments below. I will put my life in a box. Something that will show you the way. Even if you're afraid to fight. There is light in the evening. If the moon doesn't rise, the sun stops shining, you'll know you'll have a light you Waiting for the right time, together we
will find it. There are no Thank you for watching "Forgotten History". Please like, share, and subscribe. If you have any comments or ideas for the show, we 'd love to hear them. Thank you again.
