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In 49 B.C.E., a provincial governor named Julius Caesar lead an armed insurrection against the Senate and People of Rome. He commanded 10 legions, which was a lot, and although they remained personally loyal to him, most of them were hunkered down all the way up in Gaul for the winter. Only one, the 13th Legion, was in any position to be of use in the short term. At half strength, the 13th only consisted of approximately 2,500 solders, and the moment these soldiers crossed into Italy, it amounted to a declaration of war.
Way up in Gaul, Caesar's close friend and right hand man Labienus had been left in charge of Caesar's legions in his absence. Labienus knew that there was a political back and forth going on in the south, but assumed that everything would be fine. Well, everything was not fine. When negotiations broke down, news started trickling in that Caesar had risen up in open rebellion and was in the process of marching on Rome.
Labienus was shocked. Let's not forget that up until this moment, Labienus's achievements in Gaul had been truly remarkable. He had spent the last 10 years leading semi-independent military operations in Caesar's name. Labienus was the only man Caesar trusted to take command of the Republic's largest army in his absence. In fact, I would argue that Labienus deserves half the credit for the conquest of Gaul. Unlike Caesar, Labienus actually lived on deployment with the legions, and unlike Caesar, Labienus military record was an unbroken string of victories.
Without any exaggeration, Labienus was up there with Pompey and Caesar as one of Rome's greatest living generals. And this fact may have caused some animosity. Had Labienus devoted the last 10 years to his own advancement rather than Caesar's, he would have been one of the most influential men in Rome. Now, Labienus was over 50, and if he was ever going to translate his military success into political power, it was going to be as one of Caesar's men.
Caesar noticed this shift in attitude. As time went on, he granted Labienus more and more independence, and gave every indication that the Gallic provinces would be his whenever Caesar returned to Rome. Finally, Labienus would get an independent command. Some whispered that the consulship might follow. But then, Caesar rose up in open rebellion against the Senate and People of Rome. From what we can tell, he didn't even bother to consult with Labienus before doing so. Labienus was angry. I would have been angry too.
Labienus had hitched his wagon to Caesar, and now Caesar had decided to foolishly run off a cliff. And it wasn't all about ambition. If we are to believe Labienus's surviving words, which, in fairness, come to us through biased sources, he considered taking up arms against the Senate morally repugnant. Absent any data to the contrary, I see no reason not to believe him. This was the most important decision of his life, and taking his reasoning behind it seriously is the least we can do. Without too much fuss, Labienus immediately left camp, accompanied by a large contingent of cavalry that were personally loyal to him.
He made no attempt to bring along any of Caesar's legions. Once free, Labienus publicly denounced Caesar as a traitor, and pledged his loyalty to the Senate. He would join up with the Pompeians in Italy. This was an unexpected blow to Caesar. The two had been close friends for at least 14 years, probably longer. Labienus had earned Caesar's absolute confidence. It was a big deal. But, for what it's worth, Labienus made no attempt to stab Caesar in the back by stealing his legions.
He could have, but he didn't. That's worth something. Caesar ordered his men back in Gaul to pack up Labienus's personal belongings and have them shipped to Italy. Some historians have described this as a callous reaction to the loss of a friend, but I don't see it that way at all. Labienus had lived in Gaul for 10 years, and then just walked away with nothing. To my eyes it's a small act of compassion to be like "sure, follow your conscience if you must, but you're going to need all your stuff once you get back to Italy." When Cicero learned that Labienus had defected from Caesar, he wrote: "Labienus seems to
have condemned a friend of his of a crime for the sake of the Republic." Continuing, he wrote: "I judge Labienus a hero. It has been a long time since a more glorious political move. If Labienus has accomplished nothing else, he has caused Caesar pain." I would add to Cicero's thoughts. If Labienus had accomplished nothing else, he had deprived Caesar of skilled lieutenant. In that respect, he was irreplaceable. When news traveled south, there was panic on the streets of Rome.
The Senate was as surprised as anybody. They had been keeping a close eye on Caesar's legions north of the Alps. If those legions moved, they told themselves, that meant that Caesar was gearing up for an invasion. Well, those legions hadn't moved. Caesar invaded anyways. Now, the recriminations began. The war-hawks in the Senate started pointing fingers, arguing that Pompey had walked them into this mess. It's not true, by the way. If anything, it was the other way around. The war-hawks walked Pompey into this mess. There were legions mustering to the south, but they wouldn't be ready for some time,
and even when they were, these raw recruits wouldn't stand much of a chance against Caesar's hardened legion. There were more experienced legions in Spain and Greece, but it would take months to get them over to Italy. In the defense of the Pompeians, it was winter, and they had assumed that they would have months to get ready. They were just wrong. In Rome, those who could packed up their belongings and fled the city. When Cicero learned that Caesar's march south was creating a steady stream of Roman refugees, he remarked: "are we talking about a Roman general here, or Hannibal?"
Pompey could see no way around it. He would not be able to mobilize a resistance in time. He would have to temporarily abandon the city of Rome. His reasoning was sound. He had access to the vast resources of Rome's provinces. He had more legions. He had more money. He had the Senate on his side. The longer this conflict continued, the stronger Pompey would become. Caesar's only hope was to force an early confrontation.
By pulling back, Pompey denied Caesar this opportunity. It was the right call, under the circumstances. But that doesn't mean it was popular. Being forced to abandon the capital isn't a great way to start a war. Rome's most prominent Senators violently disagreed with the decision. Cicero was particularly upset. He asked Pompey, whom he had been privately calling "the Senate's incompetent leader," if he intended to make a stand in southern Italy.
Pompey wouldn't give him a straight answer. Cicero reluctantly agreed to obey the Senate's order to abandon the city, but decided not to go with Pompey. He would remain in the Italian countryside, ready to return to Rome at a moment's notice. The young Senator Marcus Junius Brutus was also quite torn. On paper it should have been a no-brainer, since his beloved uncle was none other than the arch-Conservative Cato. But it was more complicated than that. Brutus's mother was Caesar's longtime mistress, and the two men seemed genuinely affectionate towards each other.
Plus, there was an additional wrinkle. When Brutus was a child, Pompey had personally ordered the death of his father. The hatred ran deep. To this day Brutus could barely bring himself to speak to the man. After intense period of soul searching, Brutus decided that the Republic's integrity was more important than his personal feelings. He pledged his loyalty to his father's killer, and accompanied Pompey into southern Italy. Domitius Ahenobarbus, another powerful senator, was angry.
Domitius was the guy who had been selected by the Senate to replace Caesar in Gaul whenever he resigned his command. Now, Domitius was one of the many that were furious at Pompey's decision to abandon the capital. Without bothering to consult with Pompey or the rest of the Senate, Domitius grabbed 10,000 militiamen and raw recruits, and marched north. He would stop Caesar's advance, or die trying. This was not as crazy as it might seem. Against Caesar's one half-strength legion, Domitius would have outnumbered him 4 to 1.
However, things had changed in the last few weeks. As soon as he crossed the Rubicon, Caesar split up his tiny legion and captured 5 cities in rapid succession, all uncontested. One of these detachments was lead by Marc Antony, who I would like to note was still technically a Tribune of the Plebs. Tribunes were forbidden to leave Rome while in office, and not only had Antony left the city, but here he was returning at the head of a rebel army.
Things were so chaotic at this time that it never even occurred to anybody to strip him of office. But they should've. Now that Caesar had a foothold in Italy, he ordered his legions north of the Alps to join him. He spent the rest of January capturing cities in the north. Apart from one tiny skirmish, all of the defending garrisons either fled or defected to his side. With reinforcements coming down from the north, and defectors coming up from the south, Caesar's one legion ballooned into 5 or 6. By early February, Domitius Ahenobarbus arrived at the town of Corfinium with 10,000 men, which equaled like two legions.
Caesar would have to pass this way before heading further south. Domitius knew that for him, this was probably a one way trip, but if everything went well it would give Pompey enough time to marshal his resources and march north, intercepting Caesar before he reached Rome. When Caesar's legions showed up outside the walls of Corfinium, the civilians inside the town immediately lost heart, and tried to surrender. Besieged, with no sign of support from Pompey, Domitius's 10,000 recruits and militiamen realized that this was a suicide mission.
They mutinied against their commander, opened the gates to the town, and hauled Domitius before Caesar. Domitius was humiliated. He begged for death, believing that the execution of a former consul would serve as a rallying cry for the rest of Italy. Instead, Caesar surprised everyone by publicly pardoning Domitius, and letting him walk away a free man. Caesar justifies his clemency by saying that he had no interest in alienating politicians or the public with unnecessary brutality.
If he was victorious, he wanted his victory to last, and to do that he would need the cooperation of his former enemies. That's the reason he gave. The real reason might be a little less high minded. When Domitius's 10,000 men discovered that Caesar had pardoned their former commander, many broke ranks, and volunteered to join Caesar's legions. Now, Domitius was angrier than ever. He immediately began planning a second high risk operation to save the Republic. He'd be back.
By now, Caesar now had approximately 6 legions in Italy, while Pompey was still struggling to rally 2 or 3 legions in the south. Pompey began to seriously consider abandoning the Italian peninsula. The Pompeians still held the overall advantage, even though locally, they were outnumbered. In time, the combined strength of the provinces would surely be enough to overpower Caesar's rebellion. With his mind made up, Pompey began to evacuate his army from southern Italy. Pompey marched his legions to the port city of Brundisium to make the crossing to Greece.
It didn't take long for Caesar to figure out what he was doing. He abandoned all of his previous plans, and made a beeline for southern Italy. By the time Caesar arrived, Pompey had occupied Brundisium, and half of his army had already sailed away. Caesar besieged the city, but a siege wouldn't do any good once Pompey's ships returned. He ordered a small fleet built, and used them to haul dirt and rocks and wood out into the harbor. They used the material to begin building a barrier, or a breakwater, to prevent the Pompeians from escaping.
Pompey couldn't let this happen. He responded by sending out ships of his own to slow down the construction. There was skirmishing back and forth for several days, and before Caesar could complete his breakwater, the Pompeian fleet returned. Pompey and the rest of his supporters set sail for Greece. They would live to fight another day. This was a missed opportunity for Caesar, but nevertheless, the Pompeian flight meant that Italy was now firmly under his control. It had been approximately two months since Caesar crossed the Rubicon. He was now finally free to enter Rome. The reception was not what he expected.
The place was a ghost town. Those who could had fled the city. Those who couldn't opted stayed indoors. After all, Caesar was a traitor, an enemy of the Republic, and people had good reason to expect a bloodbath. But Caesar wasn't here for blood. He needed something else. Upon entering the city, he immediately called for a meeting of the Senate. Rome's best and brightest had gone with Pompey, but there were a few senators still in the city. Caesar told this little makeshift Senate that he wanted access to Rome's treasury. He was desperate. He was already paying his legions with I.O.Us, and he would need to continue paying them for at least another year now that Pompey had escaped to Greece.
Caesar gave some B.S. justification for this request, saying that since Rome no longer had to worry about fighting the Gauls, the money previously spent on that should go to him instead. His reasoning didn't make any sense, but it didn't need to. None of the senators objected. In fact, none of the senators said anything. Caesar decided to interpret their silence as approval, which was not how voting worked, but whatever. Then, one of the few remaining Tribune of the Plebs, a guy named Metellus, summoned his courage and vetoed Caesar's request.
Caesar stormed out of the Senate house. He ordered his legionaries to occupy the forum, and lead a group of soldiers up to the Temple of Saturn, which housed the Roman treasury. When he got there, the temple was locked and boarded up. Metellus stood before the entrance, blocking Caesar's path and continuing to exercise his veto. Caesar approached Metellus, and told him that if he didn't get out of the way, he would order his men to murder him right there, before the gods and everyone. After a beat, Metellus decided to step aside. Caesar proceeded to plunder the Republic's treasury, and immediately began to settle up on his I.O.Us.
Up until this incident, Caesar had consistently argued that he was on the right side of the law. By coming into Rome and threatening to murder public officials, he demonstrated how untrue that was. The rule of law was dead. Rome was in the hands of a conquering warlord. Even though Caesar controlled Italy, he was still beset with enemies on all sides, which meant that he had an important decision to make. Pompey was in Greece with 2 or 3 legions, and was already rallying the combined strength of the east to his banner. Pompey also had 7 legions active in Spain, which were continuing to operate independently.
Caesar joked that to his west there was an army without a general, and to his east there was a general without an army. He could only deal with one of these threats at a time. But which would it be? East or west? After some deliberation, Caesar decided to head west, to deal with Spain first. Here was his reasoning. At this moment, Pompey was in no position to attack. If Caesar spent a year campaigning in Spain, Italy would be relatively safe. The opposite was not true. If Caesar spent a year campaigning in Greece, Italy would probably fall to the Spanish legions.
Spain was the immediate threat. Greece was the future threat. The immediate threat had to be dealt with first. This must have been an agonizing decision. Caesar understood that Pompey would become more and more powerful as the war dragged on. In his absence, Caesar would leave behind Marc Antony as the informal governor of Italy. Had things gone differently, this would have been Labienus's job, but he was with the Pompeians now, and Caesar needed a new #2 that he could rely on. For the moment, Antony was that man, although as we'll discover, good help is hard to find,
and Antony was no Labienus. Caesar prepared to split his army. He sent three legions to capture Sicily, with orders to continue on to Africa if they were successful. He sent another legion to capture Sardinia, which was close enough to Italy that they could return if something went wrong. Both of these expeditions would require naval support, which meant that Caesar would travel to Spain with his remaining 3 legions on foot.
Finally, he sent orders to his 6 remaining legions in Gaul, instructing them to break camp and get themselves to Spain as quickly as possible. They would beat him there, but that was fine, because time was of the essence. Every day Caesar spent in Spain, Pompey would be gathering strength in Greece.
