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What is it about this region that has kept America so involved for so long? Part of it is oil. Apparently, something goes back to the Carter Doctrine, aimed at securing oil supplies from the Middle East. Part of it is Israel, and not just pressure from it, but a kind of sentimental ideological attachment of many American politicians and many Americans to Israel. I think it definitely distorted American policy in the region, but I would also say that it's been decades since America had a truly consistent Middle East policy. George W. Bush had one, trying to bring democracy to the region.
It wasn't the best policy, it didn't work, but it was a comprehensive idea. I would say that every president since 2011 has been nothing but reactive since the beginning of the Arab Spring. Something is happening in the Middle East, America has to respond somehow, and so it intervenes, but what is the broader policy or goal that America is trying to achieve? No one really had an answer. And what's quite strange about this, what you point out in your briefing this week, Greg, is that America and the Middle East, or certain countries in the region, do not share the ideological views that America is trying
to impose. This is not like Europe after World War II. This is, you know, a kind of liberal democracy, the ideas that America claimed it was trying to bring during its various interventions. This is not something they are somehow working on together. It's a really strangely disjointed thing. I find myself wondering if this is partly a historical coincidence. I mean, it so happened that France and Britain took over parts of the Middle East after World War I, instead of fulfilling their promise to give Arab countries independence as a reward for fighting on their side. And then after the Suez Crisis, it became clear that Britain and France didn't really have the means to manage this. And somehow America seems to have inherited this.
I mean, I wonder if they had gained independence back in the 1920s, would the whole history of the region have been completely different. Also, let's give the countries of the region some agency in this. Why was America so involved in the Persian Gulf region? Because the Gulf states themselves wanted it, because they were happy to delegate their security to the United States and make this "oil for security" deal with the US. So, it wasn't just the Americans who did this. It was also a number of Arab countries that encouraged it. And, of course, Israel has welcomed America's involvement and support in the Middle East on many occasions.
So, in other words, once you start delegating your security, it's very difficult to take it back. Yes. And, as you said, oil was critically important, because in the 70s and 80s, America was an oil importer. She desperately needed this region. It does n't need it now, because it has its own reserves and can even export, and the Persian Gulf is more of a competitor in this sense, but I still believe that America is interested in controlling global energy supplies. She is still interested in Israel's security. And if you're trying to secure Israel, you need to protect it from its enemies, and its main enemy is Iran. So while I think we're seeing a trajectory of American withdrawal-they're out of Syria, they're out of Iraq, they're reducing their
presence in the Gulf. I also think we need to take a look at reality, and maybe America is deciding that its military is not the best form of intervention. It can get a much better return on its money, and sanctions are still having a huge impact on the region. So while the military withdrawal and the removal of the "security umbrella" are true, it still affects the lives of millions of people across the region. Well, you're talking about Iran. Let's look at this and how the outcome of the war affects how this vacuum is filled. And, as you say, there is pressure on America to continue to intervene, even if it doesn't play this overarching role.
Nick, tell us a little bit about what state you think the regime is in, how stable it is, and whether it is likely to become stronger and more ambitious after this war is over. This question is the hardest to answer right now, as this regime is still in a state of reconfiguration. Previously, we could hear speeches from the Supreme Leader. We knew what he was thinking, how he pitted one Iranian faction against another, how he was in many ways the ultimate arbiter. And now we don't have such a supreme arbiter. We do not know the condition of the Supreme Leader's son and successor, Mojtaba Khamenei. We didn't see him. We have n't heard anything about him. He was nominated and
appointed in March, and, you know, almost half a year has passed, and we still haven't seen him. So I think one of the problems with trying to make a deal is that there is still a power struggle going on in Iran, and who controls this deal will be critical to the future of Iran. So, we know that there are different factions. We know that they don't agree with each other on everything. They probably all agree on suppressing domestic dissent, but the question is how they are going to negotiate with America-whether by escalating to gain more leverage, or by trying to take Trump's word, which has proven unreliable in the past, and make a deal now. I think this question remains open. So until the issue of succession in Iran is resolved, it is quite
possible that no one will sign any agreement. Greg, tell us a little bit about how you think the Gulf states' response will change depending on how strong they perceive Iran to be after the war. A strong Iran means one thing, a weak Iran means another. Just explain this calculation to me. Well, in general, we can say that a strong Iran capable of maintaining control over the Strait of Hormuz is perceived by the Gulf countries as something bad, and this will force them to negotiate more often, regardless of what happens between the US and Iran. At some point, the Gulf countries may have to negotiate. Negotiate with Iran? With Iran, to restart their economies, to establish the movement of goods. If Iran is greatly weakened or if
the regime collapses, then in a sense it is good for the Gulf, because this threat disappears. On the other hand, it creates a risk for the Gulf, because if Iran implodes from within, becomes a "failed state, " as we've seen in Syria, Iraq, or elsewhere, it will create all sorts of dangers: non-state actors, refugee flows, things that will really worry the Gulf states. So the outcome of the war, whatever it may be, is of concern to the Gulf countries. The only question is, are these short-term problems or long-term ones? Josie, how concerned are you that a strong Iran will start rebuilding and rearming all those groups that caused so many problems before the war?
We saw Hezbollah, we saw the Houthis, we saw, um, the militias in Iraq. They all played an important role not only in this war, but also, apparently, in all the wars that lasted both the last 3 years and before that. Um, and Iran was funneling huge amounts of money and weapons to these various groups, and they were a hugely important part of how it was asserting its power across the region in its dealings with Israel. And while these groups have certainly been weakened-whether by Israeli attacks on Hezbollah or simply by the fact that they have been fighting for so long -I think a strong Iran will certainly want to reassert its influence in this way, especially if it sees America retreating, creating a vacuum and more opportunities for a regional power
to assert itself. You mentioned the word "vacuum" already, and I think it's very clear now, especially from the events in Iran and from Nick's reporting and analysis of the situation there, that there is no vacuum in the region. When Israel and America think they have beheaded the Iranian leadership, it very quickly recovers, re- emerges, and suppresses dissent, even if it is weakened, even if it is not the same people who were at the very top just a few months ago. This power, this resilience still exists, there is no vacuum, and the same, I believe, applies to some of the Iranian puppets in the region. Israel had the illusion that it had destroyed Hezbollah at the end of 24.
Yes, Hezbollah has been weakened, but it is still stronger than the Lebanese government and still able to hold its own when, you know, when it is pushed against the wall. We have seen this over and over again in this region. There is no vacuum there. I think America will leave, and there will be some kind of power vacuum. No, there will be no vacuum. There are forces out there ready to occupy, you know, fill that space and compete for the same hegemony that America had, or at least that we thought America had in the past.
