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Once upon a time, there lived two princes in two kingdoms. Apparently they had a lot in common. If you look at Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, these are two countries with enormous natural resources and the wealth that comes from them. Both are ruled by monarchs. Both are Muslim countries. They really have a lot in common. They have many common interests and are led by two people- Muhammad ibn Salman in Saudi Arabia and Mohammed ibn Zayed in the UAE-who also have many common traits. They were both younger brothers who were not always prophesied to become rulers. They developed a relationship in which MBZ in the UAE was a mentor. They cooperate in certain areas of foreign policy.
Together they entered Yemen in 2015. They united together against Qatar. So, historically, these two countries, which are geographically very close and similar in many ways, have had a fairly close relationship. But recently they have started to get worse So Greg, what went wrong? I don't think we'll ever know the full truth about what changed, because the royal courts in this region are very opaque, but overall, I think two things happened. First, a personal enmity arose between the two rulers MBS in Saudi Arabia sees himself as the head of the largest Gulf country, the largest Gulf economy, someone he sees as the natural leader of this region, and so he wanted to lead the process. He wanted
to determine the direction not only of Saudi foreign policy, but also of the foreign policy of the Gulf as a whole. And I think the MBS in the UAE is starting to take offense, he sees his country as a more dynamic, significant middle power, and he doesn't like taking orders from the junior crown prince of Saudi Arabia. So, that's one part of the problem. But these are also countries that view foreign policy and security very differently. Saudis are an integral part of the Arab and Muslim world. They want to be leaders in this region and have a very traditional view of foreign policy, where state sovereignty is above all else. This is the most important thing. The UAE sees it differently. They are happy to make deals with countries outside the region.
In fact, very often they seek to look beyond the Arab and Muslim world. They are willing to work with non-state actors, separatist republics, and other entities that are not traditional states. And it sees itself as a center for finance, travel, and trade, and that is the foundation of its foreign policy. Whereas the Saudis have a much more, again traditionalist view of the world. Let's try to understand this a little And I think I want to try to take different aspects of their conflict and look at how it manifests itself in individual countries. I would like to start with security and Greg in Yemen because they have a
common interest, but they seem to express it differently. They have a common interest. Both of them would like the Houthis to no longer rule large parts of Yemen. But of course, the disagreement is how to advance this common interest? Throughout the Cold War, Yemen was two countries. There was the north, which was first a religious monarchy, and then became a dictatorship. And there was the south, which was a communist state. In fact, it was the only communist state in the Middle East until 1990, when the two Yemens united. The Saudi position is that Yemen's unity is very important. Again, going back to this idea of sovereignty. So, they want to work with factions in Yemen that seek to preserve the unity of the country to fight the
Houthis. The Emirates see it differently. The Emirates looked at Yemen and decided that among their most useful allies there were the separatists in the south, the so-called Southern Transitional Council, a group that advocates for South Yemen to become an independent country again. It was with them that the UAE decided to cooperate. Ultimately, Saudi- and UAE-backed forces in Yemen clashed over this issue of separatism. The Saudis prevailed and subsequently forced the UAE to limit its support for these factions in Yemen. But in the future, this split still persists. So in this case, they have a common interest, but they allowed their rivalry to take over, which hurt both of them. Leno, they also have commercial interests and concerns,
particularly regarding access to ports and waterways. Tell me a little about it. As Greg said, the Saudis are largely a state that seeks to maintain the status quo. They were quite interested in cooperating with the state of Sudan, which they saw as represented by the army, even though there were always questions about how stable it was. Whereas the UAE decided that the USR was actually a better partner in terms of finding someone who would represent their commercial interests. So, to understand the commercial interests of the UAE: they have investments in ports and infrastructure along the coast that they are very concerned about and for which they seek local forces that will support their investment interests in these places
. Whereas for the Saudis, as Greg said, the Red Sea is much more of a security issue. They believe that for them Sudan is across the sea. That's pretty close. It is only about 200 km in the narrowest part of the sea. And since the war with Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz, which both the Saudis and the Emiratis depended on to export their oil, I think this security aspect has become much more important to the Saudis' commercial interests in the Red Sea as well, because they now use it as an outlet for their oil exports. So this concern has increased significantly. So here we see that security is a particular concern of the Saudis, while initially, at least, commercial interests were the concern of the Emiratis. I mean, this is an incredibly stupid approach to
commerce. You know, Emiratis can be and would be desirable investors in many peaceful places. But what's happening here is that if there are three things in the world that make wars last longer, it's climate change, corruption, and complexity. And you can't blame the Emiratis for climate change, but in Sudan they are definitely part of the other two. So the war between these two, essentially, very criminal forces, the army and the even more criminal USSR, is largely about looting. Hemedti runs gold mines. The fact that he now has many commercial connections in the Persian Gulf makes it easier for them to launder the proceeds from this. This fuels the conflict, giving combatants more incentive to continue fighting. And then the difficulty: when
you have multiple players, and Sudan was quite difficult from the start. When you have multiple warring parties in a war, research shows that it's simply harder to resolve because there are more variables, more people to satisfy in order to end it. So in pursuit of these narrow commercial goals that they could be pursuing in many other places, they have caused humanitarian and Another concern, I think, a long-term concern for the Emiratis, Greg, is the desire to be able to secure Tell me a little about it. In fact, it worries everyone in the Persian Gulf. This is obviously a very inhospitable region. It's impossible to grow much food here.
They depend on imports from abroad. That's why in recent years we've seen Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and all the big players in the Gulf investing heavily, especially in the Horn of Africa, buying up arable land that they see as key to their future . Here, for example, is the case of the UAE: they have acquired large tracts of land in Sudan along the Nile River, very fertile land, which is then used or should be used to grow crops that are exported to the Gulf. And this became an arena for competition between the Gulf states on the Horn. This has become a problem for governments, farmers, and citizens in the Horn of Africa as all this arable land is being bought up.
All of these water resources are used to grow food that is ultimately not intended for the needs of the people living in these countries, but is to be exported to the GCC countries. And I think this is a great example of how suicidal this rivalry between the UAE and the Saudis is for both Gulf countries as it unfolds in the Horn of Africa. A very compelling argument can be made that they should stop intervening because of the scale of the humanitarian crisis they are causing. And that would be enough to argue that they should change their foreign policy. Governments do not always act on such altruistic arguments, but there is strong evidence that their foreign policies have a suicidal effect on themselves.
I mean, this whole " farmland buying" strategy was flawed from the start. There is no food shortage in the world. If you have money, you can get food. What they really should have been worried about was the safety of the sea routes through which they imported products. They can buy them anywhere. So the idea that you have to control large swaths of arable land makes no sense. Especially if you incite war and ultimately cause famine in the place you occupied.
