16:05
By the end of the First World War, warfare had been changed forever by tanks, modern artillery, rifles, machine guns, airplanes, poison gas, and all the other novel methods of killing. Common wisdom says cavalry was useless in this new modern war. But was that really the case? Let's find out. The cavalry is one of the oldest arms in history and in 1914, there were well over 700,000 cavalrymen in European armies. The period leading up to WW1 saw it rapidly evolve to keep up with new technology and tactics. By the start of the war, cavalry regiments had machine guns, skirmished in spread out formations to avoid enemy firepower,
and mobile horse artillery moved powerful guns around the battlefield at pace. Military thinkers also debated about how cavalry could be most effective in combat. Should they use their rifles and machine guns from a distance, or get closer to the enemy and use revolvers, lances, or sabres? Most agreed a mixture of both would be best, including the 1912 British Cavalry Training manual, partly written by Douglas Haig: "The rifle endows cavalry with great independence […] cavalry must be prepared, therefore, to use either the sword or the rifle, or the two in combination." (Cavalry Training, 268).
German pre-war regulations also called on cavalry to attack when they had infantry or artillery support - but their job included many other missions, like reconnaissance, rear-guard actions, raids behind enemy lines, and exploiting "gaps" made in enemy lines by other arms. Once the war began in 1914, even though it was primarily an infantry and artillery war, all these theoretical ideas about cavalry would be put to the test. Every army fielded all sorts of cavalry, and its role would change as the conflict evolved, but let's start with a quick look at France.
The French army have a reputation for contradictions in 1914: their infantry still wore its infamous red trousers, and their heavy Cuirassiers still wore metal breastplates and fancy-looking helmets. And indeed, French cavalry ran into serious problems at the start of the war. One of the main issues was their standard of "horsemastership", the skills of individual cavalrymen in caring for their animals. The French had not placed much emphasis on the long-term health and survival of their horses in training and this had deadly effects in 1914
when men and animals were pushed to the limit. For example, the I Cavalry Corps marched into Belgium and then retreated back into France in 38 days of non-stop movement over 1500km. The riders in the vanguard averaged 87km a day - which meant that the Germans were often the least of their worries. Many horses ended up dying because of French doctrine. Troopers rarely dismounted, which led to sores forming on the animals' backs, which often got infected and killed them. Standing orders also prevented the men from watering their mounts as often as necessary, a source of frustration to one squadron commander: "[…] we were forbidden to water the horses to avoid lengthening the divisions,
interminably. […] The fact that it was midsummer and the horses became tired easily, made frequent watering all the more necessary. The routes became marked by horses in agony, who, partly from lack of water -unable to throw off the poisons which fatigue had accumulated in their system were seized by rigor mortis before dying." (Cavalry Combat, 439). By 1916 the French adapted and were following the British example in horsemastership, since the British had learned hard lessons about horsecare during the 2nd Boer War. With these changes in place, French cavalry scored more successes later in the war. For example, when the Germans retreated to the Hindenburg Line in 1917,
a French Cavalry reconnaissance force probed the German rear-guard to locate the new German positions. In snowy weather, the 1st Cavalry Division rode 60km over ruined landscapes, forded rivers, engaged German units, and scouted German positions near St Quentin - with minimal losses of horses and men, a significant improvement over 1914. So the French managed to improve their cavalry's overall performance as the war went on, including reconnaissance. But most of us associate the cavalry with charges - a tactic that seemed obsolete among the trenches and machine guns of the Western Front. Sometimes though, riding straight at the enemy was a sound military decision.
At the Battle of Soissons on May 30, 1918, a squadron of French Chasseurs attached to the 74th Infantry Division conducted a frontal charge against a German position on the recently captured Chaudun Plateau - after a French infantry attack had failed. 80 riders, spread out over a kilometer managed to capture the position within minutes, even though the Germans defended it with artillery and machine guns. What's more, the French didn't lose a single man killed - although 11 horses did die. The French cavalrymen stuck to the rules, and showed that a quick and decisive action by mounted troops still had a place in war - even against modern weapons. First off, the charge was
a surprise: the French riders sneaked up behind helpful terrain before attacking. Secondly, it was fast. Speed gave some protection to the cavalrymen even against artillery and machine guns. British officer Ewing Paterson noted that cavalry usually took casualties only in the last 55 meters of a charge, a distance a man on a horse could cover very quickly. Once this happened, the fight was often over: "Once the men were on top of the enemy they put up no fight and appeared completely demoralized." (Kenyon, 205/6). Speed kept cavalrymen alive on the Western Front and allowed them to successfully participate in
battles right up until the end of the war, like at Chaudun. The French horsemen emerged from their cover and charged in an extended formation that left 50 metres between each platoon, and 2 metres between each rider. Most WW1 cavalry charges were spaced out, and far from the knee-to-knee stuff of earlier eras or films. The outnumbered French horsemen prevailed, and this was not the last or the only successful cavalry charge in the west. While Allied cavalry was ultimately tactically successful on the Western Front, it was in the Middle East where British Empire cavalry would be strategically decisive in the war against the Ottomans.
By 1918, cavalry had helped the British at every stage of the Middle East campaign: from Egypt through Palestine and into Syria. Even against modern Ottoman weapons, British-led cavalry could be effective, and General Allenby gave the cavalry credit for the "completeness" of Allied victory. In Palestine, the British commanded units from the UK, India, Australia, and New Zealand. Only the Indian Cavalry and British Yeomanry (cavalry of the Territorial Force) began the war as "true" cavalry who were able to operate both mounted with a sword and
on foot with firearms. The Australian and New Zealand mounted forces began as Mounted Rifles, which were organized and trained like regular cavalry but were not armed with sabres and were not expected to be able to charge on horseback. Over the course of the war the Australian Light Horse had conducted a series of tactical experiments, and this learning curve culminated in the charge at Beersheba on October 30, 1917. The Australian Light Horse scored an overwhelming success against dug in Ottoman soldiers, attacking according to standard British cavalry doctrine. One Australian trooper summed up the enemy reaction this way: "Men are remarking how the Turk fights till the very last charge,
until the pounding hooves are upon him, then he drops his rifle and runs screaming." (Kennedy) Australian commander General Hodgson argued that the victory at Beersheba meant that his men should be given swords and converted to regular cavalry. In mid-1918, the Light Horse received their swords, and put them to use at the Battle of Megiddo and the capture of Jenin. As 50 Australian riders approached the town, they drew their sabres and charged a group of 1800 Ottoman soldiers resting in an olive grove. The Australians captured all the Ottomans,
which helped the rest of the Light Horse to take the town and 3000 more prisoners - all without a single Australian casualty. Australian Brigadier General Lachlan Wilson wrote that if the cavalry had not been equipped with swords, things might not have gone so well: "[Without swords] the procedure would have been a careful approach, then probably a fire fight and we could not have got into Jenin that night. Probably [the prisoners captured] that night would have evaded us or had time to organize." (Anglesey, 290). The Allied victory at Megiddo wasn't just thanks to the Australians though - Indian Cavalry also played a key role.
Indian Cavalry Regiments were typically armed with lances and were slightly larger than their British and Australian counterparts, but their training was basically the same. One Indian unit, the 9th Hodson's Horse, helped show the continued effectiveness of cavalry at Megiddo - at least in the eyes of their regimental historian: "[…] As [D] squadron approached a troop of Turkish cavalry [they] opened fire from some trenches on rising ground about three hundred yards north of the village, but they were promptly charged by a troop under Jemadar Nawab Ali Khan and forthwith surrendered. Some miles further on another Turkish troop was encountered covering the
crossing of the Nahr Iskanderum, but they too were charged in front and their retreat [was] threatened by another troop on their flank, and they made haste to retreat." (Anglesey, 266/67). On September 20, 1918 outside the village of Afule, Indian cavalry of the 2nd Lancers made another astonishing attack against a unit of 500 Ottoman soldiers, including machine gun positions. Indian troopers of C squadron dismounted and worked with the accompanying machine gun squadron to suppress this enemy force. D squadron moved on the Ottoman flank, while B
squadron protected the Indian force's own flank before joining D squadron in a successful charge. At Megiddo, there were also cases where a small number of Allied troopers captured many Ottomans. Private Forrest of the Gloucestershire Yeomanry, for example, charged a retreating Ottoman column all by himself. They surrendered to him, and he escorted the 37 wagons, four officers, and 100 men back to British lines. Not every charge went without losses but the Palestine campaign illustrates just how effective cavalry could be. While Allied cavalry reconnoitred and charged across the trenches and desert, the Germans
also made use of mounted troops. While they had very little cavalry on the Western Front by 1918, German horsemen played an important role on other fronts, like pursuing the enemy in Romania. In early November 1916, there was heavy fighting around the town of Targu-Jiu, and by November 20, the Central Powers' forces had broken the main Romanian resistance. German command had been holding the Schmettow cavalry corps to exploit any gaps opened by the infantry, and the opportunity to take advantage of the Romanian retreat was now at hand. After already capturing Craiova unopposed, the Germans continued their advance, and on
November 26 the German 7th Cavalry Division encountered Romanian cavalry. The Romanians attempted to stem the tide, but the Germans kept pushing their men forward. On December 1, Romanian forces tried to counterattack, but German cavalry launched harassing attacks to disrupt enemy preparations. These did cost the Germans some prisoners but also showed the Romanians that the Central Powers still had the initiative, and Romanian units couldn't march in safety. With the failure of their counterattack, the Romanians retreated into Moldavia. As a part of this relentless pursuit, German Lieutenant Wahl's 26th Dragoons got an order
to destroy the Bucharest-Pitești railway line to deny it to the enemy. He and his men rode as fast and as far as they could until they ran into Romanian sentries. They dismounted, advanced on foot to the railway and planted the necessary explosives before making their escape: "[The third train came] three minutes after the second: a heavy crash, splintering of wood, steam explosions, the locomotive's nose [had] been pushed into the ground and [behind it] the first three coaches [were] entirely crushed. […] For 1/4 hours we were in the saddle,
marching in heavy fog which was coming from the valley of the Arges […] Again I had to rely entirely upon my compass […] and in addition to the bitter cold, snowy rain, it was impossible to see [one's] hand [in front of] their face." (Cavalry Combat, 413/14) A small number of cavalrymen were able to use their superior mobility in a fluid combat situation to inflict disproportionate damage on an important Romanian logistical line. In this campaign, the German cavalry had successfully conducted a harassing pursuit that helped push the retreat of the Romanian military eastwards into Moldavia, and kept the enemy off balance. Falkenhayn's cavalry contributed to an increased operational tempo for which the Romanians had no answer.
So we've covered some of the various uses of cavalry by the French, British, and Germans. But the power with the most cavalry was Russia which fielded nearly 300,000 cavalrymen at its peak. Among the hundreds of thousands of Russian horsemen who served in the Great War, Cornet (later Captain) Vladimir Littauer's experience provides with a typical example of a cavalryman's war. In August 1914, he was with the Sumsky Hussars when they invaded East Prussia. Littauer noted that in his first battle, when attacking the town of Markgrabovo on a reconnaissance mission, his divisional
commander kept their machine guns in reserve. Despite the lack of machine guns, this action did show that the Russians followed best practices, like moving horse artillery units as far forward as possible to support the cavalry when it attacked dismounted. On the other hand, cavalry were vulnerable to concentrated fire from industrial weapons. Littauer described German infantry taking his unit being by surprise in East Prussia: "Machine guns opened fire with the riflemen, and shrapnel began to burst above our heads. We had not expected anything like this. The surprise was overwhelming and all three platoons turned
back. How I turned I do not remember. This was the only instance when I experienced such a complete black-out: I was in a panic." (Littauer, 153) just before the Battle of Tannenberg in late August 1914. Yet even here his regiment operated in tandem with artillery and fought both mounted and dismounted. During their retreat, the Sumsky Hussars acted as a rear-guard, and successfully delayed a German cavalry regiment from pressing their pursuit. First, they ambushed an approaching German cavalry squadron by dismounting and taking firing positions just below the crest on the reverse slope of heights overlooking the road.
The Russians waited until the Germans were as close as possible before opening fire and were able to decimate the German squadron. Next, after mounting their horses again, the Sumsky Hussar squadron spotted another squadron of German cavalry and charged them: "In a matter of seconds Menschikov ordered 'Canter', the German squadron turned round and disappeared, and we halted. A minute later we were under heavy fire […] It was our turn to run away. […] We had only one or two wounded; the German aim had not been too accurate. We dismounted again and kept on exchanging fire with the Germans until they brought up a battery. This is when Menschikov looked at his
watch and said 'That's enough. The division must have crossed the river by now.'" (Littauer 169) The Germans did not follow Littauer's division, which then made it to Russian lines, in part because of this rear-guard action which ultimately prevented the destruction of their division after the failure of the raid. Littauer's experiences in the opening month of the war are a good example of typical cavalry action during the Great War. He was excited to charge at the Germans with a sabre, and terrified when under fire. He was awed by the sights during the attack on Markgrabovo.
He bivouacked in the open, cared for his horse, marched, and counter-marched. His unit was involved in reconnaissance, charges, rear-guard actions, and ambushes - all critical functions of cavalry on the vast and fluid eastern front. On the whole, Littauer's experiences in East Prussia were similar those of most other cavalrymen during the Great War. Cavalry were a dynamic arm of service during the First World War, and all nations adapted to battlefield realities to make the most of mounted troops. Strategically, cavalry was at its best when it was able to exploit a breakthrough and turn a withdrawal or localized retreat into a larger rout, like the Australians did in Palestine or the Germans in
Romania by keeping up the pressure on the enemy. Cavalry also contributed on a strategic level by providing valuable reconnaissance at times or in places where warfare was not completely static. Tactically, cavalry was at its best when it was able to use its supporting arms like machine guns, artillery, or dismounted men - or, under the right conditions, to charge the enemy with speed. Of course cavalry also had its limitations, especially on those battlefields that were defined by deep systems of well-defended trenches. But using cavalry in WW1 was not futile or
pointless - it was often a logical choice given the lack of mechanization and engine-powered mobility available. Eventually, tanks could break through enemy defences, but were still too slow to exploit, a job better suited to the quicker and more flexible cavalry. Their roles were complementary, at least until mechanization became more widespread after the war. Sometimes, commanders made mistakes or poor decisions, and used their cavalry unwisely, but that doesn't mean that cavalry was of no use across the board. The role of cavalry in the First World War is more important and more complex than
it's often given credit for, and that is an idea worth pursuing. The evolution of modern warfare didn't spell the end of cavalry right away, just like 30 years later the atomic bomb didn't mean the end of conventional warfare. In fact, it marked the beginning of the nuclear arms race between the West and the Soviet Union - and the Soviets also saw the potential in nuclear energy for atomic powered communism. If you are interested to learn more about the Soviet nuclear program from its origins in WW2 to the Chernobyl disaster and beyond, you can watch our new documentary series Red Atoms exclusively on Nebula. Nebula is a
streaming service we're building together with other creators and where we don't have to worry about the algorithm or advertising guidelines and where viewers directly support creators. If you go to nebula.tv/thegreatwar, you can get 40% off an annual subscription. For just $30 a year you can watch Red Atoms or our other Nebula original series and much more. Want to learn more about one an infamous Cold War Icon? Check out Tip of the Spear by Mustard about the B2 stealth bomber. And of course, on Nebula you can also watch all our videos ad-free and usually earlier than on YouTube. That's nebula.tv/thegreatwar for 40% off an annual subscription and supporting us directly.
We'd like to thank Matt Novosad for his help with this episode. As usual, you can find all our sources for this episode
