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After denying Saddam Hussein a quick victory, Iran had gained strategic initiative in the war against Iraq by 1982. Now it was Iran's turn to invade Iraqi territory. This second episode covers Iran's offensives, Kurdish participation in the war, Iraq's use of chemical weapons, and how both sides worked to undermine each other's capacity to fight IRAN ON THE OFFENSIVE By 1982 not only had Saddam Hussein failed to achieve a quick victory over Iran, but his army had also taken massive losses and severely depleted its officer corps. Iraq had no other choice, but to prepare for a long
and defensive war, hence, the mass mobilisation of Iraq was ordered. The Iraqi Armed Forces had expanded from around 200,000 men to approximately half a million troops by 1983. The Republican Guard, an elite force with the primary goal of protecting the regime, had around 10,000 to 20,000 men at the beginning of the war and grew to around 200,000 by the end. The Republican Guard soldiers had better pay, more experience and training, hence they were a stronger fighting force than any other unit in the Iraqi army. They would go on to play a crucial role in defending
against the Iranian attacks. Furthermore, Iraq switched to a sort of war economy with a lion's share of oil money going to foreign weapons purchases and domestic military production. The Iranian leadership was unsure about its next move. Ali Khamenei - then serving as President of Iran, and not yet holding the title of Ayatollah, which he received only upon becoming Supreme Leader after Khomeini's death in 1989 - and the new prime minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi, who of course later became the leader of the opposition Green Movement in Iran,
were wary of invading Iraq, since they did not think that their military had the capacity to carry out a successful offensive. However, in the end the desire to punish Iraq for attacking Iran and hoping to ignite a Shia rebellion against the Saddam regime prevailed and in July 1982, Iran launched the Ramazan Offensive on Shia-majority Basra the capture of which would cut off Iraq from the Persian Gulf, turning it into a landlocked country. Iran's 92nd Armored Division, along with Sepah, Basij and other paramilitary forces totalling to some 100,000 men were the
attacking force, but the Fish Lake east of Basra created by Iraq in anticipation of a potential incursion from Iran stood as a barrier, flooding the area and preventing the Iranian armor from moving freely. Iraqis were able to lure the Iranian forces towards the Fish Lake, the Iraqi kill zone. Iran's situation was exacerbated by a sudden sandstorm, which blew against their forces and caused disorientation, making them easy targets for the Iraqi army. The subsequent human wave attacks without proper armored, artillery and air support did not lead
to any major success, as Basra remained firmly in Iraqi hands. Iran tried to break the Iraqi defence two more times by attacking towards Mandali in October and in the Musian area in November, but while they gained minor ground, they failed to achieve a real breakthrough. One of the methods Iraq employed to stop the Iranians assault was chemical attacks, which Iraq used more and more often as the war went on. In 1983, Iran conducted several more offensives to decisively turn the tide of the war in their favour. In preparation for a defensive campaign,
Iraq expanded its defensive structures, including extensive minefields to deny the Iranians any opening. And they played an important role in mitigating Iran's significant manpower advantage. In February 1983, Iran launched Operation Before the Dawn, attacking along a wide 40-kilometre-long front on Amarah with 200,000 Revolutionary Guard troops. After initial progress, the Iranian attack was stopped by the Iraqi 4th Corps with the help of the air force. Iran once again heavily employed human wave infantry attacks without any success. Another offensive in April 1983 around the Al-Fakkah field was also repelled by the Iraqis.
Clearly, the Iranian offensives relying on human wave tactics against well-defended central and southern sectors did not work, and Iran's leadership had to rethink its strategy. They decided to focus on Northern Iraq, where the Iraqis did not expect an assault coming from mountainous terrain, which was disadvantageous for the attacking side. But on the flip side, mountainous terrain prevented Iraqis from using their advantage in armor and air force. Furthermore, this was a Kurdish-majority area, and Iranians exploited the grievance of many Kurds,
including their political parties - Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdish Democratic Party and their paramilitary forces, who felt against the Iraqi regime. They cooperated with Iran in hopes of taking advantage of war-caused disruption in Iraq. Following this logic, on July 22, 1983, they attacked Haji Omaran and captured it with the help of Kurdish forces, who participated in this operation both as soldiers and guides of the Iranian army. Soon Haji Omaran was captured and the Iraqi attempts to dislodge Iranians and Kurds by attacking them
with helicopter fire and chemical weapons failed. In September 1983, Iran attempted another offensive with the support of the Kurdish forces, this time on Sulaymaniyah, but despite capturing some Iraqi land, ultimately, this offensive also failed to secure its main target. BATTLE OF THE MARSHES In 1983, the only notable success was the operation to capture Haji Omaran, in which Iran caught Iraq by surprise by attacking in an unexpected area. For their next offensive, they chose the Hawizeh Marshes north of Basra. Thousands of Iranian soldiers and paramilitaries were trained in infiltration
tactics and marsh warfare. On February 15, 1984, Iran launched Operation Dawn 5 and 6 to secure the highway connecting Baghdad to Basra in the area between Basra and Al Qurnah, creating a wedge between Iraq's 4th and 6th Army Corps. Capturing this highway would have created major problems for the Iraqi supply lines to Basra. The initial offensives were primarily conducted by disorganized Sepah and Basij militia, once again employing human wave attacks without proper armored, artillery or air support. Iran managed to breach Iraq's first line of defence
and capture a high ground overlooking the highway some 15 kilometres away from it, but ultimately they were stalled by the Iraqis. That is when Iran launched Operation Kheibar. Some 250,000 members of the Iranian military and paramilitary forces attacked north of Basra on February 21, quickly crossing the Hawizeh marshes in speedboats taking the Iraqis by surprise, who believed that the marshes would be a sufficient barrier against the attacking side. Once again, the initial Iranian assault was successful and they pushed back Iraq's 6th Armored Division, which was unable to use its tanks effectively in the marshlands.
Sources report about an incredible job done by Iran's military engineers under enemy fire. They built pontoon bridges to cross the most difficult portions of marshlands. They built small floating rafts for their artillery guns to operate from inside the marshes. On top of that, Iran's Sepah and Basij militia, no matter how undisciplined and unprepared, had this zealous belief in their righteous struggle and pushed forward despite all odds. Ra'ad al-Hamdani, an officer of the Iraqi Republican Guard at the time, who later rose to the rank of Lieutenant General,
described Iran's strategy in this attack as "very unclear". He claimed that Iran lacked a centralized command structure, with each of the fighting forces - the regular army, the Sepah militia and the Basij militia operating independently without cooperation. Each had their own line of communication with Ayatollah Khomeini and competed for glory and influence. That is why, according to Hamdani, the Iraqi command could not discern a pattern in the Iranian forces' actions. Hamdani described his interrogation of an Iranian prisoner of war who had a video tape on him, which
really illustrates how many Iranians volunteered to participate in this war. The tape purportedly showed 5 militia members with a sheikh or an imam driving in a civilian vehicle from Isfahan to the front. This group traveled independently and did not join any existing formation of the Iranian army upon reaching the front. The POW told Hamdani that this sheikh or imam ordered them to attack and reach Karbala. That is it; that was the whole plan. Go fight and take Karbala, the holy city of Shia Islam. No wonder, the Iranian militia had so many casualties, but
the sheer amount of pressure by Iran's infantry sometimes resulted in territorial advance. In the case of this offensive, in its early days, Iran captured Majnoon island. By the end of February 1984, they reached the outskirts of Al Qurnah, approaching dangerously close to the Baghdad-Basra highway. But the Iraqi defence, which had several lines of defence, bent, but did not break. Once the Iranians advanced beyond the marshes, taking advantage of an open terrain the Iraqi armor, artillery and helicopters started doing considerably more damage. Iraqi airborne units
would land behind enemy formations to disrupt their operations and wreak havoc. In addition, Iraq extensively used chemical weapons against Iranians. So, by the time of the final battles of this Iranian offensive, the momentum had been exhausted. Ultimately, the Iraqi army forced Iran to withdraw to the marshes, though the Iranians still managed to hold on to Majnoon island. WAR OF THE CITIES. ASYMMETRIC WARFARE Although Iran's offensives did not result in decisive successes and were largely contained by Iraq, constant defending was taking its toll on
the Iraqi army. At this point in the war, Iraq was not in a position to conduct ground offensives due to high losses in manpower and equipment, but they needed to find a way to prevent Iran's constant offensive pressure too. One of the ways was the bombing of Iranian cities. Here Saddam Hussein pursued two aims. The first aim was to retaliate against Iran's offensives and to dissuade them against any future offensives. Second, Iraq wanted to bring the war back to Iran to make it even more costly for ordinary Iranians in order to achieve demoralization in Iran. In February 1984,
Iraq responded to constant Iranian offensives by bombarding Tehran, Dezful, Ahvaz, Qom, Isfahan and several other cities with airstrikes and ground-to-ground missiles. The bombardment continued for fifteen days. Residential districts, industrial and transport infrastructure and oil facilities were targeted, with hundreds of civilians getting killed in this indiscriminate attack. Iran retaliated by striking Baghdad, Basra and Kirkuk, including vital oil facilities of Iraq. Throughout the war, the brutal bombing of civilian areas sporadically intensified. This
is dubbed the War of the Cities. We will discuss this further as it pertains to our description of the Iran-Iraq War. For now, let's say that as the war progressed a more favourable international situation of Iraq, which led to a steady supply of Scud missiles by the USSR and aircraft by the USSR and France, along with strong financial backing by fellow Arab countries, gradually led to a decisive advantage for Iraq in the War of the Cities. Iran was under international isolation and a crippling sanctions regime, which not only prevented them from purchasing new equipment,
but also from buying spare parts to keep the existing aircraft running. That is why, as the war went on, Iran preferred to conserve whatever aircraft was still at their disposal and as a result their sortie rates declined. Another byproduct of the Battle of Marshes was the extension of the war to the Persian Gulf. Even before 1984, Iraq targeted ships entering or leaving Iranian ports in the Gulf. For instance, in February and March 1983, Iraqis struck Iran's offshore oil installations causing a major oil spill in the Gulf waters. This was not only
a retaliatory tactic for Saddam Hussein. Iraq also sought to provoke Iran into an oil war in the Gulf, including the closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran, in order to involve major powers in forcing Iran to stop the war. In late 1983, Iraq expanded its long-range strike capacity by leasing five Super Étendard fighter jets equipped with AM-39 Exocet air-to-surface missiles from France's own naval fleet. Iran threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz if Iraq used Super Etendards against Iranian assets, which then prompted the United States to warn Iran against this action
and dispatch three warships to the Gulf area as a precaution and a threat. Evidently, at the time the United States cared considerably more about the safety of international maritime trade routes. In any case, in March 1984, Iraq retaliated against Iran's ground offensives by striking oil tankers carrying Iranian oil and the oil terminal at Kharg Island, which was and still is Iran's main oil export port. As a result, Iranian oil exports were significantly disrupted, but not completely stopped. Tehran retaliated by attacking oil tankers related to Iraq,
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, which were the principal Middle Eastern supporters of Baghdad during this war. Throughout 1984, Iraq conducted 54 attacks against Iran's oil infrastructure and tankers, with Iran managing only 18 retaliatory attacks due to its more limited long-range capacity. Just like the War of the Cities, the Tanker War also continued to intensify until the end of the war with Iraq, gradually asserting greater dominance due to its superior capacity and easier access to foreign weapons. Attempts at international action, such as UN Security Council
Resolution 552, which condemned attacks on oil shipping, did not amount to much. CONCLUSION So, by the beginning of 1985, Iran had an advantage in the ground war, conducting major offensives from time to time, albeit with little to show for them. They had gained some ground here and there, but a decisive, war-ending success eluded them. In addition, they had lost a lot of manpower in these offensives, and while Iran had a very large mobilisation pool, it was not infinite. Tehran's international isolation also meant it could not properly resupply to continue fighting a long war amid equipment losses and resource
depletion. Meanwhile, Iraq held the upper hand in the War of the Cities and the Tanker War, which significantly harmed Iran's economy. Nevertheless, this was not enough for Iran to accept Saddam Hussein's offers of truce or ceasefire. The war was far from over. In our next episode, we will follow the events of 1985 and 1986 as the war ground on. If you do not want to miss that and many other historical videos, make sure you are subscribed and have pressed the bell button to see them. Please consider liking, subscribing, commenting, and sharing - it helps immensely. Our
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