Ireland's Wars of Independence and Civil War 1919-1923

In 1919, Great Britain had just emerged victorious from the First World War, and ruled over an even larger empire than before. But in Ireland, many were unhappy with British rule, and over the next two years, Irish republicans won a brutal war of independence -but victory soon gave way to division, and Ireland would be torn apart by an even bloodier Civil War. The Irish War of Independence, or Anglo-Irish War that raged from 1919 to 1921 was rooted in Irish desire for independence from Great Britain. The so-called Irish Question had marked UK politics

even before Ireland became part of the UK in 1800, and was still a difficult topic in 1914. That year, the British parliament passed a Home Rule Act giving Ireland more autonomy within the UK, but the government delayed implementing it when the Great War broke out. Many Irishmen though, they felt British rule was foreign and unjust and wanted a fully independent republic. Some radical armed groups launched the Easter Rising in 1916, and declared a free Irish government - but British troops crushed them and the government caused outrage by executing many of their leaders. London tried to find a political solution with an all-party Irish Convention, but it failed. Then,

in the December 1918 election the republican Sinn Fein party, with links to the Easter Rising, won three quarters of the Irish seats in the UK parliament with support from Ireland's Catholic majority. The mostly Protestant Ulster region though, supported the pro-UK Irish Unionist party. Sinn Fein didn't send its representatives to sit in the London parliament - instead, leader Eamon de Valera announced an Irish-only parliament called the Dáil. Preparing for conflict, Sinn Fein worked closely with the armed group soon to be known as the Irish Republican Army, or IRA.

So, in early 1919, a self-declared Irish parliament allied with the independent IRA, and the Anglo-Irish War soon began. The Dail sat for the first time January 21, 1919, and declared independence: "We solemnly declare foreign government in Ireland to be an invasion of our national right which we will never tolerate, and we demand the evacuation of our country by the English garrison." (Hopkinson 208) The British though, still controlled Ireland through the Dublin Castle administration and the police - the Royal Irish Constabulary or RIC. To republicans, they were an occupying force even though most police were

fellow Catholics, so on the same day the Dail declared independence, the IRA ambushed and killed two policemen at Soloheadbeg. Sinn Fein had not approved the attack, but it's often seen as the start of the war even though London considered it a police matter at first. The IRA now began a guerilla campaign against the RIC and British officials. They avoided pitched battles and instead ambushed police patrols or barracks with whatever weapons they had, even home-made bombs. The IRA also organized itself into county brigades, or parish companies,

and recruited unit leaders. They also used "flying columns" of mobile attack groups that could quickly form up, attack, and disappear. This was a tricky process and there were struggles, but a decentralized structure had advantages: "The democratic organisation of the Volunteers and the impossibility in the circumstances of any tight control by the headquarters staff permitted and encouraged the development of local initiative on a scale quite abnormal in a regular army." (Hopkinson 16) To the RIC, the attacks seemed to come out of nowhere, and the attackers melted away into the civilian population. IRA fighter Seamus Conway described a typical ambush: "In a brief space of time two lorries…

approached. The mine on being exploded blew the front part off the first lorry, bringing it to a standstill and throwing out the occupants. The second lorry pulled up behind this and concentrated rifle fire was brought to bear on it. Its occupants jumped, and dived for cover, a good many of them knocked out as they did so. Cover at this point was scarce. They got their Lewis gun into operation immediately, but after a few bursts, the gunner was knocked out and the guns did not get into action any more." (Leeson 138) The IRA attacks were small -- they killed 15

policemen in all of 1919 - but they had a big political impact. Even when the RIC repelled IRA assaults on better-defended police barracks, which they usually did, they improved republican morale and forced the British on the defensive. The IRA usually chose the time and place of any combat, which overwhelmed the RIC, which suffered more casualties than the attackers. So in March 1920, the British created the RIC Special Reserve, better known as the Black and Tans since they used some army khaki in their dark uniforms. Most were English or Irish Protestants

who had fought in the Great War, though 20% were Catholic - but contrary to popular belief, very few were criminals before joining. Poor training and pressures of counter-insurgency combat meant that the Black and Tans would commit more crimes than other British soldiers while in uniform. The IRA's guerilla campaign against the police accelerated in 1920, which also saw escalation from the British side. IRA ambushes become more frequent and more deadly in the second year of the war, killing 143 police. The embattled RIC spent more time in barracks in towns for safety, leaving rural Ireland in

the hands of the IRA. The IRA also began an arson campaign that summer, burning over 400 abandoned police barracks and 50 courthouses. Sinn Fein set up a parallel state in the countryside, including republican courts, police patrols, and taxes. They also brought the British courts system to a virtual halt, as witnesses, juries, and even judges refused to participate. This was partly due to republican sympathies among most Catholics, but also IRA intimidation. One magistrate wrote: "Everybody is yielding to Sinn Fein whether they approve of it or not. They say they can

do nothing else, and that the [UK] Government cannot or will not protect them, and the police can barely protect themselves." (Townshend 149) London underestimated the republican movement, but British officers in Ireland took it seriously. Lord George Riddell recorded a conversation with general Lord French: "It was absurd to think that the British Army could not quell such an insurrection if given proper powers. [French] said it was an underground conspiracy. You might pass from one end of Ireland to the other and not see anything abnormal. But the rebel organisation was there." (Riddell 202/203)

British strategy was failing, so they created a new force in July 1920 - the Auxiliary Division of the RIC, or Auxies. They're often confused with the Black and Tans, but they were a separate paramilitary force of ex-Great War British officers. Their task was to take the fight to the IRA in the southern counties, and while they were well armed and well paid, they were poorly housed, poorly fed, and poorly organized. The Auxies had some success against the IRA, like capturing 40 prisoners at Kilmashogue in September, but morale was bad and turnover

high. Auxie Ernest Lycett explained the stresses: "We were on dangerous duty, which was to keep the highways and roads open to traffic. Every morning the patrols would leave the Castle […] All in battle order and ready for trouble on the way […] it was very interesting, passing through the most beautiful country, but we never knew what was just around the bend." (O'Brien 34) The Auxies and Black and Tans became more known for violence against civilians than for fighting the IRA. They often couldn't find the IRA after an ambush, and many shopkeepers refused to sell to police, so under constant threat of attack, the Auxies

and Black and Tans turned to violent reprisals as punishment. After an IRA attack or simply for perceived republican sympathies, they shot into homes, looted shops, and burned buildings. Between July and September, there were notable reprisals in Thurles, Upperchurch, Limerick, Templemore, and Balbriggan, and Tubbercurry. Local resident Mrs. Murricane recounted her experience: "They all seemed to me to speak with an Irish accent. The swearing was awful. The men asked me where my husband was, and I asked him what they wanted him for. They

replied, 'To shoot him.'" ("Tubbercurry," Manchester Guardian, 4 October 1920. p. 8.) The British officially banned reprisals in August, but officers turned a blind eye and some encouraged them: "The more you shoot the better I will like you, and no policeman will get into trouble for shooting a man." (McMahon 62) The reprisals turned more Irishmen against Britain, but also frightened some into giving the police information. The IRA also pressured civilians to cooperate with them, and killed suspected police informants. In general the republican side benefitted politically from the violence, except in Ulster. There,

an attempted republic economic boycott led to the revival of a unionist paramilitary organization, the Ulster Volunteer Force. Many northern towns became divided on sectarian lines as Protestants and Catholics fought in the streets and forced each other into separate neighborhoods. So by fall 1920, the violence had spread to all parts of Ireland. British police morale was low, but the Auxies had gained control over some republican areas. In early November, British authorities reported on their progress: "Much of the moral and material support lent to Sinn Fein is due to fear and with the growth of the realisation

that the Government is beginning to get a grip of the situation there are indications of a return to sanity and revulsion against Sinn Fein on the part of more responsible persons." (Townshend 216/217) But the IRA was about to launch its most ambitious attack yet. One strength of the IRA was intelligence. Sinn Fein's secretive Minister for Home Affairs and Director of Intelligence, Michael Collins, had become a legendary figure. He built a network of informers in the British administration and police, using the information to carry out

targeted assassinations of British officials. British intelligence, on the other hand, consistently failed in Ireland: they once arrested Collins but only realized it after they'd already released him. IRA intelligence operative Florence O'Donoghue explained British troubles: "One thing [the British] lacked which the IRA had in generous measure [was] the co-operation of the people and without it they were blind and impotent." (O'Brien 43) The British relied on paid informants, a problematic system but one that did bring

some results. Collins decided a dramatic action was needed. The Dail approved his plan for an IRA group known as the Squad to kill 12 members of British intelligence known as The Cairo Gang, in their own homes. On the morning of Sunday November 21, 1920, the Squad killed 14 men, including the first two Auxies of the war in an unplanned clash. It's not clear how many of the dead were in The Cairo Gang. That afternoon, the British responded, surrounding a crowd watching Gaelic football at Croke Park. The police said they wanted to search for IRA agents, but claimed that someone fired at them from the stands - a claim

that has never been verified. The Auxies and RIC fired into the crowd, killing 14, including 3 children. At Dublin Castle, British officers executed three prominent IRA prisoners. Publicly, the IRA trumpeted Bloody Sunday as a victory: "My one intention was the destruction of the undesirables who continued to make miserable the lives of ordinary decent citizens. […] If I had a second motive it was not more than a feeling such as I would have for a dangerous reptile. By their destruction the very air is made sweeter […] They have destroyed without trial. I have paid them back in their own coin.' (Dolan 794)

Privately though, Collins had doubts as he had not expected the harsh British response. The events of Bloody Sunday sent a shockwave across Ireland and Britain, but the violence continued even as diplomacy began. Even before Bloody Sunday, the British had been divided about Ireland. General Nevil Macready wanted to impose martial law, but Lloyd Geoge refused, saying one did not declare war on rebels. Instead, in December 1920 London passed the Government of Ireland Act, which foresaw two Home Rule systems and two Irish parliaments: one for Ulster,

and one for the rest. But the act didn't satisfy republicans or unionists. Lloyd George started secret talks with Sinn Fein's Arthur Griffith, but IRA commanders were planning more ambushes. In County Cork, the Auxies had become complacent: "There was always careless talk in the town and it was easy for [the enemy] to find out which section we would be patrolling on any day some days ahead, and make any plans they thought fit." (O'Brien 55) On November 28, Tom Barry's IRA unit ambushed a convoy of two police lorries - killing 16 of 18 Auxies on the spot and one later. The IRA accused

the police of pretending to surrender before opening fire, a claim that is still debated a century later. The lone surviving policeman, on the other hand, insisted the IRA executed the police after they had surrendered. The Auxiliary Division had suffered its bloodiest defeat of the war and the British declared martial law in four counties, including this public warning: "Note Well: That a state of armed insurrection exists, that any person taking part therein or harbouring any person who has taken part therein, or procuring, inviting, aiding or abetting any person to part therein, is guilty of levying war against His Majesty The King, and is liable on conviction by a military

court to suffer DEATH." (O'Brien 49/50) After another IRA ambush in Cork City, British troops and police torched the city centre in reprisal. Foreign governments condemned the British action, and London paid residents 3 million pounds in compensation. Some Auxies though, saw it as payback and wore burnt pieces of Cork on their caps. The British decide they need to channel the violence of their forces, so they introduce a system of official, limited reprisals in January 1921. But imposing martial law in part of Ireland did not solve London's problems, like poor morale, complicated British command structure and infighting between various police, administration, and military services. With Irish elections planned for May 1921,

Lloyd George proposed a truce, which the IRA rejected since they'd have to disarm. So both the British and the IRA were facing serious challenges to achieving their aims in the war - but the fighting would be more intense than ever in 1921. Both sides went on the offensive. Britain sent reinforcements, and soldiers and police patrolled aggressively into IRA-controlled territory. The IRA also adapted, with better training and replacing the Flying Columns with smaller Active Service Units. The Dail also took responsibility for the IRA, to smooth tensions and improve ammunition and weapons procurement.

At first, the spike in violence in 1921 led to British success. Several IRA raids went badly, and at Clonmult the British killed 8 and arrested 12. Police and soldiers also seized IRA weapons, leading to a critical shortage. But politically, violence still benefitted the republican cause. In March, they planned an ambush to kill British Lieutenant General Strickland. 70 IRA men under Sean Moylan and Paddy O'Brien attacked the British convoy with mines and machine guns: "Our men opened fire on the leading lorry, and stopped it by killing the driver. The second lorry pulled up, and the touring car and armored car almost dashed into it… The rear lorry came on until stopped by our rifle fire. There must

have been a big roll of casualties in this car, as a very effective fire was poured into it from the north and west. After a 2 hour fight, in which the enemy machine guns searched the whole countryside, and which finally developed into a series of skirmishes over a large area, we retreated in good order after inflicting heavy casualties and without suffering any on our side." (Townshend 243) The IRA had killed a British officer, but it wasn't Strickland - it was Brigadier-General Hanway Robert Cumming, along with 4 others. It was not as successful as the IRA made it out to be, but was another blow to the British army.

Such countryside attacks were important, but republicans knew the political center was Dublin. The IRA's new Dublin Active Service Unit stepped up small-scale attacks, striking more than 200 times between March and May. De Valera wanted a larger operation so on May 25 IRA units stormed the Dublin Custom House. 120 IRA men set the building on fire, but Auxiliaries in an armored car arrived, killing 6 IRA men and forcing 80 to surrender. Sinn Fein publicly celebrated a victory, but internally members worried about such heavy losses.

The escalation in 1921 left both sides exhausted: the republicans were militarily weak but politically strong, while the British had the opposite problem. Something had to give. By July, the British had arrested 4500 IRA men, leaving only 2000 active IRA fighters in the field. The British even narrowly missed capturing Michael Collins himself - again. Lloyd George, however, acknowledged the reality of majority republican support outside Ulster and offered more talks. In July 1921, a fragile truce began. Hardliners on both sides grumbled

since they thought their side was winning, but for Collins at least, it was a necessity: "We had not when these [truce] terms were offered an average of one round of ammunition for each weapon we had. The fighting area in Cork… was becoming daily more circumscribed, and they could not have carried on much longer." (Knirck 76) London wanted an autonomous Ireland to remain part of the empire. Sinn Fein leaders were divided between those willing to compromise and those who felt anything short of a fully independent republic was a betrayal of the cause. Talks bogged

down on two questions: the status of Ulster and whether an Irish government would have to swear an oath to the Crown. Most republican politicians eventually accepted Ulster would remain in the UK, and de Valera proposed an oath that recognized an "association" with the Crown and not loyalty. But De Valera went back on his own draft oath, and refused to participate directly in the talks. On December 5, Britain gave the divided Irish peace delegation in London an ultimatum: accept the latest deal or face renewed war. The delegates thought they had the authority

to sign without consulting de Valera, and did. The final terms represented major compromises by both sides: an Irish Free State would have its own Parliament for domestic affairs; enjoy financial independence; and have its own small military. British troops would leave the country, except for 6 of the 9 counties in Ulster, which chose to remain in the UK. The Irish Free State was still a part of the British Empire and the parliament had to swear an oath to the Crown. The Irish War of Independence took the lives of around 260 British soldiers, 360 police,

550 IRA fighters, and 200 civilians. But the peace caused a political crisis in the Free State. De Valera and other hardliners bitterly opposed the treaty, and republicans split into pro- and anti-treaty factions. Just before the Dail ratified the treaty in January 1922, De Valera made an ominous prediction: "If the Treaty was accepted, the fight for freedom would still go on, and the Irish people, instead of fighting foreign soldiers, would have to fight the Irish soldiers of an Irish Government set up by Irishmen… They would have to wade through Irish blood, through the blood of the soldiers of the Irish Government,

and through, perhaps, the blood of some of the members of the Government in order to get Irish freedom." (De Valera and Moynihan 98/99) Ireland had just won partial independence - but the Irish Free State was on the brink of civil war. Irish political and military leadership was now bitterly split into two factions. The anti-Treatyists rejected the deal, and were led by Eamon De Valera, who had resigned as president after parliament narrowly approved the treaty,. The most prominent of the pro-Treatyists was Michael Collins. He claimed the treaty was not perfect but was a stepping-stone for full independence later on.

The pro-treatyists established the Provisional Government in Dublin, and wanted implement the treaty quickly. They claimed they had overwhelming public support, and although anti-treaty politicians blocked a plebiscite on the issue, 24 of 26 southern Irish city councils did pass resolutions in favor of the treaty. Sinn Fein founder Arthur Griffith now became president, and Collins chairman of the Provisional Government. The anti-treatyists led by De Valera refused to accept the new government, claiming it had no authority to disestablish the republic that had been announced in the 1916 Easter Rising.

The IRA also split into pro- and anti-treaty factions. Much of the experienced leadership of the General Headquarters supported the treaty, but the Dublin-based GHQ had limited control of IRA units in the field. Of the 16 IRA commands in Ireland, only 5 wholly or largely supported the treaty - the southwestern region of Munster soon became the anti-treaty heartland. Tensions were increasing, and violence between rival groups was barely avoided in February 1922. The split in the IRA was further exacerbated when the Provisional Government created an official

armed forces, the National Army. The army was based on the British model of a conventional force, and the pro-treatyists attempted to portray it as the successor of the IRA. In March, the anti-Treaty forces held a series of banned IRA Conventions and formed a new Army Executive separate from the National Army. With about two-thirds of IRA brigades represented, the Executive claimed it would no longer answer to Dublin. The new group elected First Southern Division commander Liam Lynch as its leader. That's not to say all IRA cooperation stopped.

Anti and pro-treaty leaders, including Lynch and Collins, continued to work together in the partitioned north-east as late as April 1922. Both factions did make plans for a unified offensive against British control were laid, but never acted upon. So as rival Irish governments and armies formed, the British quickly and quietly left the territory of the future Irish Free State. The departing Brits handed over barracks and equipment to whichever IRA brigade controlled the region, and often the British left behind a power vacuum. Law and order in Ireland quickly began to suffer after the British forces left. Sectarian violence,

agrarian agitation, strikes, robberies and looting all became more common. Republican unity had largely kept the peace during the Anglo-Irish War, but this was beginning to unravel. Pro-treaty minister Kevin O'Higgins described the difficult position of the Provisional Government: "Simply eight young men in the City Hall stand… amidst the ruins of one administration, with the foundations not yet laid, and with wild men screaming through the keyhole. No police force was functioning throughout the country, no system of justice was operating, the wheels of administration hung idle, battered out of recognition by the clash

of rival jurisdictions." (Coogan 30) Talk of civil war was also becoming more frequent, including from former president De Valera in March: "The Treaty… barred the way to independence with the blood of fellow Irishmen. It was only by Civil War after this that they would get their independence… if you don't fight today, you will fight tomorrow; and I say, when you are in a good fighting position, then fight on." (Irish Independent 17/3/22) Some members of the IRA Executive, led by Rory O'Connor, decided to act while the Provisional Government was weak. On April 14th, around 180 men of the Dublin No. 1 Brigade occupied the Four Courts in Dublin - the

nation's most important judiciary building. Clearly reminiscent of the Easter Rising in 1916, the move was designed to undermine the authority of pro-treatyists in their capital, and perhaps provoke British reaction - which could potentially reunite the IRA against their mutual enemy. At the same time, though, De Valera and Collins were attempting to reconcile. Both suggested putting forward a unified Sinn Fein in the coming election in June, but the plan soon broke down amidst suspicion from both sides. The British claimed it was tantamount to refuting the treaty.

When the election results came in on June 16th, pro-treaty Sinn Fein won a convincing victory, with 58 seats to the anti-treatyists' 32. Britain now put pressure on the Provisional Government to end the Four Courts occupation, which had been going on since Apri l. Then, on June 22, two IRA gunmen, both former soldiers in the British army, assassinated British Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson in London. The British government stated that if the Irish Provisional Government could not impose order, British forces would return to Ireland and do it themselves. Winston Churchill made his position clear in the House of Commons:

"The presence in Dublin of a band of men styling themselves the Headquarters of the Republican Executive is a gross breach and defiance of the Treaty. The time has come when it is not unfair, premature or impatient of us to make to the strengthened Irish Government and new Irish Parliament a request in express terms that this sort of thing must come to an end… If it does not [then] we shall regard the Treaty as having been formally violated." (Coogan 36/37) With the British gone but threatening to return, and the Four Courts still occupied by anti-treatyists, the Irish Provisional Government's new National Army issued an

ultimatum on June 28, 1922: if the occupiers wouldn't leave, the Army would open fire. During their two-month occupation, the IRA had done little to fortify the Four Courts building or develop defences, partly out of a desire not to provoke the National Army. There were also no plans to assist the garrison if it was attacked, and they didn't occupy the surrounding buildings. IRA leader Ernie O'Malley estimated he needed 70 more men to fully defend the large building. Still, the IRA were armed with rifles, automatic weapons, mines and 'The

Mutineer' - a Rolls-Royce armoured car. In the early hours of June 28th, Major General Emmet Dalton of the National Army issued an ultimatum to the Four Courts occupiers: Surrender or face bombardment from his British-supplied 18-pounder field gun. The IRA refused, and so at 4.30am, after a misfire reportedly rectified by a kick, the National Army fired the first shells were at the Four Courts - the Irish Civil War had begun. As the bombardment started, National Army troops cordoned off the area and probed closer, but their inexperience began to show. They were reluctant to assault the building and British General

Nevil Macready suggested the artillery was more useful as a morale booster than an actual weapon: "I agreed to send [Dalton] fifty rounds of shrapnel, which was all we had left, simply to make a noise through the night, as he was afraid that if the guns stopped firing his men would get disheartened and clear off… About every quarter of an hour during the night a shrapnel broke up against the walls of the Four Courts, making much noise but doing no harm." (Hopkinson 120) British civil servant Alfred Cope was equally unimpressed with the fighting:

"[This is] not a battle. Rory is in the Four Courts. Free Staters are in the houses opposite, each firing at the other hundreds of rounds with probably remarkably few hits. A few hundred yards away the people carry on their ordinary business." (Cottrell 165) The next day, the IRA tried to relieve the Four Courts garrison from outside Dublin, but efforts were poorly organised and blocked by the National Army. But, a smaller group of IRA fighters were able to occupy several hotels along O'Connell Street - later called 'The Block'. They were soon joined by anti-Treaty leaders including De Valera, former Defence Minister Cathal Brugha

and Lynch. However, these new positions could do little to support the Four Courts. On June 30th, National Army troops stormed the Four Courts with fixed bayonets. During the short fight that ensued, a huge explosion damaged the public archives, destroying hundreds of years of Irish records. There is debate whether this was caused deliberately by IRA mines, or munitions being hit by artillery. In any case, the explosion marked the surrender of the Four Courts. The National Army now turned to The Block, where the morale of IRA fighters like Emmet Humphreys was weakening: "We were becoming more and more frustrated

at the fact that we were achieving nothing whatsoever." (Hopkinson 124) Some IRA men talked about going down as martyrs, but few were enthusiastic. Instead, De Valera and others were smuggled out of the city before 'The Block' surrendered on July 5th. Brugha, however, charged out into the street where National Army troops shot him. The storming of the Four Courts was a disaster for the IRA. 12 of the Executive's 16 members were there, and Rory O'Connor, Liam Mellows, Tom Barry, and others were arrested. Liam Lynch was captured, but was later released on the promise he would not continue the fight - a promise he soon broke. The

occupation had not resulted in a surge in public support or sympathy for the republican movement. 65 combatants and civilians were killed, and 281 wounded. Perhaps most importantly however, the Dublin battle clarified the civil conflict: it was now the Irish Free State versus Irish Republicans. The Free State had defeated the Republicans at the Four Courts, but the Irish Civil War was far from over. Despite the Four Courts debacle, the IRA still seemed to hold the military advantage. In July, the Free State announced an expansion of the National Army to 35,000 men,

but many of these were young, raw recruits attracted by regular pay. The Dublin Guard, made up of IRA veterans and former Dublin Fusiliers, would become the shock troops of the National Army. But what the National Army lacked in experience, it made up for in firepower. Britain provided the Free State army with rifles, Lewis guns, revolvers, grenades, machine guns, artillery, trucks, armoured cars, and aircraft. The Free State government also instructed the media to reinforce it as the legitimate government: "The Army must always be referred to as the 'Irish Army', the 'National Army', 'National Troops', or simply 'Troops'.

The [IRA] Irregular Forces must not be referred to as the Executive Forces nor described as 'forces' or 'troops'. They are to be called 'bands' or 'bodies'." (Kissane 81/82) The Free State estimated around 12,900 IRA fighters were still active, especially in the south-west. Many of these were veterans of the Anglo-Irish War, although their quality had been diluted by new arrivals following the truce, and they only had one rifle for every two men. Nonetheless, three-quarters of the country could be considered anti-Treaty territory, and the largest and most experienced IRA divisions, the First and Second Southern, were strongly anti-Treaty.

Given IRA weakness, Lynch ordered his units back to their home turf to take over pro-treaty barracks and towns. But some IRA leaders like Séumas Robinson told Lynch he was being to cautious: "Liam… it's absurd to stay in your own areas, for they'll take you piecemeal." (Hopkinson 129) In reality, there was little central control over IRA forces. In July, the National Army began to advance to prevent a rival government from forming in Munster. The IRA abandoned County Wexford, and Lynch tried to form a defensive line running from Limerick to Waterford. But the

line was an illusion: there were few defensive positions, and the IRA rarely contested it. On July 20th, the National Army captured Limerick after a short battle - breaking communications between the IRA in Munster and the north. Waterford fell soon afterwards, followed by Westport, Carrick, Redmondstown and Clonmel by early August. IRA successes were limited to clearing the towns of Skibbereen and Listowel of their pro-treaty garrisons. In most cases, the IRA withdrew in the face of overwhelming firepower, and only fought pitched battles around the villages of Bruree and Killmallock.

In early August, General Dalton shifted his strategy to focus on weak IRA coastal defenses. On August 8th, National Army troops landed at Union House and Yougal in amphibious assaults, which were diversions for the main landing at Passage West near Cork. Exhausted IRA fighters like Frank O'Connor struggled to mount a coherent defence: "Technically, a landing from the sea is supposed to be one of the most difficult military operations, but as we handled the defence it was a walkover." (Cottrell 181) On August 10th, the National Army took the IRA stronghold of Cork, followed by the last IRA military base at Fermoy. After a string of National Army victories, the so-called Munster Republic was over and some IRA

men began to talk of surrender. Instead, Lynch ordered his forces to form flying columns and conduct guerrilla operations. This was a return to their old methods and led to new successes. On August 22, 1922 Michael Collins toured the southwestern regions recently captured by the National Army despite warnings from colleagues. Officially he went to inspect the troops, but oral evidence suggests he wanted to start peace talks with the IRA. In the early hours, Collins and General Dalton left Cork in a convoy consisting of a motorcycle scout, a Crossley tender, a touring car and an armoured car in the rear. When passing through

the valley of Béal na mBláth, the convoy asked a local for directions. Unbeknownst to Collins, the local was also an IRA sentry, who recognised Collins and informed his unit. Assuming the convoy might use the same route to return, the IRA blocked the road with a cart and mined it to prepare the ambush. But by 8pm, the convoy had not returned, and most of the ambushing party left. Five men remained to dismantle the blockade, but just as they got started, the convoy arrived. The IRA men launched an impromptu ambush. Dalton told Collins to drive straight through, but instead Collins ordered his men out to fight. The resulting firefight lasted 30 minutes, during which the armoured

car's machinegun jammed. Towards the end of the skirmish, Collins rose from cover with his rifle in hand and was fatally shot in the head. He was the only casualty on either side. Michael Collins' death is perhaps the single most controversial moment of the Irish Civil War, and who fired the fateful bullet is still hotly debated. The most common suspect is IRA man and former British Army marksman Sonny O'Neill, but there are other theories. Some republican historians suggest he was killed by his own entourage, even by Dalton himself,

because Collins wanted to make peace. Some have said that De Valera set up the hit, and others point to the Scottish gunner on the National Army armored car, since he later joined the IRA. Many of these theories first arose long after the event, based on statements from people who were not there at the time. In any case Collins, the most influential of the pro-treatyists, was dead. So the Free State had lost of its leaders, but the National Army still held the upper hand - and now it cracked down on the IRA harder than ever before.

W.T Cosgrave replaced Collins as Chairman of the Provisional Government. Originally, the British were doubtful about the civilian Cosgrave, but he soon proved a willing commander. Collins had largely been reluctant to instigate harsher policies against the IRA, many of which were his former colleagues. Cosgrave would have few such reservations. From August, the war began to resemble the Anglo-Irish conflict that had come before it, a reality General Dalton recognized: "The [IRA] have now adopted a type of warfare, of which they have years of experience. They now operate over territory which they know. They are now better armed and better trained

than they were against the British. In short, they have placed me and my Troops in the same position as the British were a little over a year ago." (Hopkinson 174) In August alone, the National Army lost 58 men in IRA ambushes, and it now became harder to strike back at IRA groups. As the war began to resemble an insurgency, National Army troops became frustrated. Often the IRA would fire the first volleys in an attack, kill or wound soldiers and then immediately surrender before the National Army could fire back. In such circumstances,

commanders reported it was hard to prevent their troops executing prisoners. Pressure mounted on Cosgrave to allow the official execution of captured fighters as a deterrent to such tactics. The result, in October, was the Army (Special Powers) Resolution. It allowed the military to establish special courts, to try suspected IRA fighters and execute them if necessary. Commander-in-Chief Richard Mulcahy had a blunt message for the Irish parliament: "Life must be taken, if necessary, and it is the responsibility of the government to say that it must be taken." (Enright 26) The Catholic church also lent their support. Captured IRA fighters were

to be denied communion, and an official pastoral made the Church position clear: "The guerrilla warfare now being carried on by the Irregulars is without moral sanction; and therefore the killing of National Soldiers in the course of it is murder before God. " (Kissane 89) In response, Lynch ordered the assassination of all parliamentarians who voted for the resolution. But attacks were immediately answered by the firing squad. In November, the first executions based on the resolution were carried out. Eventually, high ranking republican figures like Rory O'Connor, Liam Mellows and Erskine Childers were executed,

supposedly in response to IRA attacks. The brutal government policy seemed to work, since Lynch abandoned his assassination attempts in December. The government resolution also allowed for official reprisals, which also became increasingly common. The Dublin Guard gained a grisly reputation in Kerry for brutality, including executing IRA prisoners with mines. However, unlike British reprisals in the Anglo-Irish War, the National Army usually directed their attacks against specific individuals, not entire communities.

The IRA's guerrilla campaign in late 1922 began to flounder in the face of government executions, and the republican cause was in trouble. By early 1923, IRA morale had plummeted and men were already disbanding and returning home. Politically too, the anti-Treaty side was in tatters. De Valera was increasingly side-lined by military leaders and failed to form a viable political alternative to the Free State. Meanwhile, as the National Army shifted to cordon and search operations, more IRA fighters and

leaders were arrested or killed. On April 10th, National Army troops fatally wounded Liam Lynch in County Waterford. By the time of his death, 12,000 IRA fighters were in custody. Lynch's replacement, Frank Aiken, understood the struggle was now over. On May 24th, 1923, he ordered all remaining republican units to ditch their weapons and go home. De Valera's joint statement suggested future operations might be possible, but in reality the Irish Civil War was over: "Further struggle on your part would now be in vain and the continuance of the struggle in arms [is] unwise in the national interest. Military victory must be

allowed to rest for the moment with those who have destroyed the Republic." (Cottrell 187) By the end of the fighting, about 750 pro-treaty troops had been killed, along with a similar number of anti-treatyists, at least 78 of whom were executed by the Free State. It's likely that more people died in the Irish Civil War than the War of Independence that preceded it. So why did the IRA, who seemed so effective against the British, fail against the National Army barely a year later? Historians have suggested several reasons. Firstly, the IRA - a mostly irregular formation - was unsuited to position warfare

or defensive battles. Liam Lynch's decision not to push on Dublin has been criticised, as it gave the Provisional Government time to breath, receive British support and take out isolated IRA brigades. Many National Army officers were former IRA men themselves, so they understood IRA tactics and even knew the locations of safehouses and caches. The Four Courts occupation has also been highlighted as naive, wasteful and poorly executed. Even at the time, IRA commanders were criticised for acting like common soldiers - with many being captured as a result. But perhaps the most critical issue for the IRA was a lack of public support. The Four Courts occupation did not get the sympathy of the Easter Rising of 1916, and throughout the civil war,

IRA commanders complained of local hostility in some regions. Anti-treaty leader Harry Boland admitted the population was against them: "There is no doubt that the people in the main is [sic] against us at present, believing that we are to blame for the present state of affairs." (Hopkinson 127/128) Some of the public opposition to the IRA was based on the dire economic situation. Many of the anti-treaty regions were those most economically damaged by the Anglo-Irish War, and IRA activities, and the need to raise finances limited economic recovery. IRA attacks on railways in particular earned public scorn. For a sizable

portion of the public, the Free State seemed to be the only institution capable of providing security, peace and economic recovery after years of conflict. The IRA was no longer the face of popular rebellion, and although attritional guerilla tactics worked against a perceived 'foreign occupier' they were much less effective against a government largely seen as legitimate. But, the end of the civil war was not the end of violence, especially in the partitioned north. Sectarian violence and assassinations would continue, even after Ireland gained full

independence from Britain in 1937. In the 1960s, rival paramilitary organizations, some of whom claimed continuation from the IRA, would engage in a 30-year conflict in Northern Ireland simply dubbed 'the Troubles'. Only in 1998, after nearly a century of violence the Good Friday and Belfast agreements brought peace to Ireland that has lasted more than twenty years. Since you made it to the end of the video, you are probably a fan of detailed history documentaries. We actually produced three documentary series with a combined runtime of more than 9 hours:

16 Days in Berlin and Rhineland 45 feature the last battles of World War 2 in Europe and our series Red Atoms breaks down the Soviet nuclear program from its origins to the Chernobyl disaster and beyond. Unfortunately we couldn't upload these series to YouTube where we have to navigate advertising guidelines and the almighty algorithm. So where can you watch 16 Days in Berlin, Rhineland 45 and Red Atoms? On Nebula, a streaming service we're building together with other creators. If you sign up at nebula.tv/thegreatwar you can watch

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