The Great Retreat of 1915: How Russia Lost the Eastern Front in World War I

The Great Retreat of 1915: How Russia Lost the Eastern Front in World War I

In 1915, the Russian Empire suffered a catastrophic defeat on the Eastern Front during World War I, known as the Great Retreat. Facing a combined German and Austro-Hungarian offensive, the Russian army was forced to abandon Poland, Galicia, and vast territories, losing over a million men. The retreat exposed severe shortages of weapons, ammunition, and leadership, leading to a political crisis that foreshadowed the Russian Revolution. This documentary explores the military and strategic failures that led to one of the war's greatest disasters.

Russia's Great Retreat 1915 (WW1 Documentary). | Transcript:

By early 1915, the Eastern Front ran on a line that left part of East Prussia and much of Galicia in Russian hands, while Central Powers forces occupied part of Russian Poland. In January, the Germans used poison gas for the first time in history, attacking Russian forces at Bolimov with tear gas. The Germans then attacked at the 2nd Battle of Masurian Lakes in February, pushing the Russians out of East Prussia entirely. The Austro-Hungarians were desperate to relieve the besieged fortress of Przemysl and its 100,000 man garrison. So they launched an offensive in the

Carpathian mountains in the dead of winter, with disastrous results. A Russian counteroffensive then captured more ground and critical mountain passes, threatening the Hungarian plain. In another catastrophe for Vienna, Przemysl surrendered in March. The fighting in the first four months of 1915 cost the Russians up to 1 million casualties, while the Austro-Hungarians suffered up to 900,000 - losses they could barely replace, especially the officers. Austria-Hungary's weakness factored into the Central Powers' strategy.

German overall commander Erich von Falkenhayn and other so-called "Westerners" felt the Central Powers should focus on the Western Front in 1915, while Paul von Hindenburg and the "Easterners" thought they should attack in the East. More importantly, something had to be done to help Austria recover, and to dissuade Italy and Romania from joining the Allies. The Russians also had problems. Their pool of trained men was running low, and they were badly short of officers and NCOs. Even worse, Russian industry and Allied suppliers

could not produce enough rifles, bullets, artillery shells, or even boots. The resulting shell shortage meant that Russian artillery would be hard-pressed to support the infantry. Russian General Konstantin von Stackelberg explained the problem to the French ambassador: "We don't have this marvelous ability that allows you French and English to make good during wartime your mistakes made during peacetime. For us, the war simply aggravates the vices of the system, because it imposes on our bureaucrats a task they are doubly incapable of fulfilling." (Le Naour 256) Still, Russian generals argued about where

they should attack next - some wanted to keep up the pressure on Austria-Hungary, while others wanted to focus on Germany. French intelligence warned Russian Commander-in-Chief Grand Duke Nicholas of a possible German attack in the East, but he took no decisive action. Russian authorities also busied themselves with Russifying the Austro-Hungarian territory they'd conquered in 1914 - they deported 200,000 local German settlers (Gattrell 179), forced Polish and Ukrainian schools to teach in Russian, and deported 50,000 Jews, who they viewed as potentially sympathetic

to the Central Powers. Russian troops even drove perhaps 10,000 Jewish civilians across No Man's Land towards enemy lines (Watson 196-197). Before Tsar Nicholas II's visit to Przemysl in April, the Russians deported the entire Jewish community and local Polish leaders. So both sides were caught in strategic dilemmas with limited military means. The Germans struck first, transferring reinforcements to the east for a major offensive to weaken Russia and save Austria-Hungary - even though Falkenhayn did not expect to knock Russia out of the war completely.

In a sign of the worsening relations, Falkenhayn did not tell Austro-Hungarian commander Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf about the plan until just three weeks before it was to begin. The spearhead of the coming Central Powers' offensive was German General August von Mackensen's 11th German and 4th Austro-Hungarian armies. They would lead the advance between the towns of Gorlice and Tarnow, to break through Russian lines and threaten their positions in the Carpathians to the south, and around Warsaw to the north. The Central Powers concentrated about 360,000 troops against the Russians' 220,000 for the planned attack,

and brought up 1500 guns to outmatch the Russians' 700. (Neiberg 78) One of the Austro-Hungarian officers is Conrad's son Erwin. General von Mackensen wrote to his wife on the eve of battle: "A great victory is expected of me, a resounding victory, and yet, in most cases, great victories in battle come at the cost of great losses. When I order my men to attack, how many death sentences am I handing to them? It is this very thought that plagues my mind before every battle." (Lloyd 125) The German and Austro-Hungarian guns opened up early on May 2, sweeping Russian positions with a short hurricane bombardment of just four hours.

The overwhelming weight of shell was meant to destroy Russian positions and clear the way for the infantry to break through. The Russian 3rd Army, under Bulgarian General Radko Dmitriev, had not received the reinforcements he had asked for, and held weak lines in swampy terrain. In just two days, Central Powers forces smashed through the Russians. When Russian units tried to pull back to even weaker secondary defenses, German and Austrian shrapnel cut them to pieces. Many Russian soldiers stood and fought, but many were overwhelmed by the power of German guns. In

the first week of fighting, 140,000 Russian Empire soldiers surrendered - about twice as many as in the great defeat at Tannenberg the year before. The Russian High Command at first hesitated, then sent in its only available reserve corps. But the Russian defense had already collapsed. Their artillery did not have enough shells to fight back - some guns had just one or two rounds to fire per day. Grand Duke Nicholas ordered a defensive stand on the San River, then on the Dniester, but the Central Powers crossed both, so the Grand Duke dismissed Radko Dmitriev on May 20.

As the Central Powers advanced, Russian forces in the Carpathians gave up their hard-won gains and retreated to avoid being encircled. German newspapers trumpeted the victory: "Corps, divisions, brigades and regiments melted away as though in the heat of a furnace. In no direction was escape possible, for there was no spot of ground on which the 400 guns of the Teutonic allies had not exerted themselves. […] Moreover, insanity raged in the ranks of the Russians, and from all sides hysterical cries could be heard rising above the roar of our guns,

too strong for human nerves." (Neiberg 78) The Russians had no answer to the so-called "Mackensen Steamroller": German heavy guns fired from positions out of range of smaller Russian guns, wrecked the weak Russian positions, which German and Austro-Hungarian infantry then took, and the process was repeated. German superiority in the air thanks to models like the Albatross C.I. meant gunners knew exactly where to hit and when. Russian General Anton Denikin's division fought a bitter but hopeless defensive battle: "No cartridges, no shells. Bloody fighting and

difficult marches day after day. No end to weariness, physical as well as moral. Faint hopes followed by sinister dread…Our regiments, although completely exhausted, were beating off one attack after another by bayonet or short-range fire. Blood flowed unendingly, the ranks became thinner and thinner." (Lloyd 150) The Germans brought up super heavy 420mm guns to smash the Russian garrison of Przemysl. German troops entered the town on June 3, much to the frustration of the Austro-Hungarians, who had wanted their troops to liberate it.

After one month of fighting, the Central Powers had advanced up to 160km and inflicted more than 400,000 casualties on the Russians. And still they advanced - in late June, Habsburg troops recaptured the city of Lviv after heavy fighting witnessed by German General Hermann von Francois: "In the trenches, corpses, torn limb from limb, piled on top of one another; machine gun emplacements buried in earth; deep craters gouged by mortar fire; body parts scattered everywhere; the earth hacked to smithereens. A scene that exemplified all the many horrors of war. " (Lloyd145) Mackensen and Conrad were promoted to Field Marshal, and bells pealed out across the Habsburg lands in celebration.

The Central Powers' victory over Russia surpassed even their expectations, but in mid-summer, they were again facing tough decisions and a new enemy. The Russian threat to Hungary was now gone, but a new threat appeared even as the Central Powers were pushing the Russians back. On May 23, Italy declared war on Austria-Hungary and attacked in the Alps. Berlin and Vienna had expected the move, but it still worsened their strategic situation. Conrad wanted to shift his forces west to counterattack the Italians, Hindenburg still

argued for a grand encirclement via the Baltics, while staff officer Hans von Seeckt argued for a pincer attack to capture Warsaw. Falkenhayn wanted to focus on Serbia, and worried he didn't have the strength to continue the offensive in the east and overstretching might lead to a defeat that would influence Bulgaria and Romania towards the Allies. The discussions worsened the already bad relations between the Habsburg and German commands. Even von Mackensen's compliments were backhanded: "Austrian troops did well in the fighting. It is strange how the proximity of the Pickelhaube

affects their attitude in battle." (Lloyd 128) Conrad could barely contain his fury at what he saw as German arrogance: "[Talking to Falkenhyn] is truly one of my hardest duties, which requires endless self-control and self-sacrifice. I can hardly describe how much anger I have to swallow, but for the greater common cause it must be so." (Rauchensteiner 465) Meanwhile, the Russians scrambled to contain the disaster. The generals blamed shell hunger, but failures of command and control, training, and morale were just as important. The Tsar dismissed War Minister Vladimir Sukhomlinov, which made him a convenient scapegoat,

and created a special council to coordinate the war effort. The situation at front also worsened tensions on the home front. There was panic over mostly imaginary spies, unrest in Moscow, and the economy was in trouble - to the point where British and French banks had to bail out Russian banks to prevent financial collapse. Political intrigues flourished in Petrograd, many involving the unpopular Tsarina Alexandra Feodorovna and her spiritual advisor, a monk named Grigory Rasputin. They opposed Grand Duke Nicholas, who had spoken out against Rasputin,

and urged the Tsar to dismiss him: "I have absolutely no faith in [Grand Duke] Nikolai. [I] know him to be far from clever, and having gone against a Man of God, his work can't be blessed, nor his advice be good." (Lloyd 153) So both the victorious Central Powers and defeated Russians faced internal tensions in summer 1915. Front commander General Alekseev told Stavka that he could save the army or hold Warsaw, but not both - a choice he soon had to make. Falkenhayn decided to continue the campaign in the East, and the Kaiser supported him against

an embittered Hindenburg. Mackensen's forces had suffered over 80,000 casualties in May and June, so even more German reinforcements moved east for the operation to take Warsaw. The German plan was to advance against the sides of the Russian salient around Warsaw. General Max von Gallwitz would lead the northern pincer across the Narev river, while Mackensen and the Austro-Hungarians would advance from the south. On July 13, the northern attack began. One of the major obstacles facing the Germans was the system of Russian forts built to protect Russian Poland

from just such an operation. But the Germans were well prepared, having stockpiled 400,000 shells to allow them an even heavier bombardment than in May. German orders for their gunners were similar to what later became known as a rolling barrage: "Artillery must provide the infantry with necessary protection from enemy fire until the breakthrough. Immediately after the last shell has landed, the first man in the assault line must be in the enemy trenches." (Lloyd 159) Each German heavy gun had 1000 shells, while each Russian heavy gun only had about 5 shells

available. There were thousands of guns in the Russian fortresses, but thy were stationary, and their commanders mostly unprepared. In the first few days, the German assault waves sliced through the poorly-armed Russian infantry, despite isolated counterattacks, as one German soldier recalled: "Little close combat was required. The enemy artillery appeared to have been completely overpowered; only a few guns were still being fired. Other than those who abandoned their weapons and hastily fled the

scene, the Russians were either captured or - for those that resisted - killed. Their losses were considerable; ours were but minor." (Lloyd 159) The Germans quickly surrounded the Russian forts and pounded them with heavy guns. The first were mostly older designs, and could not resist modern large-caliber artillery. Some garrisons held out for longer than others, but most fell without making full use of their large stocks of precious shells. The massive Novogeorgievsk fortress held out for just ten days before its garrison of 90,000 surrendered and gave

up tens of thousands of shells, and 1300 guns. The southern Central Powers' attack began July 15, led by Mackensen and General Remus von Woyrsch. The lack of railways, poor roads, and Russian resistance slow their advance, but Lublin fell on July 31, and Austro-Hungarian troops under Woyrsch crossed the Vistula river near Denblin. The two pincers couldn't close, despite the best efforts of Austro-Hungarian officer Josef Pilsudki's Polish Legions, but they made Warsaw untenable. Grand Duke Nicholas reluctantly gave the order to abandon the city, and the Russians implemented a scorched earth policy on their retreat.

They took as much food and supplies as they could, forced all military-aged men to join the retreat, and slaughtered what cattle they could not drive with the army. American journalist Stanley Washburn described the scene as the Germans approached: "Standing on the new bridge one can see great German shells and volcanic fumes, while the heavy reverberations shake the city. Across the Vistula hangs our observation balloon, while the sky is dotted with German aeroplanes, soaring hither and thither amid smoke-puffs." (Lloyd 161) [Stanley Washburn] German troops entered Warsaw on August 5, marking another Central Powers victory and another blow to Russian prestige.

So by early August the Central Powers had taken Warsaw, and now occupied a large chunk of Russian Poland. Millions of civilians now found themselves under occupation or refugees. As the Central Powers advanced, 350,000 residents of Warsaw fled east, joining an estimated 3.3 to 6 million refugees by the time the Great Retreat would end in September. (Lloyd 161) Officer Peter Kondzerovskii witnessed the suffering of a humanitarian crisis that overwhelmed the Russian authorities: "The highway, which was usually deserted, was flooded with a never-ending train of wagons: these were refugees from the western provinces, fleeing from "the Germans". […] The train stretched as far as the eye could see, leaving small mounds with crosses on top

here and there along the road. Those were the graves of babies that did not survive the long journey." (Lloyd 160) [Peter Kondzerovskii] Civilians in the areas controlled by the Central Powers also faced hardship. Habsburg authorities suspected their Ukrainian countrymen of collaborating with the Russians, which led to repressions. They also forced many Poles and Ukrainians in occupied Russian Empire territory to work clearing battlefields of bodies and debris, and building log roads through swamps. Austrian officer Ludwig Hesshaimer recalled:

"In the area of the eastern theatre of war, large portion of the countryside population drafted to road work in labor companies. Because of the lack of men, many strong women were among them. … In Miechow they all wore a piece of white linen cloth with numbers sewed onto the sleeves of their upper arms. They were also made to work the fields." (Rauchensteiner 462) As refugees streamed eastwards, the relentless advance of the Central Powers into the Russian Empire continued in August and September. The Russian army simply could not make a stand, for reasons Russian soldier A.V. Gorbatov well understood: "Adopting a defensive stance after

such a long retreat and among such confusion [weakened discipline]. The soldiers lost heart, began to think the enemy was invincible, lost their faith in the strength of the defence, and considered it only a postponement of further retreat." (Lloyd 160) Despite the unfolding disaster, some Russian units held out to the bitter end. One such episode catapulted the garrison of the Russian fortress of Osowiec to post-war fame. On August 6, the Germans attacked with poison gas, and took the trenches and supporting defensive works outside the main fort. Russian infantry from the garrison then launched several

counterattacks. A Russian survivor later recalled: "I cannot describe the furor and frenzy with which our soldiers marched on the German poisoners. Neither heavy rifle and machine gun fire, nor thick shrapnel could stop the onslaught of our enraged soldiers. [.] There were no laggards, no one had to hurry. Here there were no individual heroes, companies went as one man, animated by only one goal, one thought: to die, but to get revenge on the vile poisoners." (Подвиг псковича) According to post-war accounts, the Germans panicked at the sight of these so-called

"dead men" coughing up blood into the kerchiefs they'd tied around their mouths for protection against the gas. These gory details can't be confirmed, but the counterattack did rout the Germans and retake the Russian positions. But the "attack of the dead men" was the exception. Fortress Osowiec fell to the Germans, as did Kaunas August 18, Delgava on the 20th, Brest-Litovsk the 26th, and Grodno September 2. A final German push took Pinsk and Vilnius in mid-September. The Russians had to throw in a hastily-created new army to stabilize the front

and secure Minsk against a German cavalry thrust. German troops were at the end of their strength: "Exertions, privations, very heavy knapsack, neck and shoulder pain from the rifle and long, difficult marches, extremely tired feet and body. Bad roads-either uneven asphalt or deep sand-and always the uneven fields, marching up and down deep furrows. Often in double-time, and usually no water or at best stinking water, no bread for days on end. […] Nothing but freezing and freezing, and back pains." (Dowling) Tired men, the onset of fall, stretched supply

lines and Falkenhayn's changing priorities brought an end to the German campaign. While Austro-Hungarian troops under German command helped push the Russians deep into Belarus, Conrad was desperate for an independent offensive that would restore Habsburg prestige and recapture the rest of East Galicia. In late August, Austro-Hungarian forces were badly depleted - they had fewer men in the field than in July 1914. Some historians argue they would have made peace with Russian if Petrograd and Berlin had been willing. Still, on August 27, they began the Black and Yellow Offensive east of Lviv. They

took Rivne and Lutsk, but failed to encircle Russian forces as planned. The Habsburg army and its field commanders were simply unable to perform such large, complex operations without German help. Rain and Russian counterattacks added to the Austrians' self-inflicted problems, and the advance degenerated into a series of hesitant local frontal assaults. Conrad was furious with his generals. Meanwhile generals in the field, like Feldmarschalleutnant Hugo Martiny blamed Conrad: "We're all defeated. What's the reason? The scatterbrained and unjustified energy that the

High Command constantly demands of us, until the events, pressure from a superior enemy, and the exhaustion of the troops lead to catastrophe." (Rauchensteiner 471) Catastrophe came in late September. General Nikolai Ivanov's armies counterattacked and threw the Austro-Hungarians back, forcing German units to rush in to stabilize the line. The Black and Yellow offensive failed to restore Austrian prestige, failed to liberate all of East Galicia, and cost the Austro-Hungarians about 230,000 casualties - 70,000 of whom were prisoners. It was the last Habsburg-led offensive of the war on the Eastern Front.

The Great Russian Retreat finally came to an end in fall 1915, marking one of the greatest disasters in Russian military history. Estimates vary, but perhaps 1 million Russian Empire soldiers were killed or wounded, and 800,000 captured between May and October. Austro-Hungarian casualties were perhaps 750,000, and the Germans' perhaps 200,000, though estimates vary widely. The Russian Empire had also lost 300,000 km2 of its western lands. The success of the Central Powers brought mixed results. Bulgaria joined the war on

their side in September, and Falkenhayn argued for a separate peace with Russia to focus on the West. But to other German leaders, it seemed Russia was weak and they were in no hurry to give up their conquests. Hindenburg even thought they could have knocked Russia out of the war if he'd had more men. Austria-Hungary had been saved, though now it was even weaker and more dependent on Germany than before. Russia had been thrown into crisis by the catastrophe. Opposition politicians came together to form the Progressive Block that demanded political and military reforms. The army was still fighting but relations between officers

and men were tense - industrialist Aleksei Putilov even predicted revolution would come soon. Tsar Nicholas II dismissed Grand Duke Nicholas and took a fateful decision: from now on, he would serve as Commander-in-Chief of his armies. His advisors warned him that the public would blame him for any future defeats, and he might even put the 300-year reign of the Romanov dynasty at risk. To this the Tsar replied: "I know. I may perish, but I will save Russia." (Lloyd 162) [Tsar Nicholas II] Russian industry at least, had finally begun to produce enough shells and rifles,

but whether these would be enough for the Tsar to save Russia remained to be seen. Thirty Years after the events of the Russian Great Retreat, the situation would be switched. It was a Soviet Army that pushed back a disintegrating German Army through Eastern Europe and it would be the Germans suffering from supply problems and the Red Army that had material in abundance. And in Early 1945, they would stand at the gates of Berlin. If you want to learn more about the Battle of Berlin, you should check out our 4 ½ hour 18-part documentary series 16 Days in Berlin. Covering the entire battle day-by-day with detailed maps,

animations, expert interviews and more, 16 Days in Berlin is the most detailed documentary about this battle ever produced. With our uncompromising portrayal using authentic combat footage, we couldn't upload it to YouTube because of their advertising guidelines. So, where can you watch 16 Days in Berlin? On Nebula, a streaming service we're building together with other creators, where we don't have to worry about advertising guidelines or the almighty algorithm. Nebula is available in 4K resolution in your browser, on your smartphone, Smart TV or streaming box like Apple TV or Roku. If you go to nebula.tv/thegreatwar you can watch 16 Days in Berlin, our other original

documentaries Rhineland 45 and Red Atoms as well as a host of other smart creators - and all that for just $36 for an entire year. And that's not all, on Nebula you can also watch all our regular videos ad-free and earlier than on YouTube. Right now, you can also get the Nebula Lifetime Membership. Pay once and get access to everything Nebula has to offer for as long as you and Nebula exist. The Lifetime membership allows us to invest in more original content and improve the platform for everyone. One third of your Lifetime membership will also support us at Real Time History directly.

If you want to learn more about the Eastern Front in the First World, check out our documentaries about the Brusilov Offensive and the Russian Collapse in 1917. As usual you can find all the sources for this episode in the video description below. If you are watching this video on Patreon or Nebula, thank you so much for the support, we couldn't do it without you. I am Jesse Alexander and this is a production of Real Time History, the only history channel which requires endless self-control and self-sacrifice to talk about Conrad von Hötzendorf.

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