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The First World War is often seen as futile and pointless. Millions of men fought and died for years, but no one was satisfied with the outcome, which did not bring a lasting peace. But that is not how governments and many people saw the war as it was being fought. So what did the countries fighting actually want to achieve? In other words, what was the purpose of the First World War? To understand why the First World war was fought, we have to look at the war aims of the Great Powers who fought it. War aims are the political, ideological, or economic goals a government decided it wants to achieve or defend by fighting. Sometimes,
the Powers changed their war aims depending on the course of the war, internal debates, or reactions to enemy war aims. We should also remember World War One was a war between states - governments decided to go to war, not banks, arms manufacturers, or other interest groups. Ideologically, most powers saw themselves as fighting for virtuous ideals, like civilization, freedom, and culture, against enemies representing barbarism or soulless materialism. Some have argued that these ideas were the most important aims of all: "We fight not to destroy a nation, but to kill a nest of ideas [.] The ultimate purpose of this war is propaganda, the destruction of certain beliefs and the creation of others." [H.G. Wells] (Strachan FWW 1115)
So bearing that in mind let's start with the Central Powers. When Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia in July 1914, it just wanted a local war to weaken Serbia. Some had long argued for this, while others, like Franz Ferdinand himself, were opposed: "Even if we settled the score with Serbia without anyone troubling us, what would we gain from it? A band of thieves, assassins, bandits, and a few plum trees." [Archduke Franz Ferdinand] (Le Naour 58) But in July 1914 he was gone. Vienna decided that reducing Serbia would preserve its Great Power status and prevent the Serbs from acquiring
Albania or menacing Bosnia in the future. Once the war became generalized, the Austrians debated territorial aims, like the annexation or vassalization of Serbia (though there was no agreement), preservation of the border with Italy, and the possibility of creating a Central-Powers friendly Poland. Some politicians also wanted parts of Albania or Montenegro. Foreign Minister Ottokar Czernin, for example, hoped that if Austria allowed Germany a free hand with Poland, it might get territory from Romania and free hand in the Balkans.
As the situation worsened, Vienna also aimed to maintain its independence, since Germany had taken control of most military decisions. By late 1917 Austria-Hungary had, in a way, won its war: Serbia had been crushed, Russia was all but out of the war, and Italian forces were on the defensive deep in Italy. But the Dual Monarchy's government, economy, society were approaching collapse. It had also become dependent on and subservient to Germany, which represented a failure to preserve its prestige and power. In the final year of the war, Emperor Karl aimed
for a white peace, and to preserve the state by making concessions to the empire's Slavic peoples. Austria-Hungary, of course, achieved none of what it intended when it started the war in 1914. The war aims of its ally Germany, on the other hand, are perhaps the most hotly debated of all. One argument is that Germany long planned on starting a war before Russia got too strong and took advantage of the July Crisis to make a bid for world power in 1914. And in the war's early days, Kaiser Wilhelm and the high command talked of annexing Russian Poland,
the Baltics, Belgium, and northern France. But other historians argue German politicians were more moderate. A fall 1914 policy document known as the September Program discussed possible annexations, satellite states, and more land in Africa - but it also left these questions open. The Program also envisioned a future Mitteleuropa, a German-dominated customs union. German leaders discussed whether the union would include Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Belgium, or perhaps even France, Italy and the Netherlands as well. Mitteleuropa was an economic goal on the surface, but was really about German dominance in Europe.
As the war dragged on, German leaders divided further. Some favoured a negotiated compromise peace, a Scheidemann Peace, while others stuck to maximalist aims, a Hindenburg Peace. Chief of Staff Erich von Falkenhayn's aim was modest: "If we survive against this coalition of superior strength and emerge able to negotiate credibly, we will have won." [Erich von Falkenhayn] (Chickering, 107) Berlin did make a peace offer in December 1916, though Germany refused to evacuate the occupied territories, showing Berlin still hoped for extensive gains from the war. The Reichstag then voted for a Peace Resolution in July 1917 that gave up annexing territory. By then though, Germany had become
a virtual military dictatorship where the High Command held more sway than parliament. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, a dictated peace signed with Bolshevik Russia in 1918, fulfilled Germany's aims in the East: Germany indirectly controlled Finland, Ukraine, the Baltics, and Poland, and maintained occupation forces. The treaty crippled Russia, gave Germany control of Eastern Europe's resources, and, politicians hoped, could be used as a tool in future negotiations with the Allies. Even in summer 1918 many German military leaders, still called for annexations in the west. In the fall, with the army in full retrea t, the civilian government hoped to salvage what it could by embracing Wilsonian self-determination to avoid losing territory.
So German goals did indeed trend towards European dominance. Ironically, partly because of the harshness of Brest-Litovsk, the Allies took a harder line. Meanwhile Germany's Ottoman ally had much more limited aims. The Ottoman Empire joined the war in October 1914, and its aims were shaped by its relative weakness after defeats in recent wars. The Sultan's government reasoned that if they stayed neutral, whoever won the war could impose their will on an isolate ed Constantinople: "The Slavic world is growing more rapidly than its neighbours…a strong Ottoman state
must form an alliance with Germany and take a defensive position against the Russian and Balkan Slavs." [Abdurrahman Cami Baykut](McMeekin 87) Politicians were divided as to which side to join, but the leaders of the governing Committee of Union and Progress chose the Central Powers because they considered the Allies a greater threat - the Russian Empire wanted to conquer their capital, and the French and British had imposed one-sided economic treaties in the past. Holding off the Russians and cancelling the economic "capitulations" would restore the Empire's full independence.
Given the political unrest the Empire had suffered before 1914, and surging Turkish nationalism, the government also used the war to achieve its internal aim of state consolidation. This included repressions that mostly targeted Christian Greeks and, especially, Armenians. The deportation and killing of much of these populations, in the eyes of the government, made the Empire a more stable, Muslim-dominated state. After battlefield success in 1915, the Russian revolution, and Greek entry on the Allied side in 1917 Constantinople formed territorial goals
as well: they wanted the northeastern regions lost to Russia in 1877 (which they briefly recovered after Brest-Litovsk), Aegean islands to protect the Dardanelles, and to recover Egypt and Tripolitania from Britain and Italy. They also planned to increase Ottoman influence in the Caucasus, Iran, and Afghanistan - though Germany was uneasy with this objective. The Ottomans failed to preserve their empire, but paradoxically they did consolidate their state, which contributed to a post-war Turkish Republic. Now let's turn to the Allies, starting with the Russian Empire.
One of St. Petersburg's aims in 1914 was maintaining its Great Power prestige after defeat in the Russo-Japanese War, the Revolution of 1905, and a diplomatic defeat in Austria-Hungary's annexation of Bosnia in 1908. Russian leaders felt they couldn't afford to back down over Serbia in 1914, even though the High Command worried the army wasn't ready for a general war. Tsar Nicholas II made the position clear when war came: "We have now to intercede not only for a related country, unjustly attacked (…) but also to safeguard the honour, dignity, and integrity
of Russia, and her position among the great powers." [Nicholas II] (Schimmelpenninck, 3) During the war, St. Petersburg claimed German and Austro-Hungarian territory, and wanted to prevent Germany from becoming dominant in Europe. Some of this territory might be included in an autonomous Polish kingdom under the Tsar, and they suggested breaking up Austria-Hungary much earlier than any other Ally. The Russians also hoped Serbia would expand at Austria's expense. All this would increase Russian influence in the Balkans. Once the Ottomans joined the Central Powers,
Russia aimed for control of Constantinople and the Turkish Straits, which would allow them access to the Mediterranean and give them control over an Orthodox Holy city. After the February 1917 revolution, the weakness of the Provisional Government and the influence of the Petrograd Soviet changed Russia's aims. The Kerensky government now suggested a negotiated peace without annexations, and framed the war as a struggle to preserve the revolution against reactionary Central Powers monarchies. When the Bolsheviks overthrew the
Provisional Government in October, they wanted peace at any price to consolidate their revolution and focus on the civil war against the counter-revolutionary Whites. France's political and military war aims were mostly about security in the face of a larger, more powerful Germany. Public discussion was limited, but in December 1914, President Raymond Poincaré stated France wanted the return of Alsace-Lorraine, Belgian independence, the destruction of Prussian militarism, and a reorganized Europe that would ensure French security. Parliamentarians hotly debated territorial claims beyond Alsace-Lorraine. Some, both on the right and centre-left, wanted to extend French
influence in some form over Belgium, Luxembourg, and Germany's Saarland and Rhineland regions. More radical politicians proposed that France support an independent state in the Rhineland or even annex it. A few hardliners proposed breaking up all of Germany into smaller pieces. Prime Minister Georges Clémenceau summed up French resolve, equating waging war with achieving war aims: "My foreign policy and my home policy are the same. At home I wage war. Abroad, I wage war… I shall go on waging war." [Georges Clémenceau] (Tison, 4) French leaders also wanted to weaken German economic potential in the future, including
inter-Allied oversight of raw material production in Europe. Some argued for a post-war political union with Belgium and Luxembourg, or a customs union with the Low Countries and Italy - all to secure French influence and security against Germany. What never changed were the objectives to defeat Germany, recover Alsace-Lorraine, and create a new security architecture in Europe. France also developed new imperial ambitions. The Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 granted France direct control and a zone of influence in what were then Ottoman lands in the Middle East,
but Paris never clearly defined France's goals in the region until after the war. France's late-war goals also included future security guarantees from the United States and Britain. American entry into the war, the desire of the French army and people for peace, pressure from the French socialist parties, and the Bolshevik revolution in 1917 all modified French aims. Without Russian support, they dropped the idea of a Rhenish state or breakup of Germany. France had not wanted the breakup of Austria-Hungary for fear Germany might gain from
it, but when President Wilson insisted, the French pushed for the new states in Central Europe to be as large as possible to resist potential German influence in the future - there was even talk of a Greater Poland including Lithuania and part of Ukraine. France also wanted close relations with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia, and potentially Ukraine to counter Germany. In the end France recovered Alsace-Lorraine, gained new colonies and partly weakened Germany, but failed to create a Europe where France was safe - partly because of British resistance.
In 1914, the British government was divided about joining the war, until Germany attacked neutral Belgium. Germany's violation of Belgian sovereignty looked to London like a threat to the international order it wanted to uphold. If Britain didn't join the war, Germany might become the dominant power in Europe and leave Britain isolated - something politician Sir Edward Grey had worried about as far back as 1911: "The moment the weakest Powers in Europe were assailed, either by diplomacy or by force, one by one they would appeal to us to help them.
[If we] sat by and looked on and did nothing, then people ought to realise that the result would be one great combination in Europe, outside which we should be left without a friend" [Sir Edward Grey] (Jeffrey, 47) Britain saw the restoration of Belgian independence, reducing German military and naval power, and limiting German influence in Africa and the Middle East as its primary war aims in 1914. To keep Britain's global empire and maritime trade secure, Germany must not be able to project its power on the high seas. In 1916, Britain added imperial expansion to its goals, with the Sykes-Picot Agreement dividing
the Ottoman Middle East with France. Britain's potential new territories in the region would improve the security of the Suez Canal and sea lanes to India, and provide more resources, especially oil. British presence in the Middle East would also counter future Russian influence, especially once Russia became a hostile Communist power in late 1917. These Realpolitik war aims conveniently overlapped with liberal ideas of free trade, and the independence and freedom of small nations: "We have battled and will continue to battle our hardest for the common cause in Europe. But on
behalf of that cause, as well as in defence of our existence, we shall find ourselves compelled to complete the liberation of the Arabs, to make secure the independence of Persia, and if we can, of Armenia, and to protect tropical Africa from German economic and military exploitation. All these objects are justifiable in themselves and don't become less so because they also increase the general sphere of British influence, and afford a strategical security [.]" [Leo Amery] (Jeffrey, 58) During the Peace Conference, the UK's diplomatic goals shifted to trying to make sure German commerce would partly recover,
and that France would not become too dominant in the post-war order. The UK achieved imperial expansion, restored Belgian independence, and eliminated the German fleet and colonial empire. Italy though, was quite unhappy with its results. Italy joined the Allies in 1915, since nationalists wanted to complete the unification of the country that had started in the 19th century. Their position won out over the neutralist and socialist camps, both of whom wanted to keep Italy out of the war. Rome didn't have clear war aims before Italy joined, but its claims soon grew according to the policy known as "sacred egoism."
Italy wanted Austro-Hungarian territory - not only where Italian-speakers lived, but defensible so-called natural borders in the Alps and surrounding the Adriatic. They also hoped for new imperial conquests in Ottoman Anatolia and the Aegean, and possibly a deal to expand Italian colonies in Africa in exchange for the British and French taking German colonies elsewhere. Later in the war, Italians debated whether they would be strong enough to protect everything they claimed if they ever received it - especially after the Russian revolution removed an ally and
potential rival. The threat of a victorious Tsarist Russia influencing Central European Slavs on Italy's doorstep disappeared, and a potential Yugoslav state became the new challenge. Prime minister Vittorio Orlando saw an opportunity: "When imperial Russia's triumph was a possibility, with the immense influence it would have gained over the Slavs of Austria and the Balkans, which would have become one of its branches to the Adriatic and the Mediterranean, taking territorial precautions could be justified. Not today. Today the Slavs of Austria, the Serbs,
the Yugoslavs are very disheartened; they feel they have lost their ancient and powerful protector, and look to us. If we know how to handle things and we offer them friendship, our prestige, in the alliance, as the main protectors of their cause, will increase, after the Russian protection has failed […].": [Vittorio Orlando] (Baravelli, 5) But the more aggressive camp, led by Foreign Minister Sidney Sonnino or extreme nationalists like Gabriele D'Annunzio, won out, and Italy retained its early-war goals, supported the complete dismemberment of Austria-Hungary, and clashed with the Yugoslavs over territorial claims at the Peace Conference. When the peace treaties were signed, Italy
gained less territory than Rome expected, its relations with Yugoslavia were poor, and it was wracked by social unrest. It temporarily also gained territory in Anatolia, which it quickly gave up in the face of Turkish resistance and instability at home. The United States entered the war in April 1917 with political and ideological objectives: to protect its own security and to remake the international order. Many Americans saw the Central Powers' actions as a direct threat to US safety. Beyond the US lives and property lost to German U-Boats when the US was still neutral, the infamous Zimmerman Telegram,
in which Germany proposed an alliance with Mexico against the US, caused Washington to see Germany as a real threat. And, if the Central Powers won the war, that might mean a worrying German presence in what the US saw as its backyard - a peace settlement might have seen the Germans make claims for territory or bases in French or British possessions in the Caribbean, South America, or even Canada. So, one US war aim was to eliminate this potential danger, since Washington feared if they stayed neutral, a Central Powers victory prove dangerous.
The most well-known US war aim was to reimagine an international order based on democracy, free trade, and self-determination. The new system would be upheld by the League of Nations, which President Wilson wanted to create as part of the peace settlement. At first, Wilson called for peace without victory, and saw the root problem of the international system, and the cause of the war, as imperialism and autocracy. But, partly because of the harsh terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918, Wilson became convinced that Germany had to be
weakened. However, in contrast to the British and French, he still wanted Germany to quickly recover and join the post-war League of Nations. Wilson's advisor, Colonel House, hoped the League of Nations would guarantee peace with Germany: "… if after establishing the League, we are so stupid as to let Germany train and arm a large army and again become a menace to the world, we would deserve the fate which such folly would bring upon us." [Edward House] (Macmillan 182) In the end the US achieved its own security goals by contributing the defeat of the Central Powers,
but did not achieve Wilson's international vision, and did not join the League of Nations. So while it is often said that the First World War was fought for nothing, historically speaking this wasn't the case for the countries who fought it. They all had distinct war aims, some moral, some expansionist, and some defensive, which changed and evolved over the course of the war. What they did not know is that both victors and vanquished would be forming new war aims just 20 years later. And unlike 1918, the Second World War in Europe wouldn't end with a ceasefire but
only with unconditional surrender of Germany in May 1945. In the final weeks of the war the Red Army launched a massive offensive from the banks of the Oder river to take Berlin, the capital of Nazi Germany where its leader Adolf Hitler was holding out in his bunker. The Battle of Berlin is one of the biggest battles in history, but often overlooked in classic World War 2 documentaries. That's why we produced the most detailed documentary about the final assault on Berlin. With a total runtime of over 4 hours, our documentary series 16 Days in Berlin
follows the battle day by day featuring detailed maps, infographics, authentic combat footage, expert interviews and much more. Due to the uncompromising portrayal of the Second World War, we cannot upload this documentary to YouTube. So, where can you watch 16 Days in Berlin? On Nebula, a streaming service we're building together with other creators. On Nebula you can watch our exclusive documentaries like 16 Days in Berlin, all our content ad-free and other awesome creators like Epic History TV. If you go to nebula.tv/thegreatwar you can sign up for
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