6:33
Shashank, I was with you in Washington last week, and we heard from many people that we should prepare to resume kinetic attacks on Iran. Do you think this will happen fairly quickly after the midterm elections? Well, Danny, as you know, being here, one of the things about this city is that the circle of decision-makers is quite narrow, so many people are left to guess. But my feeling after talking to many people, including you, and after you left, is that the risk of escalation is very high. And, by the way, it's not just about Trump. This is due to the feeling that Benjamin Netanyahu, who of course also came out beaten after the recent national elections, may have an incentive to resume
attacks on Iran because he has unfinished business. And, of course, on a more cynical note, it would delay coalition talks and help avoid the prospect of him losing power in Israel. And there is a feeling that he is also discussing with Trump the possibility of a joint attack. I think it's quite possible. What's surprising is that there is not a single person in the Trump administration who, in your opinion, would sincerely support such an idea. Not J.D. Vance, not Stephen Miller, not his aides, not Susie Wiles, his chief of staff. It's sometimes hard to understand who really wants a full-scale resumption of war with Iran, but there's a premonition that we're headed that way. And of all the foreign policy crises
we could talk about-Russia-Ukraine, Cuba, or the summits with North Korea-I think Iran is the one that will grab the most political attention after this election. And I think many outside the United States will ask themselves: How is it possible, if the Democrats gain control of one or both houses of Congress, that the president would then respond by, you know, inciting kinetic war? Ca n't they stop him? No, they can't. And David's example of the "surge" in 2007 is a perfect example, actually, a very similar case. At the time, the Iraq War was very unpopular, but Bush believed he could do it.
However, I believe we should monitor oil prices. I mean, there was resistance to the extension, and oil prices are approaching $120 a barrel. They are moving in this direction in part because of speculation about actions after the midterm elections. But you see that if active actions begin, they will go even higher. China, which previously held back the price, has exhausted a significant portion of its reserves and may not be able to do so again. And I keep asking myself, what does this really accomplish?
I mean, if the mood in Tehran suddenly changes and they decide to sit down at the negotiating table, and it's interesting that there are rumors that J.D. Vance is starting to establish contacts with Tehran. This might shift things. I somehow don't see much strength in this. What I can't understand is how a long-term, large-scale bombing campaign against Iran can achieve anything when one has already been launched and destroyed all the obvious and easy targets. But to clarify on your first point: do you think the sharp rise in oil prices will deter President Trump from such actions?
Yes, I think if it affects the markets, he is sensitive to it, and that has been the trend so far. He, of course, said during one of his many campaign rallies that the result of the Republicans losing control of Congress would be a crash, a stock market crash. So he is preparing the ground for this. But I think he's very, very sensitive about it, and if he's concerned about his legacy as president, the prospect of becoming Herbert Hoover worries him. He won't want to be one. There is another view I have to voice: there are people in the administration who believe that Trump is keeping Iran where he wants it. Oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz. The Iranian regime is running out of oil
stored afloat in places like Asia, and an economic crisis is looming in Tehran, so Trump should just wait and strangle them. The problem is-and you'll hear this from military people connected to the Department of Defense and the Navy-that the cost of maintaining this blockade is having an extremely devastating impact on the U.S. Navy. For every month of the blockade, one expert suggests, the US Navy's combat readiness is reduced by about a year. And I think the debate about whether it's better to slowly strangle Iran or to escalate sharply with short-term costs is one that really worries the administration.
And this is a key discussion, because if Trump wants to use the two years he has left to accomplish something, he needs to act decisively. As long as this exists, it is a real problem for him. Yes, the question is whether a new bombing campaign will help eliminate this. David, you just got back from the Persian Gulf. Can you tell us what they think about this? Both in terms of Iran's likely calculations and in terms of what you think the impact of the election results in Israel will be, where it is obviously not yet entirely clear who will be able to form a government. How will this affect the state of affairs?
One senior official from Zatoka used the word "angry." This is how they feel about this situation. Some of them are more inclined to blame Donald Trump than others. Some want to put all the blame on Israel. But there is a real sense, regarding your comment about Trump's calculations with high oil prices, that America is also making good money. Its energy exports are growing rapidly. You know, some energy companies don't think so, at least in the Gulf. In Zatoka, these are only solid minuses. You know, if you go to a country like Qatar, where I was, they only get 5% of their pre-war LNG supplies. They are simply stunned by it. They say a new wave of strikes is coming. They don't see any logic in this. Also, an
interesting detail, I was told that they are very concerned that the Iranians, with whom they constantly communicate, have a very naive idea that Donald Trump's defeat in the midterm elections will be great for Iran , because the Democrats will supposedly restrain Trump. And the Qataris are literally giving the Iranians lessons in American politics, saying, "It doesn't work that way." "He is actually in charge of foreign policy." "You really have a ridiculous plan." So, the Iranians are literally saying, "We don't want to make any concessions to him before the midterm elections because we want him to lose in the House and the Senate." It's as if they are playing into American domestic politics. And the
Qataris answer them: guys, you don't understand what you're doing. This sounds like a potentially catastrophic miscalculation on all sides, but what about Israel? Is there a possibility that Bibi Netanyahu has similar calculations, namely: in the current uncertainty, when the government has not yet been formed, it is possible to act quickly. There was a lot of suspicion, paranoia, call it what you want. Remember last week we saw these planes flying up to the Iranian border and turning around? The Gulf Obsession: What Was It? Has Israel already tried to provoke war? It is generally believed that Benjamin Netanyahu benefits from the resumption of hostilities. They can't explain why that would be a good thing. They
only strongly suspect that he sees this as his own benefit, and it is bad for the Gulf, and even for Israel itself, for the region to become completely unstable, for American bases in the Gulf to be attacked, and perhaps for the Americans to redeploy their forces, for example, to Israel. There is now complete distrust of Israel's motives Yes, our correspondent Anshel Pfeffer believes that this gives Netanyahu the opportunity to call for the formation of a national unity government. So maybe that's the point. But I also think we need to take a step back and look at the state the war leaves Iran's nuclear program in: it has suffered enormous damage, but the enriched uranium
, highly enriched uranium, is still there, hidden. The possibilities remain, and for the Israelis, it is truly an unfinished business. So I think that in the medium term, there is a difference in calculations between what Israel thinks about the threat from Iran and what America thinks about it. For Israel, the calculation is certainly different, but from an American perspective, what I hear from all of you is an uncomfortably high risk of returning to active hostilities without a clear end result. I think so too.
