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It's crazy because three, four months ago, we meant to topple the regime and now this regime is forcing us new equations because we failed in the war. Short time ago, the United States military began major combat operations in Iran. Today, President Trump says Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatah Ali Hami was killed in the attacks. The Pentagon is weighing a takeover of that island as a way to force the reopening of the street of Hormuz. Iran begged for this ceasefire and we all know it.
Does anyone really think that someone can tell President Trump what to do? Come on. I'm Venicia Rainey and this is Iran the latest. It's Tuesday, 9th of June, 2026. Day 102 of the war and day 62 of the ceasefire, which ladies and gentlemen, is back on. As for the exchange of strikes we saw yesterday and the day before between Israel and Iran, nothing to see here. It's all over. We're back to vague suggestions from Trump that a deal is imminent. Last night, he said the US and Iran were in the final throws of a deal. We heard previously that he thought one might be struck on Tuesday or Wednesday before all of this
happened. So let's see if anything comes of that. World Cup starts on Thursday. As we discussed yesterday, a potential deadline that he'd like to get things wrapped up before. But one thing we have learned from the past few days and that is the diverging US and Israeli views on this war. That aspect of this has been thrown into sharp relief. Israel believes there is unfinished business in Iran. The US can't wait to declare the whole thing over. And those competing interests very nearly unraveled. For now, Trump has managed to keep a handle on it all. Now, in yesterday's episode, we did a review of the last 100 days of war with an American, former General Ben Hodges, and an Iranian analyst Holly
Dagris. The full chat was filmed and is exclusively on YouTube. So, if you're listening on your podcast app and you're a bit confused, you need to go to YouTube. We will post a link to it in the show notes. Apologies for initially forgetting to do that yesterday. I have since corrected. We will also publish it as an audio episode on these audio feeds this weekend. But if you can't wait, do go watch it now. It's very good. We originally wanted to include an Israeli voice in that discussion given that they are the third major player in the war, but plans fell through last minute. So, we're going to tackle that perspective today instead. Why does Israel want to continue this war? What more does it
want to do in Iran that couldn't be done in 40 days of intense bombing? And what's its strategy to tackle Hezbollah in Lebanon? But first, a quick update on where we're at this morning. So, Iranian media reported that two Iranian soldiers were killed in Monday's attacks by Israel. I haven't seen any other reports of other casualties at around midday on Tuesday, but the usual caveats apply in terms of reporting censorship restrictions inside Iran. Intriguingly, we have had some more details on a US Apache helicopter that crashed off the coast of Oman yesterday near the straight of PMUS. Apparently, it was a mechanical failure.
Um, we've heard that the US used an unmanned Navy surface drone, so a drone boat basically, to rescue the two crew members. Quite an interesting development there. Trump says both of the crew members are fine. Tran state media did acknowledge the crash, but didn't say anything more. We do know that Apache helicopters have been a key asset for the American military to enforce the blockade on any ships going to Iranian ports. So, we assume it was there doing that. Whether it was caught in some kind of crossfire, that's not clear at the moment. Fighting is continuing in Lebanon. The Israeli military has continued to bomb targets a day after Iran called for the attacks to stop and threatened a severe response if
they didn't. Eight people have been killed in the southern city of Ty. There are more evacuation orders there. We've seen scenes of people fleeing. And some Christians have been calling for the international community to help protect the ancient Phoenician city known as Sur in Lebanon. We've also seen reports of a lone gunman who was shot dead after trying to cross into Israel from southern Lebanon and opened fire on Israeli troops. Residents in nearby Israeli villages were told to stay indoors while the army searched the area. Those are all the news updates. We're going to take a short pause now and coming up afterwards, who are the biggest winners and losers of the war so far from an Israeli perspective.
Welcome back. You're listening to Iran, the latest. Now to discuss the Israeli perspective on the conflict. I'm joined by Danny Satrinovich, senior researcher in the Iran and Shiite Access program at Israeli think tank, the Institute for National Security Studies. He previously served 25 years in the Israeli Defense Intelligence, including as head of the Iran branch. Joining us now from Tel Aviv. Welcome to Around the Latest, Danny. Good to have you back on. We're speaking in the aftermath of an explosion of violence that was triggered by, as far as I can tell, an entirely predictable attack by Hezbollah on northern Israel, which triggered an attack by Israel on Beirut, which triggered an attack by Iran on Israel,
which led to Israel attacking Iran. What do you think the last few days have taught us about the state of the war? When we are analyzing what happened in the last two days and connecting that to what actually happened in the war, it's safe to say that despite the u the operational achievements of Israel and the US during the war, this was a colossal failure. If we have after the war a regime in Iran that is ready to attack Israel when Israel attacking the denut not even attacking in Iran and then we have a US administration that is rushing to contain the Israeli reply or response then it's obvious that it's not a win it's a failure but the problem is that it's not ending there Iran is not
only forcing Israel a new equation when Israel will attack in Beirut in the future probably have another barge of missile coming from Iran but I think that what is really alarming from the Israeli standpoint is the fact that the US is highly interested in reaching an agreement but definitely not interested in returning back to the war. So Israel is so dependent on the US that this is problematic also in front of the Israeli deterrence towards Iran because Iran will know in the future that um Israel will not be supported by the US and this is something that is very damaging to the Israeli ability to project power against Iran.
How have we got here? Because this war started with Israel going in to strike Iran alongside the world's most powerful military. Presumably Netanyahu thought this is the opportunity I've been waiting for years, decades. And now we're in a place where, as you say, most Israelis, I think, share your view that Israel's hands are tied as they're trying to deal with threats to their national security. How did we get here? Yeah, it's very interesting because if you, you know, return back to 28th of February, we were all in a furia. Well, not me, but a lot of people were in a foria saying that this is the dream come true that US and Israel work together to
topple the regime. This was really the uh the dream of Netanyahu since he entered the Israeli politics that he managed to persuade the American president actually to do that. And this is actually happened 8 months after he persuaded Trump to attack Odinat. So definitely he had a lot of influence on the American president. But it's obvious that there was an overestimation on relying on air force and yes Israel air force US air force are amazing but you cannot do things you're missing boots on the ground you cannot do everything from the air and second you know everybody thought about you know from the Kurds to jug they build actually this puzzle on the very bad pieces that are not connected together but I think uh the
common dominator is the hubris thinking that you're too strong and they're too weak and you can do whatever you want and That combination is very problematic one. Yes, Israel control the Iranian sky. Yes, we have operational intelligence superiority. But at the end of the day, you cannot change a trajectory of a nation that you know more than 500 years are is independent. Even if you had achievements when you're comparing that to the purpose you put in the beginning of the war, obviously it's a failure. And I think it's a problem. And I think we see that now in the gap that was created between Israel and the
US when Israel as I mentioned trying to reach agreement and Israel is still thinking about returning back to war. Maybe the only country in the world that really interested in returning back to war against Iran. Were we always going to reach this point where American and Israeli interests in this war would diverge and Trump would end up trying to restrain Netanyahu or is there a version of this war where we could have ended up with things going well for the Israelis from the Israeli perspective? What's happening between Trump and Netanyahu is really fascinating, fascinating, and also in a good way for the for Israel. You know, Trump is really supported by Israel and
rightly so. I think he is a president that really supported Israel cause. If you remember what happened in Gaza, the releasing of hostages and I think even said that one of the strength points that Israel has is his relations with Trump and Trump support the Israel and I think what is happening in these days and especially since the war that now we truly understand that Trump has his own interests and sometimes the Israeli interests are not aligned with the US interests and I think what's happening here again it's like you know the u the fly running with the elephant and saying to him Look how much dust we are doing. I'm not saying that Israel is a fly, but definitely when
you're going to war with a superpower like US, you have to know one important thing that they will determine how it's going to start and how it's going to end. And I think that Netanyahu didn't actually uh implement this way of thinking. Really thought that he can still influence Trump. But Trump move forward. He doesn't have an interest to returning back to the word. And I think that's creates problem in the ability to influence Trump. And I say even more than that. Why it's so problematic for Israel? Because when Obama was president, it was easy for Netanyahu to give speech against Obama in the Congress, whatever. If Trump will reach with Iran, nobody can bypass him from the right, not the Republicans, not the
Democrats. And what we have then it's a collapse of the Israeli standpoint regarding Iran because we highly depending on the support from the Americans and the fact that we see eye to eye regarding the need to topple the regime. Now what we have now is a different story and it's not we're not aligned and if Trump will reach a limit with Iran that would be the end from the Israel ambitions to topple the regime. So this is a very problematic situation that we got into and we really in a stark difference what we had in the end of February when you started this campaign. You mentioned that Israel is probably the only country that wants this war to continue. Why is that? What exactly militarily does Israel think there is
still to achieve that couldn't be achieved in 40 days of intensive bombing? It's a very good question. Uh because I think the missing piece of course is hitting the energy facilities in Iran. Look, Israel first and foremost, we are interested, you know, is interested in the regime obviously, but if not, then Israel is interested in transforming Iran to become a failed state, a country that cannot pose a threat to the state of Israel. No missile, no nuclear, whatever. So I think that Israel believes that hitting hard of the energy facilities, the oil and the gas and the power plants and electricity, those things actually will force Iran to choose between putting money to build
its military capabilities or putting money investing to rebuild its infrastructure. And I think that Israel is hoping that eventually that will transform Iran not to become a threat to the state of Israel. The problem is that in Israel we don't understand one important thing that nobody will allow us to do that especially no Trump because what we created in the Gulf is more or less like a mutual destruction in terms of energy mad concept like we had between the USSR and the USA meaning that everybody knows that if we attack the energy facilities in Iran, Iran will retaliate and against the energy facilities in the Gulf that will create economical ecological damage to the entire planet. So I think Israel is
hoping to do that but Trump will not allow us I think anytime soon to do that because he knows what will happen then the implication on the oils revenues oil prices and things like that would be dramatic. So I think Israel is hoping to do that but I don't think it will happen and that leave us to attacking the same facilities that we attacked beginning of the war knowing that the underground facilities in Iran it will be very hard for the IDF to attack and so I don't think we have something dramatic more than that and I don't think we have the ability to attack the LG facilities because of the restraints coming from Washington. You mentioned ground troops earlier. We heard reports that Israel
set up elite troops in Azabaijan. I think I saw last week. We obviously heard lots about two secret bases in Iraq. They were operating out of I don't know if there were ground troops supposed to be based there. Can you talk a little bit more about that element of the plan and why it didn't happen? Well, I have to say that is denying. I don't know if it's true or not because they want to preserve the good relations with Iran. I can understand even if it's right why they're denying. were definitely a very important country for Israel and also in terms of Iraq is running a college that but I would say something in general even if we had bases in those places it was very for tactical missions like saving pilots if
they were been shutting down or things like that the main problem that we had in this campaign or one of the main problems that we had America had is the fact that we didn't have any plan to use boots on the ground and know maybe tactical thing maybe commander thing but nothing in terms of invasion or making K island all those things why it's so important because then you're relying on proxies like the Kurds and we all knew listen another flood assumption the Turks would never prove that let alone the Iranians and of course the sheepishes in Iraq that the Kurds will invade to Iran so I think it was obvious that will call Trump and say listen forget it and Trump will say yes and I
think but even if he wouldn't say yes it doesn't matter the Kurds wouldn't have changed anything in terms of how the war will develop so I'm turning back to constraints while you are not using your own forces because you're afraid of soldiers being kidnapped or killed then you're missing a significant part in your ability to topple the regime and if you're relying on people like or the Kurds it's obvious it's a loose cannon you cannot really control them let alone what happened is the basis probably if there were bases probably tactical one I think the main problem was the fact that we don't have the ability to use the military or the Israeli army in order actually to continue and invade Iran
It sounds you know problematic in from begin with but if you are putting uh the purpose of toppling the regime but not you're not willing to bring the necessary troops to do that then you failing happened in this campaign. Can you talk about the Lebanon aspect of this war from Israel's perspective? We've seen more strikes today. I believe eight people killed in the southern city of Ty saw in Lebanon. Israel is clearly intending to continue its campaign against Hezbollah. We know it has a sort of agreement with Lebanon to create these pilot zones where the Lebanese army will come in, but the Lebanese army have also been attacked by the Israelis.
They held a funeral over the weekend. Can you just talk us through the logic of the Israeli military campaign, what they're trying to achieve, and how viable you think that is? Yeah, and again, I'm I'm sorry I'm not the bear of good news here. And I'm saying that because in Lebanon, we have a strategic opportunity. Joseph Salam. I see them as brave people. Especially Joseph looking his interview to CNN. The Lebanese president. Yeah. The Lebanese. He's the level of Sadat. I'm not really exaggerating. You know, when you have war against your country, and you're still negotiating with the enemy, Israel, and you're willing to move the extra mile, I think
that we have to do everything to strengthen him. am. Now, I'm not ignoring the fact that the Lebanese armed forces are weaker than it will very hard to dismantle militarily, but I'm saying that Israel need to do things, dramatic things, even withdraw from Lebanon order to strengthen the Lebanon forces now and the power that we have in Lebanon that we don't have strategy. We don't know what we're going to do. you know uh we caught uh in the problem during the campaign you know 40 hours after we decapitated Kzbala launched missiles against Israel and put us in some sort of strategic trap because we didn't have strategy to cope with that now definitely we're stronger than is weak after we decapitated but it's still very strong in Lebanon
and can still cause damage now Israel cannot dismantle this organization by force we cannot in order to do so we need to invade and control over or Lebanon we don't have enough troops for that and if we had we don't want to turn back to 82 2006 we don't want to be there we don't want to rebuild the security zone it's a major problem but we want to defend our northern border that's important the problem we don't have the strategy to do that we are continuing attacking in Lebanon while negotiating with the Lebanese government and I'm not sure that is helping the Lebanese government to fulfill its mission I think the battle thing need to be as we are strengthening Lebanese armed forces and withdrawing from
Lebanon and of course agreeing on some sort of a borderline agreement that will strengthen those in Lebanon that believe in negotiation with Israel. Now Israel is trying to hold you know hold it in two ways attacking Lebanon but also negotiating. I'm not sure it will bring us anywhere. But I really think we have to go return back to the drawing board and think hardly how we going to use more the diplomatic muscle less the military muscle in order to reach this kind of understanding strengthening al and his friends and thus changing the reality of Lebon not to do that unfortunately will be in the Lebanese quagmire. Soldiers will die unfortunately and without reaching some sort of strategic purpose or target. You
mentioned Sedat. You compared the Lebanese president to a former Egyptian president, Anoir Sedat. He signed a peace deal to remind our listeners in 1979 with Israel and it was a landmark moment. It was a really historic peace treaty with a neighbor which they previously been at war with. Do you really think there is the potential for that kind of historic moment to create peace between Lebanon and Israel here? Definitely. But we have to remember one thing about that they're not going to be a peace between Israel and the Arab world without moving forward on the Palestinian issue. You know, we're turning back to Sada. The relations between Israel and Egypt today are
catastrophic because relations between Israel, what Israel is doing in West Bank and in Gaza and the Israeli wishes to push the people that live in Gaza to uh to Egypt. And I think it's a major problem. We have to rethink how they clear about that as well. But returning back to Lebanon, I think that um we have a major problem because again we are not using the political diplomatic vessel. We're only using the military one. And I think even more than that when you're looking at what is happening uh right now uh in the war in the negotiations I think that uh we have to uh return we turn back as I mentioned really think about how to improve the this kind of uh negotiation how to give
tangible earning to those who actually want to interact with the state of Israel. And I think that what is happening right now is as we are continue the attacks in Lebanon and especially in Beirut regardless of what happened with Iran actually we are justifying those in Lebanon who are saying we need to work against Israel and not for Israel and I think but the problem is that after 7th of October in general terms I have to say that Israel is relying only on the F-35 or only on the F-15 neglecting those issues. Now we have you know Iran is a problem in Israel but the legitimacy of Israel in places from the US standpoint in Great Britain in Europe in general is so problematic. It was what because we had
an endless war but we have to understand that without ending those conflicts and moving forward then nothing will happen. Now we turn back to normalization. No normalization between Israel will happen if Israel will not move forward on the Palestinian issue. And then you have the Saudi as a key not only formalization of Saudi Arabia but also with Syria and Lebanon. So the Lebanese will not sign a peace agreement with Israel even if we have some sort of a progress on the borderline until we have something on the Palestinian issue. We have to accept that. We have to understand that and
it's our actually interest to find a solution for that because we don't want to be a one-state solution. Then things will be very hard for Israel from in terms of legitimacy. So yes, I think we can reach an a peace agreement. Yes, in in the way I think we can bring some sort of a security arrangement that will lead us to that agreement, but full normalization will occur only if Israel will move forward also on the Palestinian issue. Do you think your views are widely shared in Israel? You've got an election coming up in October. I saw some polls suggesting that Netanyahu's block might win again. Do you think there's much political will to move in that sort of
direction? It's very hard, you know, to know because we are very close in terms of the polls right now and the in the election Israel will be dramatic and historical one because it will set the tone for the future state of Israel. But even then, I have to say something about the Israeli policy. You know, we had a government of change before turned back to be prime minister with Bennett Laid and actually didn't change much the policy of the state of Israel. Yes, we had uh different prime ministers that physically were seated in Jerusalem, but spiritually the policy was still there focusing on Iran, you know, laid refusing to talk to Abu Maz because it's in Holocaust denial and Abu Mazan. Abu Mazan, the um common
name for Mahmud Abbas, the Palestinian president. Yeah, exactly. And I think that this is another problem because if we have a change of gods in Israel, I think there is need to change also the policy. Now we'll have a right-wing government regardless who's going to be elected because Bennett uh Lieberman uh all those people are very right-wing even more than Netanyahu sometimes. So I think that the problem that we have is I'm not sure that even change of gods in Israel will bring change of policy in Israel and I think it's much needed because as I feel things happening in US and in Europe we cannot have it both ways. I think we're getting to a very
dangerous junction when Israel is perceived as poisoned in terms of its behavior especially what's happening in the West Bank back in Gaza and Israel you know we are not island and geography wise but geopolitics wise we are an island and I think we cannot uh you know we relying economically on Europe it's crucial for us and I think what is happening right now can really put us in a real danger this is why I'm hoping that the change if there will be a change regardless which prime minister will be a change also in terms of politics and I think we maybe something good will come out from the failure against Iran because then it's really forcing us to rethink our policy nobody will support again as I mentioned
I think the policy topple the regime but that will maybe force us to think broadly on how we are can erude the Iran activity in the region and the first thing to do that is normalization in Saudi Arabia you brought up the West Bank and Gaza there we don't talk about it very often on this podcast these days because we're so focused on Iran, but it was a subject that we covered a lot obviously over the last few years. What is the security situation like there at the moment? We hear a lot about settler violence in the West Bank. I know there was a stabbing by an Arab-Israeli inside Israel last week. In Gaza, it seems like air strikes have picked up again. Can you just talk us through a sort of a broad picture of
the security situation there? Yeah, I think that in Gaza we are in stalemate. We passed the first stage of the peace plan, but now as it Israel is demanding Hamas to dismantle its capabilities and Hamas is disan is demanding to not being dismantled but to join some sort of unified Palestinian force and I think this stalemate won't going to move and I think that um as things going or not moving in the right direction in Gaza then the chances of a new escalation are becoming extremely high. Not that the US is highly interested in that and I think that is US is putting some sort of a red line for Israel regarding that. But I think that uh for now the ability to find a solution to the Gaza issues limited
especially because the natural solution will be the bring the back the Palestinian authority to Gaza. This is something that Israel is totally against because in order to create this kind of unification that will lead to political demands by the Palestinians. So um Gaza is the stalemate. Westbach is another problem. uh we have you know maz and hudabas controlling uh the basin is I think over 90 and they have a lot of problems political economical one corruption but of course we have also the Israel activity and I think u we have ministers in the government that calling for annexation of the uh territories and we have of course as we mentioned the violence within the west
bank and it seems that Israel is not able or is not willing to stop it um now there's a lot of discussion in Israel about that the latter of pushing also from the right people in politics to stop this violence that's really erruding the legitimacy of the Israel but I think the combination of a stainment on the pol political side and us moving towards an election period that it's a fatal ground for those elements that definitely they're not the majority to do those horrible acts in the West Bank. So combining both things with Gaza and West Bank I think that Iran is not the biggest problem that Israel has today. Yes, Israel is a dangerous country for the state of Israel. But losing the legitimacy
because of what happened in Westbat in Gaza. This is more problematic to Israel. We are, as I mentioned, we are island in way. We're highly relying on connection to the international community, high-tech industries and others. And you cannot uh have that if your legitimacy is in problem. So uh so I think that towards the future hopefully the next government we have to rethink hard and clear of that because continuations happening in Gaza and the West Bank will cause us a lot of damages much more than what Iran even can do to the state of Israel. You wrote a really interesting post on X about how deterrence has been lost by the West through this Iran war. Can you sort of unpack that a bit for us?
Yeah, definitely. And I think that you know sometime deterrence is better if you're not implementing it. you know um all the time we threaten on Iran of Ali Kam that if they will rush into nuclear bomb or they continue building its capabilities then we will use force in order to tackle it and that was important because uh the Iranians really feared from Israel and the US and the ability of combined efforts in order to tackle them. This is why for example 2003 Kam decided to leave the military dimension of the nuclear side because he was afraid that Iran was next after the invasion of US to Afghanistan and Iraq.
Now um now what we have is that we implemented the threat we tried to topple this regime and the regime survived. There is nothing now that we can threat and do to the regime that will change his behavior. Meaning that he can think that he can rush to a bomb because what will happen? They will try to topple us. They already tried to topple that. They will kill the leader. They already killed the leader. So we did what you plan to do. Also we showed our constraints. No boots on the ground. You can see the problems with continuation between Israel and the US. You can see also the fear coming from the Gulf state that are interested in ending the war because they don't want to continue the war and then will be suffer from the Iranian attacks. So
actually this war highlighted the friction showed the strength of Israel in the US but also it highlighted the constraint that we have and the bottom line of things when decision maker be will occur with MTA and one of the under limit within Iran they will think okay what Israel and US can do to us when they don't want to strike the energy facilities because they know what we can do to the Arab countries the Gulf countries and that open venues for very problematic issues for example Iran rushing to Obama for example, Iran launching missiles to the state of Israel because Israel attacked in DH and Beirut. So you see there is no deterrence whatsoever. And it's really the paradox and the irony is it's crazy
because 3 4 months ago we meant to top of the regime and now this regime is forcing us new equations because we failed in the war. And I'm not saying that definitely Iran starts with severe blows economically, militarily, they have their own problems, but strategically, mentally, they are behaving there. They're not being detailed. They're attacking the US forces every day in the Gulf. So the bottom line of that is obvious. They are not deterred. So we lost a lot about deterrence towards this regime while at the end of the day going out to two wars against the regime and the regime survived and using that for its own benefit, its own good. Can I end with a few quickfire questions that we did for the 100 days of war round table and I'd
love to put to you. Who do you think has been the biggest winner so far out of this war? Uh definitely the Iranians. Unfortunately the Iran especially the aline they didn't want ali to die but they got a present. they are actually controlling Iran today and we have to remember one thing about that you know when the um demonstration occurred in beginning of January these the Iranian regime didn't have a solution to the problem being faced except the economical problem being faced uh by the regime itself you know uh the citizen demanding things that the regime couldn't bring it because he had so many economical problems now this war gave this regime a lifeline he was on his deathbed and he
gave him lifeline. So definitely the biggest winner is Iran. I'm not saying they don't have problems. They have multiple problems economically militarily they are not definitely they enter weak to this war in terms of economics. If no lifting of sanctions they will get out very weak as well. They still have many problems. The fact they didn't have internet shows that they afraid from their own population. I'm not saying that everything is good for them. But looking at where they were before the war and after the war, it's safe to say that they are the biggest winners. Unfortunately, who's been the biggest loser so far?
Definitely Israel. Uh and definitely more specifically the policy of Israel towards um Iran. So I'm not saying yes, as I mentioned, we have major achievements. We show our capabilities, our you know, air force going back and forth to Tehran. That's amazing. You know just to think a country 2,000 km away from Israel and we controlling the skies drones and everywhere attack everywhere anyone killing Kame killing senior leadership interiority within the war we managed to kill people that really showed the level of penetration of Israel to the Iranian decision-m process so definitely that was amazing but those are operational achievements strategically what we have now we have a worse regime that we
started with we have the US that is not supporting us and forcing us to contain and not to retarget. And looking to the future, everything that we build on in terms of using sticks and not cars to all this regime now is being crumbled because you have US negotiating with the same regime. And in the future, I don't think we'll see any US president after Trump that we turn back to this adventure regardless when going to be Republican or Democrat. So Israeli lost not only now in this campaign but actually lost in the broader terms regarding the ability to change the regime and going with the US together to implement this uh purpose that's not going to occur not in the foreseeable
future and this is why I think Israel is the biggest loser right now and finally most significant moment of the war from an Israeli perspective I will pick three of them first of course is the decapitation of Ali Kamade you are such a dominant guy such a dominant figure within decision-m poses in Iran they changed Iran forever as I mentioned for the bad but uh it's not that I'm supporting of him but I think definitely he had advantages he was weak he was very afraid the risk averse didn't want to use his capability so this is one element second is the decision of Trump uh not to use the Kurds 3 days into the war uh that actually ended the illusion that we are actually going to change the regime I
thought then it was best to stop I think The third one of course is the closure of the straight of Ramuz uh by the Iranians. That is a game changer. Uh unfortunately the genie is out of the ballet is not going to turn back. the implication the second third order implications are no and almost from what's happening in Southeast Asia to Africa and I think that this is something that highlighted for the US and also from Iran that you don't have a viable solution unless you reach an agreement with the Iranians and that actually was the moment that I think Iran again won the war not really in terms of how we think winning but actually finding some sort of a leverage that will force the US will force the
gold states to end this war. And I think those are for me the three main um points in the war itself. The main goal, the main one that we've had stated consistently throughout by Trump and by Israel is to stop Iran getting a nuclear bomb. That was the sort of number one goal that we've heard throughout this conflict. Do you think they've done that? Do you think Iran is less likely to be able to get a nuclear weapon now than it was before the start of this war? Unfortunately, right, the opposite. You know in the 12- day war not now the mil hammer attack was significantly important because it prevented Iran from having industrial enrichment capacity not in the tal not in for but they still
have the capacity to enrich even tomorrow they have the knowledge they have the centrifuges they have the new sites whether pickaxon and other or in isvah and I think that if they will decide to reach a bomb if they will have the ability to do so they're weeks away from reaching to 90% and then the in the weaponization part despite the capitation that we had I think they still have the ability to do that. So we the war that meant to prevent them from reaching a bomb might be the war that pushed them beyond the Rubicon to acquire this bomb because we have to remember one other thing that Kame died and also the fatwa died with him the religious order not to develop a nuclear
bomb. So yes I'm I'm very skeptical about that. This is why I'm hoping that even a bad deal is good if it will dilute the material or taking it out the material that they have right now and forcing them to freeze the program for a considerable number of years. uh because if this not let to happen we'll still have uh the regime sitting on the 440 kilos for 60% with the knowledge and the motivation with no ali fearing and no deterrence are afraid that they might rushing to Obama and this is a nitro for the state of Israel and for the region because Iran can threaten them with many things but there's no only one interstial threat and this is the nuclear thing and I'm I'm a then I have
to say that uh we didn't prevent this threat actually we maybe expedite Ed, that was Danny Citrinovich, senior researcher at the Israeli Institute for National Security Studies. That's all for today's episode of Iran the Latest. We'll be back again tomorrow. Until then, goodbye. Iran. The latest is an original podcast from the Telegraph created by David Nolles and hosted by me, Venicia Rainey, and Roland Dolphant. If you appreciated this podcast, please consider following around the latest on your preferred podcast app. And if you have a moment, leave a review as it helps others find the show. For more from our foreign correspondents on the ground, sign up for our new daily newsletter, Cables, or
listen to our sister podcast, Ukraine, the latest. We're still on the same email address, battle linesgraph.co.uk, UK or you can contact us on X. You can find our handles in the show notes. The producer is Peter Chevlin. The executive producers are Venanishia Rainey and Louisa Wells.
