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You've probably seen this ad. Dollar Shave Club might've been the biggest Direct to Consumer brand. So, let's look at their ads today. This brand was everywhere. It reshaped the overpriced razor market. It bent Gillette into lowering prices. Customers loved it. So, how did it go from this to this? Unfortunately, Dollar Shave Club was broken from the start. This is the rise and strange fall of Dollar Shave Club. CHAPTER 1 - The $4500 Ad. Dollar Shave Club, which I'll call "DSC" from here on out, was one of the most iconic "direct to consumer brands". You bought a box with a razor, some blades,
and their famous shave butter, and received monthly razors and products in their subscription. But, if you go to DollarShaveClub today, you'll find no subscription, only items to purchase. On their Australian website, you'll see "No Subscription Required." That's a clue to what happened, and the problem they had, from the start. But to understand that, we need to look at why DSC worked. The razor market was immensely profitable. Really profitable, because companies, like Gillette, came up with a simple trick. Sell the handle for cheap, but design it so only your blades fit. Then make your real money selling replacement cartridges for years.
They sold the handles cheap, then charged $2 to $6 per replacement cartridge. which are dirt cheap to produce. Meaning margins are above 60%. It was so profitable that P&G paid $57 billion to buy the company in 2005. Of course, the real cost was that breaking into manufacturing required a massive upfront investment, and convincing giant retailers to stock your products. Gillette and brands like Schick dominated the retail game, and new players couldn't really get in. These two brands controlled 90% of the men's shaving market. With all that said, you can see why customers loved the move by Michael Dubin and Mark Levine,
who were trying to figure out how to move a giant warehouse of razors they imported. That's right, DSC didn't actually make any blades. They imported rebadged blades from South Korean manufacturer Dorco. Their "Executive" 6-blade cartridge was the Dorco Pace 6, sold under DSC branding. But, this was really smart, because Dorco blades were excellent. But how do you break into the market? Then came the idea: Dollar Shave Club. Mail razor blades to customers every month, for just a few dollars. There was no retail markup, nor the gigantic Gillette profit margins. Customers would pay less, save time,
have more convenience, and everyone wins. At least, so they thought. This alone doesn't explain the wild, instant success they had. For that, they needed some good marketing, which, luckily, was Dubin's background. This is, in my opinion, one of the best ads ever produced. It's funny, it pointed out a common problem, proposed the solution, explained the business model, and really catered to the "no nonsense" trend of the 2010s. I think MBAs will be studying this ad for years. Dubin wrote the script himself and then had his friend shoot it all in one day for $4500. This went live at 6am, and within an hour and 30
minutes, the site was so flooded with orders that it crashed. By the time it was fixed the next day, they received over 12,000 order notifications. Their original supply disappeared almost immediately. So Dubin rushed to hire contractors and import more blades to keep customers supplied. This ad won many awards, including the best consumer video campaign from Digiday. People loved Dollar Shave Club, and it was growing. Fast. "Online manual blade and razor sales jumped 97% in 2014, grew another 71% in 2015 and rose 31% in 2016. " From its very first year,
DSC generated over $3.5 million in revenue. A year later, revenue had grown more than sixfold to $19 million. Then $65 million. During this time, another competitor, Harry's, jumped on the bandwagon too. DSC passed $120 million in 2015, then roughly $240 million just a year later. That same year, Michael Dubin sold Dollar Shave Club for $1 billion. At the time, the company had 3.2 million members and generated $225 million in annual sales, and had raised $160 million in VC funding. It wasn't just exploding though, it was draining sales from retail. "For the 52 weeks ended May 14 [2017],
traditional retail sales of razor blades (including women's) fell 10.5% to $2.13 billion". By 2017, Dollar Shave Club had overtaken Gillette in online market share. 47% to Gillette's 23%. It was far beyond anything Dubin had imagined. DSC allowed you to skip retailers, who always took a cut, and get a lower cost. And somehow, better products at the same time. It really was a fantastic value proposition. So, how did things go from great, to AI ads? Well… for Dollar Shave Club, things were going to get much, much worse. Dubin was still the CEO, but now had to bend
to the will of his new overlord: Unilever. CHAPTER 2 - Cost of Conglomerates You might know that name, Unilever. They own 400 brands, and are one of the big consumer products conglomerates, like Nestlé. Unilever had big plans for Dollar Shave Club. But first, they had a problem to solve. Even though DSC was generating hundreds of millions of dollars in sales, it wasn't really making money. Even if they had a viral ad… it worked for about a year. After that, they had to compete on regular marketing channels: paid Facebook, YouTube pre-roll, podcast ads, TV spots,
and even a Super Bowl ad. Hence, how they ate into so much of that $160 million VC money. Soon, competitors like Harry's and even Gillette copied the subscription model. But there was another problem. The business model. DSC was very generous with what you got. How is that a problem? Well, most people don't go through 4 razors in a month. Some might, but many would go through three, or two, some even one. So customers cancelled after stockpiling blades. But, that wasn't even the biggest issue. DSC was competing with conglomerates on price. Gillette's grip on the market was slipping,
with its U.S. market share falling from over 70% in 2010 to 54% by 2016. But wait, isn't that good? Well, the consequences weren't. Gillette slashed its prices and even admitted it on its own website: "You told us our blades can be too expensive, and we listened." Good for consumers, that's for sure. But overnight, Dollar Shave Club's biggest selling point was gone. All they had left was their cool, unique brand. So, Unilever needed to pivot. They couldn't raise the price, but the core products weren't doing enough to break even. And that's despite a huge defection from Gillette. In fact, the damage was so severe that P&G erased $8 billion from Gillette's value,
years after paying $57 billion to acquire it. Unilever began launching toothpaste, cologne, deodorant, and more under the DSC name. But in the process, it stopped feeling like a fun, relatable startup and started looking more… corporate. They also moved into Walmart in 2020, which was definitely bizarre to see. The economics of DSC just didn't work. Sell razors below break even? Great for customers and growth, not for long-term profit. Profit Unilever wanted. In January 2021, Dubin sold the last of his stake, and stepped down as CEO. By then, Dollar Shave Club was already past its peak, and I think he saw the writing on the wall.
Subscriber growth had stalled, going from 4M to 3M subs. Revenue had flattened. The company that had once disrupted an entire industry was beginning to lose momentum. Even Unilever admitted it. "We have been clear that Dollar Shave Club has not delivered the results we were expecting. The economics of the direct-to-consumer channel changed, and we found it harder to unlock non-razor sales than planned," Dubin himself no longer seemed convinced by the model he had helped popularize. He later said, "But I think brands starting out today would be wise to think: How do they get on
omnichannel distribution as fast as they can?" Omnichannel, meaning online, and in-store. He realized that this model wasn't sustainable. Granted, he had launched a huge brand, and got a good payout, so good for him! But, what can you do when the core business model stops working? CHAPTER 3: Managed Absurdity. If you've watched this far, consider subscribing! It helps the channel and means you won't miss future videos. In one final attempt to fix the business, Unilever borrowed a page from Gillette's playbook. They started offering DSC subscribers free handles and packs of blades to try out new, cheaper-feeling cartridges. This was after they had totally
moved into retail stores, so DSC wasn't much different to any other razer brand. Then they pulled the Dorco-made Executive cartridges, and pushed all members onto the new "Club Series razors". Customers were unsure where the new razors were from… but they weren't as good. "They are floppy and thin. I just cancelled my membership after 8 years… it seems like they are trying to cut costs"; "They cut me up every time I shave!"; "Canceled my 6-year-old subscription today." "New blades are garbage. Going to see if I can find the Dorco blades on Amazon that everyone seems to like." "I also ordered the Dorco Pace 6 blades that are exactly the same as the Executive DSC blades, but at a lower price. It was a good run
DSC. All good things come to an end." By this point, Unilever was done. They pulled the plug, and bailed out by selling off 65% to Nexus Capital Management. [Hein Schumacher, Unilever CEO]: "We have made some unsuccessful attempts to move away from our core." Though Nexus partner Michael Cohen had a different view: "We see growth potential and will invest in cutting-edge marketing, product quality, and new innovations… Dollar Shave Club will also serve as a platform for additional brands with a similar DNA." [Larry Bodner, New Dollar Shave Club CEO]: "Post-acquisition, Unilever moved the brand away from its core values while also scaling
back its investment in product quality. They neutered the voice of the brand. They tried to make it too corporate, and they lost that irreverent, 'on the edge' humor. And when you do that, you lose the consumer." "This is where the brand differentiates itself, in managed absurdity." He was right. DSC certainly lost a lot of its charm. Though, Bodner may have misinterpreted this "managed absurdity". They started cutting costs, reducing technology spending by 40%, then migrating from their own website to Shopify. Then they moved from LA to North Carolina, in February 2025, to cut even more costs. They introduced a Walmart-exclusive College Razor line. To bring the brand's humor back, they recruited 23 regular customers to
co-create a new ad campaign and spend a weekend at its "Order of the Blade" creative workshop. This video has about 600 views, and the feel here is totally different to the first ad. The original ads by Dubin felt more grassroots but were laser focused on the problem: Razors are annoying, and expensive to buy. This was more corporate pretending to be a "cool brand". And it gets worse. I'm unsure if these AI ads came because of this creative workshop or not… but. yeah these didn't go over too well.
Fans didn't see it as "managed absurdity" that Bodner talked about, or "putting money where it mattered". But for what it was: Cost saving. Especially when the razors were now worse. For many, that was the final nail in the coffin. The products were worse, the brand had lost its identity, it wasn't even really a direct to consumer product anymore. GRAND PAYOFF. As of 2025, DSC's online revenue is down to just $43 million, granted that doesn't include retail store revenue. But they're only forecasted to see 0-5% growth in 2026. You can still buy Dollar Shave
Club products today, but the company that sells them isn't the one people fell in love with. DSC was a brilliant idea. But unfortunately, its business model was broken to begin with. There are two ways to compete: The first is differentiation, aka being better or different. The second is price, being cheaper. There's a reason it's not recommended to compete on price. But, DSC did both of these. So they didn't really have a good path to profitability. Hence, all the weird moves to "fix" a problem that was built in.
There are quite a few brands who dominated years ago, and are now struggling. Take Grubhub. They had over 70% of the delivery market, but were sold off and are now barely surviving. How do you die after being first and having the entire market? Click this video to find out how.
