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Iran and its allies have expanded their campaign of drone and missile strikes across Iraq and the Gulf, targeting US and Israeli bases across the region. What began as dispersed attacks has increasingly evolved into more deliberate, high-precision strikes on military infrastructure. Since late February, this campaign has unfolded across multiple theaters, from Baghdad to Kuwait and beyond. Using satellite imagery and ground-level footage, we pieced together a series of strikes across the region. What was hit, the damage caused, and what it reveals about the wider trajectory of the war in this episode of Photo Evidence.
Baghdad is the political center of Iraq, which has become increasingly a battlefield. Within just a few kilometers, three critical sites sit side by side. Camp Victory, a major US military complex, Baghdad International Airport, a dual-use civilian and military infrastructure, and the US Embassy, the largest US diplomatic compound in the world. All three have now been struck. This is Camp Victory, a major US military installation on the western edge of Baghdad, integrated into the wider Victory Base Complex beside the international airport. Since the start of the war, this base has been repeatedly targeted. There have reportedly been at least seven FPV drone strikes carried out here by Iranian-backed militias operating in
Iraq. The most significant strike on Camp Victory came on March the 25th. The first observable impact in the video shows an FPV drone striking a containerized radar system. It's rotating antenna mounted on top of a trailer. This is an/MPQ-64 Sentinel Radar, a short-range air defense system designed to detect and track incoming aerial threats. The radar is operational at the time, its antenna visibly rotating before the drone sets it ablaze. The deliberate selection of the radar is operationally significant. It degrades the base's local air defense network, reducing the likelihood that subsequent drone or missile attacks could be detected or intercepted. While it is clear that more than one drone was present near the radar during the
attack, unconfirmed reports indicate the militia may have employed swarming tactics, or at minimum multiple kamikaze drones with some degree of coordination to overwhelm the bases defenses. Immediately following the drone approaches, two UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters parked within the base perimeter. The aircraft sit in a compound protected only by a low blast wall. The helicopter appears to be a medical evacuation HH-60M, with the video seemingly edited to obscure the red cross identification panels, as seen compared with a picture from the US Department of Defense. As the drone closes in, one helicopter is deliberately selected, and then the video feed cuts out just before destination. On or near the main rotor,
strongly suggesting that this helicopter was struck. The Black Hawk has been a backbone of US military operations since the late 1970s, supporting troop transport, medical evacuation, electronic warfare, and cargo lift missions. Each unit represents a $16 to $20 million investment and a critical operational capability. The destruction of even a single HH-60M not only represents a financial loss, but also degrades the base's medical evacuation readiness, mobility, and multi-mission flexibility. It remains uncertain whether the helicopter was actually damaged or destroyed, but the key point is that such a high-value target could be engaged by relatively simple, low-cost drone. Across the engagement, the drones maintain
stable feeds at extremely low altitude, moving behind structures without signal loss. This strongly suggests either proximity launch or fiber optic control links, making them largely resistant to electronic warfare systems. No visible air defense response is observed during the strike. This level of precision did not emerge in isolation. Earlier in the conflict, Camp Victory had already been subjected to multiple FPV drone penetrations. One of the earliest confirmed attacks on Camp Victory takes place in mid-March. Video footage uploaded by the Iran-backed Kata'ib Hezbollah group shows an FPV drone entering the base and moving deliberately through it. The drone flies low over roads, between buildings, and
around infrastructure, maintaining a steady feed, searching for targets rather than heading to a fixed coordinate. For nearly 2 minutes, the drone surveys the base in real time, maneuvering deliberately as if the operator is scanning for a suitable target. Only after that does it commit, accelerating slightly and striking a building within the complex, what appears to be a military shelter, geolocated northwest of the terminal. The structure appears to be a large area maintenance shelter, otherwise known as LAMs, identifiable by its gable roof, two slips sides meeting at a central ridge, forming an A-shape at the end walls. Behind the LAMs, the runway
is clearly visible, matching satellite imagery with five helicopters parked outside. The key detail is not the impact itself, but the real-time target selection and precision navigation, which represents a significant departure from traditional unguided attacks, such as rockets or mortars. The drone is almost certainly fiber optic guided, immune to electronic jamming, and capable of extremely low altitude flights. This early attack exposed a critical vulnerability that small, low-signature drones could operate inside the perimeter without meaningful interception. The March 25th strike demonstrates what that vulnerability looks like when fully exploited.
Drone strikes are notable for several operational reasons. First, there is no visible attempt by base air defenses to engage the incoming drones. While electronic or cyber responses are possible, there is no indication that directed energy systems were deployed. Surface-to-air interceptors are largely ineffective against small, low-flying drones, and alternative counter-drone measures, gun-based systems, interceptor drones like the Coyote or the laser-equipped Vampire appear absent. FPV drones are difficult to detect and target, especially at extremely low altitude. Standard radar often cannot distinguish them from birds or debris, while microwave or counter-drone radars provide only intermittent coverage. The
repeated attacks on Victory Base highlight a persistent vulnerability. The operational threat of these drones is not new. Their proliferation has been evident since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and militaries have recognized their capacity for precise strikes on fixed targets. Similar tactics were observed during Ukraine's Operation Spider Web in June 2025, when the SBU deployed FPV drones to strike Russian airbases. Operator-controlled and AI-assisted drones hit parked aircraft and fuel stores, causing major fires. The Camp Victory attacks provide a clear example of the threat posed by low-cost fiber optic FPV drones against high-value targets, demonstrating a capability that could extend to other
critical facilities. The US Embassy in Baghdad is the largest American diplomatic compound in the world, spanning dozens of acres within the heavily fortified Green Zone. Despite its size and security, the embassy has been repeatedly targeted by Iranian-backed militias in Iraq. On March the 13th, Iranian-backed militias struck the embassy's rooftop Saab Giraffe 1X multi-mission radar, a Swedish-made system specifically designed to detect and classify small UAVs and distinguish them from birds, critical for modern counter-UAS operations. This radar, responsible for detecting drones and cueing the C-RAM, a land-based Phalanx system to intercept
incoming threats, was visibly destroyed in video footage. Footage shows the radar ablaze, its AESA antenna destroyed, while the camera pans to a nearby Phalanx Base C-RAM system, which appears intact. This aligns with Google Earth imagery of the embassy compound, showing the Giraffe 1X radar positioned on the rooftop here, with the Phalanx C-RAM located just adjacent. While the radar was destroyed, the C-RAM system remained intact, a crucial last-line defense. Footage from prior incidents show the C-RAM engaging incoming Iranian attack drones at close range, firing up to 4,500 fragmentation rounds per minute to neutralize small, fast-moving threats. Its potential destruction in future strikes represents a significant
escalation in the threat environment. Two days later, footage captured on March 17th shows a fiber-optic guided FBD drone flying un opposed around the embassy for nearly 2 minutes, maneuvering at low altitude behind structures without signal degradation. The sequence of events at the embassy underscores the growing threat posed by small, low-cost, fiber-optic guided drones and highlights the need to safeguard. By April, imagery showed the radar on top of the US embassy in Baghdad reportedly fitted with an anti-drone cage, suggesting a defensive upgrade following the March strike. On March 30th, Iranian-backed Iraqi militias continued targeting Baghdad International Airport. Images confirmed that a rocket strike destroyed an Iraqi Air Force Antonov An-32B
transport aircraft. The An-32B is a twin-turboprop military transport aircraft primarily used for troop transport, cargo delivery, and logistical support. The Iraqi Air Force operates only five of these aircraft, making each one a critical component of its mobility and logistical capabilities. The strike reportedly carried out by Iranian-backed militias using Shahed-12 or similar guided missiles severely damaged the aircraft. These are not opportunistic strikes, they are deliberate, iterative attacks designed to map vulnerabilities, degrade detection systems, and exploit gaps in base defenses. The technology itself is not revolutionary, but its application is. Again, low-cost fiber-optic guided drones are being used to bypass traditional air
defenses, operate inside secured perimeters, and strike assets once considered relatively safe. Baghdad shows what that evolution looks like in practice. A coordinated pressure campaign against critical military infrastructure where the cost of attack is low and the cost of defense continues to rise. This strike on a fixed-wing aircraft in Baghdad forms part of a wider escalation in precision attacks on military aviation extending beyond Iraq to assets in Kuwait. In northwestern Kuwait near the Iraqi border, Camp Buehring functions as one of the US Army's key logistical hubs in the region. It acts as a staging ground for forces moving into Iraq and Syria supporting everything from maintenance and fuel distribution to helicopter operations
and troop rotations. In the final days before Trump announced a ceasefire with Iran, it came under sustained attack. Among the most significant indicators of the impact are ground-level images showing a US Army CH-47F Chinook heavy-lift helicopter that appears to have been directly hit. The cockpit is torn apart, the forward fuselage is heavily damaged, and the front rotor assembly critical for lift is destroyed. The CH-47F Chinook is not a frontline combat aircraft, but it is one of the most important logistical platforms in the US Army inventory. It is used to move troops, artillery, ammunition, fuel, vehicles, and supplies across the
battlefield and to support medical evacuation and special operations logistics. Each aircraft costs in the region of 40 to 50 million US dollars, but its real value lies in what it enables, sustained operations across mobile frontlines. Losing one inside a major logistics hub like Camp Buehring is therefore not just a material loss, it directly reduces lift capacity and operational flexibility across Iraq, Syria, and Kuwait. There are also indications the aircraft may have been positioned for support roles such as combat search and rescue or recovery operations elsewhere, which would have further underlined its role as an enabling asset rather than a passive transport platform. If that's the case, the strike wasn't just opportunistic, it
was targeted at a key enabling capability. Footage released by Iranian sources shows the launch of Fateh-1 medium-range ballistic missiles, which they say were aimed at the base. This suggests a layered attack profile combining ballistic missiles with drones or loitering munitions to strike different types of targets across the installation. Satellite fire detection systems recorded multiple large fires burning across the base following a wave of missile and drone strikes, indicating several impact points rather than a single isolated hit. The damage pattern on the Chinook does not clearly align with a ballistic missile strike. There is no visible crater, no wide area blast
damage, and no destruction across surrounding structures. Instead, the strike is tightly focused on a single aircraft, disabling critical components without destroying the wider area. That strongly suggests a low-altitude precision strike, most likely a one-way attack drone or loitering munition, rather than a ballistic missile. And that distinction matters because it aligns directly with what we've already seen in Baghdad. Low-cost, hard-to-detect drones being used to penetrate defended bases and selectively target high-value aviation assets. At Camp Buering, the objective was not disruption at scale, but the removal of a specific capability. A $40 to $50 million heavy-lift platform central to troop movement, resupply, and
operational reach was engaged inside a major logistics hub. Taken together, these strikes point to consistent targeting approach: identify by exposed high-value assets and hit them with precision, even deep inside the support network that underpins operations across the region. Beyond aviation and logistics hubs, the same methods have been applied to radar systems, the sensors that provide early warning, track incoming threats, and enable the wider air defense network. In our previous episode, we analyzed damage to the AN/FPS-132 radar installation at Andhar Hal in Qatar. New imagery now indicates that the installation sustained direct damage that appears more extensive than initial satellite
assessment suggested. Photos released by Al Jazeera reveal three clear impact sites on the radar. The southeastern face was hit facing towards the UAE and Saudi Arabia. The eastern corner was struck near the base of the radar. Earlier reporting suggested the northeastern face was struck, but this appears not to be the case with an impact instead on the upper structure at the northwestern corner. An internal image from Impact 2 shows the view looking out of the superstructure towards the northeast. Earlier assessments based primarily on satellite imagery indicated limited or surface level damage, but these ground level images point to internal damage, fire, and sustained heat inside the radar housing. The presence of burning
and the extent of charring suggests the use of an explosive payload that ignited a fire, one that burned long enough to require substantial effort to extinguish. That shifts the assessment. While the structure itself remains standing, this does not appear to be superficial damage. Key internal components critical to tracking and signal processing are likely degraded or disabled. And this is not just any radar. The AN/FPS-132 is one of the most capable ground-based missile warning systems in the US global architecture with a detection range exceeding 5,000 km. It provides early warning of ballistic missile launches within minutes, feeding data into US and allied air defense networks across the region. It is also
exceptionally rare. The radar in Qatar is the only one of its kind deployed outside the United States, and with an estimated cost of around $1.1 billion, replacement could take 5 to 8 years. Its degradation therefore has immediate operational consequences. Even if not fully destroyed, reduced performance at this site lowers the accuracy of missile tracking across a wide area, weakening early warning coverage in a region already under sustained threat. And it fits the same pattern seen elsewhere. These strikes show a clear evolution in how Iran's retaliatory campaign against the US and Israel is being conducted. High-value assets are not being destroyed outright, but
systematically degraded. Radars, aircraft, and logistics platforms selectively targeted to reduce capability over time. But, the full extent of that damage remains difficult to assess. The Pentagon has acknowledged 13 service members killed and nearly 400 injured, yet has provided limited detail on the broader material impact across these sites. And that gap is notable, because in multiple cases we have seen clear visual evidence of strikes on critical military infrastructure, from radar systems to aircraft inside major bases, without corresponding official comment or confirmation. At the same time, visibility is narrowing. Planet Labs announced it will indefinitely withhold satellite imagery of Iran and the wider
region following a request from Donald Trump's administration. The policy extends earlier delays on imagery access, restricting one of the key tools used to independently verify damage on the ground. That makes assessments like these, built from satellite data and ground-level footage, increasingly important, but also inherently incomplete. Even though a ceasefire has been announced, it comes before a full accounting of the damage. Much of what has been hit and how severely remains unclear, not because the strikes weren't visible, but because the information environment around them is increasingly constrained. Even so, the trajectory is clear. Analysts assess
that this campaign, combining ballistic missiles, drone swarms, and precision strikes, has stretched US defenses across multiple layers, exposing vulnerabilities in base protection, air defense coverage, and logistics.
