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We are now in a moment of rebalancing. The Americans call it NATO 3.0, a new arrangement in the alliance where the Europeans step up and do more. It seems we are at a very delicate stage in this process as the current administration is conducting a review of positions. The question I wanted to ask you, Rich: At this point, do you feel clear about the intentions of the United States regarding its military presence in Europe? Do you know what you can expect from the Americans if the conflict breaks out in 2028 or 2029? Or is it still uncertain and a matter of debate? So, the review of positions, as Secretary Hexett noted, aims to answer this very
question. But I have spoken to SACEUR over the last few days. Supreme Allied Commander Europe, the highest-ranking military officer in NATO. Alex Hrinkiewicz, and he has a key voice in this review because he leads forces in Europe and also, as Supreme Commander, he is the commander of U.S. European Command. And he says that the forces in Europe have three roles. They have a role to play in supporting US security in Europe. They have a role in terms of supporting NATO, as well as a role in supporting US power projection in the rest of the world. So there is a broad understanding of what these military elements in
Europe are responsible for, beyond simply their contribution to NATO. I am sure the US knows that Europe is a critical theater for their overall national security. We sometimes say that Europe protects the eastern flank of America's east coast. Part of the reason I'm here is because General Nick Carter takes over as the first British commander of the Combined Forces Command in Norfolk tomorrow. So, the British commander responsible for the North Atlantic and Northern Europe. And this is very important, and it ensures security for the United States. The review of positions is an ongoing process by which Americans will consider this. But I think it's important to recognize that this shift in emphasis for the US has been brewing for some time. Barack Obama spoke of a
pivot toward the Indo- Pacific region. So this is part of that long process, and I have full confidence in the military leadership offering calm, rational advice in the decision-making process. But the challenges for the US as a global integrator are real. So, I think, one of the controversial elements in the US approach to this. You point to the issue of relative burden for Europe and the US, which dates back to the days of Obama, Bob Gates, and the Secretary of Defense before that, over 15 years ago. But the contentious element, perhaps even more so now, is the question of how the US can use its bases in Europe. Overflight rights, access rights. This obviously escalated during the Iran War, when many European countries were initially quite hesitant about
allowing their territory to be used for attacks on Iran. Eventually, the UK agreed that the US could use RAF Fairford, as well as Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. But we see again, perhaps in the disputes between the US and Denmark and the agreement they reached over Greenland, that this is a really sensitive issue. The Americans want Europe to give them unhindered, open, and free access to their bases for their operations, whether it's bombing Iran or something else. What did this discussion look like for you? Will there be a greater sense of giving Americans more access as part of these negotiations? So, I understand that as part of the review of positions, the issues of access, basing, flights, and use of bases in Europe will be considered.
The Minister of Defense said this in his speech at the NATO conference in Ankara. The situation, process, and precedents are the same now as they have been since the late 1940s. But you're right, it was a source of friction. , which has invested in these bases and these relationships, wants to be confident in its ability to use them. But, equally, nation states have a responsibility under international law to make judgments about how they use them. And I'm sure we can find a way out of this I would like to say a few words about nuclear weapons and nuclear relations, because, you know, this is yet another area where NATO relies on the US arsenal. And I'm wondering if you could give us some insight into
what signals you've gotten from your American counterparts about the role of nuclear deterrence in the alliance, the commitment to it, and how they plan to demonstrate that. And I ask partly because we've also seen a lot of activity from the UK, and also France, who are perhaps trying to make a statement about greater efforts in the area of European nuclear deterrence. In recent weeks, we have seen the French holding talks with other European countries, possibly including the Finns, about creating a broader French " umbrella" over Europe. So, what does this nuclear debate look like in Europe now? Americans, both privately and publicly, are providing incredibly confident assurances of their readiness to continue to provide this nuclear umbrella.
France's position is based on President Macron's recent speech and the idea of an extended nuclear deterrent. The details of this issue are still being developed and refined. Ultimately, Russia should know that the UK, US and France, as nuclear powers, will act if attacked by a nuclear power like Russia. And I must say that I have received private and seen public very strong assurances from the US regarding their nuclear posture and status.
