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The Battle of Cambrai in late 1917 marked the first time in the war that churchbells rang out across Great Britain to celebrate a victory. In the first successful use of massed tanks, British troops broke through German lines and forced the Germans back. Despite the celebrations, the First World War would rage for almost another year after Cambrai - but it was a key moment in the development of modern combined arms warfare and anti-tank tactics, and both the British and Germans learned very different lessons at Cambrai that would help decide the outcome of the Great War.
By November 1917, the First World War had been raging for more than three years, but victory for either side still seemed as far off as ever. On the Western Front, the fighting in 1914 had resulted in a grinding stalemate characterized by trench warfare. The technology of the time - in terms of weapons, communication and transport - very much favoured the defensive. Since modern rifles, machine guns and, especially, artillery meant it was certain death to remain in the open. And operations meant to penetrate the entire enemy defense system usually failed, so armies on both sides dug in. A complex network of trenches took shape,
one that made it even easier to defend, and harder to attack, especially once many more machine guns, thickets of barbed wire, and reinforced underground shelters were added to the defences. The British, the French, and the Germans all made many attempts to find a solution to the problem of trench warfare, or Stellungskrieg as the Germans called it. The Germans tried poison gas and flamethrowers in 1915 before turning their attention to the Russian front. The British and French tried, well, pretty much everything they could think of: attacking on a wide front,
attacking on a narrow front, hand grenades, trench mortars, more artillery, different uses of artillery, breakthrough plans, attrition plans, and even that most famous of new weapons, the tank. As time went by the Allies, who were under political pressure to attack and drive the Germans out of France and Belgium, had become better at waging trench war but so had the Germans. It wasn't until the Battle of Cambrai, which took place in November 1917, that both the British and the Germans each drew their own lessons that would change the face of the war the next year.
1917 had been a bad year for the Allies. Russia had suffered two revolutions and was in a state of collapse. The French army had mutinied as a result of heavy casualties and poor generalship. Italy had been defeated at the Battle of Caporetto. The British had failed at Passchendaele in the summer and fall. German innovations in defensive tactics seemed to stifle every Allied innovation to break the deadlock. The Germans had gone over to the defensive in 1917 and had made a partial retreat to a new and even more powerful defensive system,
called the Hindenburg Line by the British and the Siegfriedstellung by the Germans. It was considered so strong that weaker German formations were sent there to recover from fighting elsewhere. Oberleutnant Zindler of the 54th Division recalled: "The sector was excellently fortified, with very broad, exceptionally strong wire entanglements, and good deep dugouts; it was therefore called 'the Sanatorium of the West'". (Hammond 55) If the Allies had not been able to break through the German positions before, the task might seem even more daunting now - especially given the pressure for the British to carry more of the load.
Even during the years of stalemate, the British were also learning and adapting even as they fought battles of attrition and could not sustain break throughs of German defences. The Battle of Cambrai is famous for being the first large-scale tank battle in history, but it was not the first time tanks were used. The British had first put tanks in the field in September 1916, at the Battle of the Somme, but the new weapon made little difference. There were too few of them, they were slow, and they were extremely unreliable - particularly in muddy conditions.
The Brits also used tanks in the spring 1917 offensive around Arras and Vimy Ridge, but they were not decisive there either. By late 1917 though, they were available in much larger numbers, and 476 new Mark IVs would be ready for the next offensive. Tank Corps commanders were anxious to have another chance to show what their new weapons could do, and Tank Corps Staff Officer J.F.C. Fuller began developing plans for a local attack in the Cambrai sector, which had been relatively quiet. This sector was held by General Sir Julian Byng's 3rd Army,
whose artillery commander General Henry Tudor had been developing offensive plans of his own. These plans were combined and expanded into what would turn into the Battle of Cambrai in November 1917. Now, tanks get a lot of attention, but they were only one component of the British Army in 1917. The infantry, the cavalry and especially the artillery would all play their part in the coming offensive - and this combined arms warfare would come together for the first time at Cambrai, and change the nature of the war on the Western Front in 1918. Coordinating the efforts of the different
branches of the army was not new - but it was extremely difficult, and the constantly-changing technology made it even more so. This was especially true in terms of the artillery. The British had a lot more and, critically, a lot more heavy artillery in late 1917 than they had before. Light field artillery like the 18 pounder was effective at firing at infantry, but heavy guns like 6 and 8 inch guns could destroy trenches and fortifications. And the British had started to use heavy artillery differently. The old technique had been to spend days pounding
the German positions to destroy them and allow the infantry to then walk in against light resistance: the artillery would conquer, and the infantry occupy. But there were problems with this: there could be no element of surprise, and it limited the number of British guns that could target German batteries to suppress them. When they did target German guns, they had to fire off a few rounds to adjust their aim - a practice called ranging - which gave the Germans time to react. The most that could be achieved was a limited bite-and-hold tactic of
grabbing a small piece of tactically valuable land, which had been done throughout 1917. To get over these problems, several innovations came together in time to be used at Cambrai. Teams of spotters tracked the muzzle flashes of German guns, and the sound of the guns being fired. Through careful triangulation, the location of the German guns could be worked out without any ranging fire giving away the British intentions. Coupled with evidence from aerial photography, detailed maps of the entire front were produced which the gunners could then use to target their
fire when the attack began, and not before. For Cambrai, the barrage would be a surprise, would be short, and would target enemy guns accurately, as well as support the infantry. So the artillery worked with the Royal Flying Corps, and with the infantry. But the infantry and the tanks would also have to work together much more closely than they had before. How exactly the tanks should be used was a point of contention between Third Army commander Julian Byng and Tank Corps staff officer JFC Fuller. And we asked curator of the Tank Museum David Willey to tell us more about the meticulous preparations of the Tank Corps before the battle of Cambrai:
Now Fuller argues uh with Bing's headquarters staff, saying, "Why haven't we got a reserve of tanks to exploit any gaps made?" But from Bing's point of view, the headquarters at Third Army, they are looking at the tank as a means of getting the infantry and then the cavalry through the wire. So, it's really important for them that all the tanks are made available to make as many gap through the wire as possible. So, Fuller loses the argument of having a reserve. All tanks are going to be used in that initial attack and to try and break through the three layers of the Hindenburg Line. Fuller comes up with these new tactics,
new drills and his argument is he's got only a maximum of 10 days for each infantry unit to train with their accompanying tank force. So, he thinks of it that he says he wants this to be like a clockwork battle and he's going to reduce the tactics down to a drill. And by doing so he's trying to simplify how the tanks and the infantry are going to operate together and to make sure they go forward literally together so that they don't lose the benefits of each other's uh systems of fighting. So, the infantry to be able to point out targets to be able to actually
hold ground that the tanks can capture from that point of view. And of course, the tanks are there to suppress that wire, to get that wire out the way, and to also then take on a machine gun post to allow the infantry to actually advance. Fuller's idea is to have the tanks in two sections, advanced tanks and the main body tanks. And if you boil it down to a section which at this time, they're looking at three tanks. So, one tank in the advance, that would be the advanced tank, followed by two other tanks. Now the first tank would approach the German line having
crushed wire as it's going through it. It would then reach the German front line, turn left and machine gun into that trench whilst the two main body tanks go forward. One of them then drops its fascine into the hole. It crosses um the German trench, advances to the next line, turns left. It's followed by its second main body tank. And that advanced tank will then gets to go back along the German line, cross over the fascine there, and advance again behind where the two main body tanks have always made it way forward, ready to then drop another fascine and continue forward.
Now, they should be being followed about 50 yards behind by what Fuller calls worms or platoon of infantry behind each tank that are in single file. So, they're gaining some protection from the tank and they're going in the tracks of the tank. So, in other words, the wire is not going to be a problem for them. And these sections are then separated into blocking parties, bombing parties, so they can secure the trenches that hopefully the tanks have got them to. Now that training goes on, units get together. In some areas that training is very, very successful before the attack.
Dummy trenches are made. Tank crews get to meet their equivalents on the ground. The officers go off for a drink in the evening, you know, there's a purpose, a need there to get the bonding going on because the infantry, many haven't seen tanks before. They were still a new thing on the Western Front. And if they had worked with tanks, maybe because of those earlier battles, they're not that impressed by them. But this was to build confidence between the two arms, the two units. So they will work in uh conjunction when the actual attack comes.
Now I've mentioned the word fascine. That's this great bundle on the top of a Mark IV tank. These are put together, the idea is by Serl who's a Technical Officer at Tank Corps headquarters. It's an old idea: Bundles of brushwood or chestnut's paling, you pull it together. Thousands of yards of chain are brought over from Britain. Back at the Tank Corps headquarters a thousand Chinese laborers from the Chinese Labor Corps, they are hired labor all the way from mutual China. They are tasked with making over 400 fascines ready for the day. And basically a chain ties up that great big bundles of about 1 and 1/2 tons of wood and they can be let go by a lever in the driver's cab as
you reach a German trench. it drops in the trench. German trenches as I mentioned about two and a half meters wide. The tank alone will not cross them. So, by having that gap filler, that fascine, the tanks can cross and advance. So all this energy, all this effort goes into making sure that we have a system in place that the infantry and the armor will cooperate. The key element being that the tanks will be going forward to clear the wire. They actually get grapnels to rip some of that wire out with two wire cutting tanks going forward, turning apart,
take away that wire in huge belts, as you can see. There's a wonderful description: "Couldn't even push a broom handle through it." You know, it's that thick this wire. But the aim being then we've cleared a way for the infantry to capture to go through the various lines of the German defenses and then let the cavalry our arm of exploitation that's been in the wings has been waiting for so long that then should be able to go through and hopefully go around comb cross the various canals on either side two sides of the battlefield and therefore capture what is a communication point
and again the famous hey always bring that mobility back to the battlefield. The Tank Corps' Major William Watson recalled training with the infantry before Cambrai: "We trained with the splendid 51st Division for ten days, working out the plans of our attack so closely that each platoon of Highlanders knew personally the crew of the tank which would lead it across No Man's Land. […] As far as was humanly possible within the limits of time, we discussed and solved each other's difficulties, until it appeared that at least on one occasion a tank and infantry attack would in reality be a 'combined operation.'" (Hammond 81)
The Royal Flying Corps also trained to bomb German communication and supply lines, artillery batteries, and airfields to directly support the ground attack. This would prevent German return fire, and allow the cavalry, which was far faster than tanks, to exploit the breakthrough. On the eve of the attack, Lieutenant Arthur Gould Lee flew over the British lines and commented on the combined arms forces he saw below: "Every village in the forward zone is crowded with troops…including artillery, and masses of cavalry with horse-lines everywhere. And there are hundreds of tanks around, too, from the air you see their tracks sprawling
across the countryside. […] Obviously, a big push is coming anytime now." (Hammond 91) Before that big push came at Cambrai, the Germans had also been preparing and adapting to Allied tanks. We talked to David Willey again about the various ways the Germans had in dealing with enemy tanks: When the Germans first saw the tank in September of 1916, there was obviously initial alarm. It engendered fright in some of the frontline troops even though it wasn't that successful on those very first tank attacks. It led the German high command to first of all start their own tank program which leads with Joseph Vollmer designing the A7V tank. But they also think they need to find methods of
defeating the tank on the battlefield. That entails they get 50 new batteries of 77mm field guns. They're made on smaller wheels. This is over a meter high on this 77mm gun. A meter wheel means it's lower. They only have four horses to maneuver it instead of the usual six. And they place these new batteries in frontline positions with the initial instructions. You are not there for counter battery work or normal bombardments. You are only there to be wheeled out or maneuvered out of emplacements if a tank attack occurs. Now, as we know,
the British don't use tanks again till the following year at Aras and then later at Messines. So there is a relaxation in the German attitude to the tank as if it's maybe not the threat they first thought it was. So a lot of these batteries get redeployed and reused as standard artillery rather than that anti-tank role. Now the Germans have already issued a 7.92 SMK armor-piercing bullet to frontline troops. They're hard to make. They've got a nickel steel core which can penetrate quite a bit of armor plate and they're in the front line already
because they're using them for sniping at things like sniper shields that are metal shields sometimes set in embrasures in the front lines in the trench systems. Now the Germans capture a Mark II tank at Bullecourt part of the Aisnes battles and it's taken away for firing trials. Now that Mark II does not have proper armor plate on it. It is just boiler plate. It was actually intended only for training and not to be used in the front line. So the Germans are doing their firing tests against this vehicle and they say to
the frontline troops, look, the SNK bullet alone, the 7.92 easily go through the armor protection. We don't think you guys have too much to worry about. And again, that's a falsehood that takes a long time before the Germans realize, even though they later capture a Mark IV tank. It's quite some time before they realize they were looking at a training tank with that Mark II. In the background, there's other ideas they put together. They are looking at using their anti-aircraft guns, their Flak vehicles. These are basically sometimes wheeled, sometimes half-track
vehicles with an anti-aircraft gun, so they're maneuverable. Behind the front line they have a 77 millimeter high angle gun. They realize they can use those. They can deploy them relatively quickly to where they think tanks might be operating and they are some of those are used at Cambrai. They also look at um much more simple ideas. The mine thrower, the Minenwerfer that they're using in the front lines. They changed the mount for it so it can actually fire its bomb at a lower trajectory straight towards an oncoming tank. They in October of 1917 put in
the order for a large anti-tank rifle that becomes the T-Gewehr firing a 13 mm bullet. But they also look at ideas, very simple ideas, making their trenches wider. So, the standard length tank would drop into it. We end up extending the length of our tanks to counteract that. And at Cambrai some of these huge 2.5 meter wide trenches are being built especially to try and trap tanks. They shouldn't be crossable for a tank. Of course, the Tank Corps comes along with a fascine to help them go over those trenches. They also dig simple tank pits. That's a 4 meter
by 4meter hole in the ground, sometimes filled with water. And the idea is it's camouflaged or covered with sticks and brush or a camouflage net. And the idea is where they think they can channel tanks because of the landscape or uh various other uh blockages, they can channel tanks. That's where you build your tank trap. So, the tank will actually fall into it. [Jesse] In a desperate close-range scenario, German troops could also use the geballte Ladung, consisting of several hand grenades lashed together to increase explosive power - but
using this kind of ad-hoc weapon was very risky. But as David Willey said, the most effective anti-tank weapons were artillery. Several German artillery units underwent specialized training in anti-tank tactics. They would conceal their gun relatively close to the front line, often on a reverse slope. When enemy tanks attacked, the gun crews would wheel out their piece and open fire - often as the tanks crested the slope and exposed themselves against the horizon. This kind of training was carried out in secrecy, and the British high command did not know that
the German 54th Division on the Cambrai Front was specialized in fighting tanks. On the other hand the Germans also didn't know everything about the British intentions since the element of surprise was to be a vital component. On top of that the use of 376 battle tanks required enormous logistical preparations which needed to be masked. David Willey from the Tank Museum talks about the creative solutions that the British come up with: Other ideas are put together. Sledges are built to carry two tons of stores because these tanks are ridiculously thirsty. About 35 miles is your absolute maximum on good going before you've run
out of fuel. So, fuel is going to be needed as well. This is a 2-gallon fuel can. The sort of shape they were using back at that time. They were looking at about 30,000 gallons of fuel. So about 15,000 of those cans just to get forward to replenish one brigade once it had gone forward. 50,000 gallons already out there in the tanks um ready for that first attack. So, supply and logistic is a major undertaking as well. And this is all done under a veil of secrecy. Uh tanks are only brought up to near the front line at night. Uh any movement is tried to be
done during the hours of darkness. The Royal Flying Corp flies over the areas just to check there's no sign from above of any tank tracks. They reckon a 100,000 square yards of camouflage netting was ordered up to hide the tanks, the ammunition dumps and some of the troop locations before the battle actually begins. This is a very sophisticated program of deception, camouflage. The British tend to call this surprise, trying to get this surprise factor. They only motor the vehicles nearer the front line at tick over speed because there is an estimate you can hear a tank engine about 400 yd away. So again, that is carefully thought
through and they actually get some noisy tanks about 30 miles south. Six of these tanks go on a loop. They're offloaded near the front line, loaded again quietly taken back offloaded again. And this loop system is going on to make it sound like there's a lot of tanks being assembled near Aras. T a dummy. It's a deception that's going on amongst many others that are put together there as well as this keen emphasis. We do not want the Germans to know about what's coming. So that idea of the secrecy is really important in terms of the logistics of those tanks.
You can tend to get 12 tanks on a train um to move it forward to one of the sidings where there are actually offloading them. It's somewhere called the plateau area which is near Albert. There are sublines going out to other assembly points. And once those tanks are offloaded from there, basically a ramp is built up. They drive all along the 12 flat cars to the front there. And normally what happens is where they're offloaded. There's another ramp out of wooden bolsters has been built and they drive forward. They perfect this, they've been training it, they can do that in a whole section of 12 tanks in about 20
to 30 minutes. So actually it's quite a speedy operation. They've trained very well for this. The clearance either side is 3 to 6 inches as they're driving along with these huge tanks with their sponsons on and of course with fascines above as well. There's stories of them clipping various bits and pieces, taking down communication cables as well that way. So, they get those tanks in 14 days to the form up points from those form points mainly hidden in woods camouflaged. Then it's the duty of the reconnaissance officers to actually mark out the
routes of where those tanks are going forward. Elliot Hotblack, in charge of reconnaissance for the Tank Corps and intelligence. They tend to blend those two things together. He has men going out with tape like this with a line through the middle laying out exactly, pegging out the route that those tanks will be taking forward to their startup points and then sometimes out into no man's land. But they try to keep any sort of visible activities away from the German observation and it seems to work. That's the great thing about this all these efforts. The Germans do think something's going to be happening
but they are not that concerned and it's only by the capture of a couple of prisoners just before the attack that they start believing that there may well be some numbers of tanks in the area. So by the end of 1917, the British had built up a large fleet of tanks and gained valuable experience in using them in tandem with infantry and artillery. The Battle of Cambrai would put these new methods and their German counter-methods to the test. The British attack at Cambrai began the morning November 20, with a short but heavy bombardment of German lines and artillery positions by 1000 British guns. Then the 376 tanks and infantry
following behind began to move forward towards the German lines just as they'd been trained - and the combined arms assault worked in most areas. 2nd Lieutenant Edward Leigh-Jones was surprised at how easy the initial advance was proving: "The wire didn't prove to be any obstacle at all. The artillery had done their job very well and the element of surprise - the heavy gas shelling, no preliminary bombardment at all- had made it almost a cakewalk, one might say." (Hammond 117) Once they'd driven over the wire, the tanks began to fire on the German
positions to make the infantry's job easier, as Private Eric Potten observed: "The tanks were shooting up the German trenches. Then the infantry coming on behind mopped them up." (Hammond 118) On the German side, the success of the combined arms assault was also clear, from the front line to the rear commanders. Leutnant Heinrich of the German 9th Reserve Division described the effect of the coordinated timing between artillery and tanks: "After about an hour the [artillery] fire went beating towards the rear. At once I raised the alarm. In the same moment, enemy
tanks appeared in our first line." (Hammond 120) German Field Marshal Crown Prince Rupprecht would later write about his surprise at the speed of the British advance, given the modest performance of the tanks in earlier battles: "I never expected tanks would be able to break through so fast." (Boff 190) At first, the British made swift progress, and for the first time in the war, the church bells rang out across England to signify a great victory. The cavalry was even moved up to exploit the long-awaited breakthrough. But Cambrai would not be the battle that won the
war and broke the deadlock of trench warfare on the Western Front for good. Overall, the British advance slowed and eventually stopped short of its objectives. British commanders made mistakes, there was a breakdown in coordination between infantry and tanks caused by officer casualties, half of the tanks were lost on the first day, there were not enough reserves after losses in previous battles, and the British had to send some units off to support the Italians. British infantry following the tanks also proved just as vulnerable as ever to machine gun fire, as Major Douglas Wimberley observed: "Tanks had got into both village and
wood to find them bristling with machine-guns. These did not bother the tanks, but mowed down the infantry if they tried to advance, and the Boche machine-guns were too many and well hidden for the tanks to deal with. They quietened down when the tank was near or its very limited field of vision was on them, only to fire again when it passed - very good and brave work too by the German machine-gunners." Hammond 258 Determined German resistance also helped stop the attack, including artillery and infantry units trained in anti-tank combat,
engineers who blew key bridges over canals, and fresh reserves moved up quickly by rail. German anti-tank units played a particularly important role stopping the British at Flesquieres Ridge, but the resulting legend of a single German soldier taking out multiple tanks is hard to confirm. Leutnant Fischer of the Fusilier Guard Regiment recalled how his men reacted: "We heard a strange roaring and clanking coming from the wood. Then, from out of a clearing, spitting fire and puffing smoke came a 'Male Tank'. Initially some men wanted to drop back into
the shelter of the sunken road, but they stayed put when they saw that others were holding fast. Anti-tank ammunition was brought out, a murderous rate of fire was opened and bundled grenade charges were made ready. [Flare] rockets were fired to inform our artillery about the appearance and whereabouts of the enemy. The response from the, fortunately numerous, artillery within range, was prompt and accurate." Sheldon 181 The British had broken through the Hindenburg Line, but could not get beyond it. The cavalry never swept past Cambrai as planned. Instead,
a German counterattack pushed the British back and by early December had retaken most of the ground that had been lost. To do this, the Germans used the infiltration tactics and their famous Stormtroopers - the British weren't the only ones learning. Both the British and the Germans paid a high price for successfully testing their methods: 44,000 British and between 40 and 50,000 Germans were killed, wounded or captured in just under three weeks. (Hammond 429). Mostly because of the massed use of tanks and early British success, Cambrai has been the subject of much discussion after the war. Winston Churchill even held it up
as an example of how things could have gone differently earlier in the war: "Accusing as I do without exception all the great Allied offensives of 1915, 1916 and 1917 as needless and wrongly conceived operations of infinite cost, I am bound to reply to the question, 'What else could have been done?' And I answer it, pointing to the Battle of Cambrai: 'This could have been done.'" (Hammond) Some historians have argued that the threat of tank attacks was a major German worry and caused them to waste valuable resources, which justified British losses at Cambrai. The reality was far less simple, as the
tactics of Cambrai were the result of those previous offensives and could not have been thought up out of thin air - on either side. The Germans had also shown they could achieve surprise and penetrate British defences with their stormtroopers as they had done successfully in Italy and Russia, but they didn't always draw the right conclusions about tanks. In some reports they conveniently blamed tanks for other failures, in other cases staff officers downplayed the tanks. The 3rd Guards Infantry division was not overly concerned after Cambrai: "The division does not see in tanks a weapon that can achieve the stunning success that
the enemy hopes - if the infantry behaves appropriately. For every member of the division, the initial effect of the tanks on morale has disappeared. Whether the introduction of tanks in a coming offensive of ours is necessary will depend on the quality of opposing troops and their counter-measures." (Pöhlmann 75) German Army Corps Arras was also not particularly impressed, even though they'd taken the blame for being surprised on the opening day at Cambrai: "Despite the unquestionable success of the tanks on November 20, the tanks seem to be a
very doubtful weapon that does not guarantee success, since counter-measures against them can quickly be found." (Pöhlmann 75) That same report went on to predict that the British would use tanks wherever the terrain allowed it, and that there would not be any quiet sectors of the front from now on (Pöhlmann 76). These reactions show that although the Germans had a healthy respect for the tanks ability to temporarily frighten their soldiers and achieve some tactical success, overall German commanders underestimated the weapon. It's understandable that they wouldn't have been particularly concerned after the ineffective use
of British tanks on the Somme in 1916 or at Arras in early 1917, but Cambrai should have made the tank's potential as part of combined arms war more clear. The Germans were slow to pick up on evolving British tank tactics and what these meant for 1918, and they had no idea the British were also developing more mobile light tanks to exploit success. The Battle of Cambrai did not end the war, and the tanks were not a miracle weapon that could bring about a decision on their own. But for the British, Cambrai showed what breaking the
deadlock would look like. Combined arms warfare involving artillery, air support, tanks, infantry, and cavalry working together would be the key to victory and an important sign of the evolution of warfare: a modern style of warfare that would not seem out of place in any conventional 20th century conflict. 1918 would see both sides wage war in similar fashion to how they did at Cambrai to end trench warfare in the west and determine the outcome of the First World War. Looking back over 100 years ago with the birth of combined arms warfare, it seems puzzling that the Germans initially dismissed the tank or that static warfare was
so hard to overcome. Of course, the Second World War would see entire armies of tanks play a pivotal role on all sides. But towards the end of the war, the Stellong would also rear its ugly head again. When the Red Army crossed the Oda River to take Berlin on April 16th, 1945, they had to overcome the Zo Heights and the German army in prepared defensive positions. And the fighting there has sometimes been compared to the First World War, even though the deadlock didn't last as long. And by the way, if you're interested in the Battle of Berlin,
we made a 4 and 1/2 hour documentary series about it called 16 Days in Berlin. And of course, we cover the Battle of the Zo Heights in the series, but also much more. Fortunately, we couldn't upload this documentary series to YouTube because our uncompromising portrayal of the Second World War would violate their content guidelines. Instead, you can watch 16 Days in Berlin on Nebula, a streaming service that we built together with other creators and where we don't have to worry about advertisers. We want to thank David Willie and the Tank
Museum for their help with this episode. If you want to learn more about the Battle of Comre, check out the Tank Museum's documentary filmed on the actual battlefield and featuring more veteran accounts. You can find it over on their YouTube channel. I'm Jesse Alexander and this is a production of Real Time History, the only YouTube history channel with a gibbalta ladom of history.
